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
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
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
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












See them p. 324-325.

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
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THE FOURTH EDITION
REVISED AND CORRECTED

L O N D O N,

Printed for C. NOURSE, in the Strand.

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NOV 1931
OLIVER
VIAZELLI

To the Right Honourable
PHILIP Lord HARDWICKE,
Lord High Chancellor of *Great-
Britain**.

My Lord,

AS no one has exercised the Powers of Speech with juster and more universal applause, than yourself; I have presumed to inscribe the following Treatise to your Lordship, its End being to investigate the Principles of those Powers. It has a farther claim to your Lordship's Patronage, by being connected in some degree with that politer Literature, which, in the most important scenes

A₂ of

* The above Dedication is printed as it originally stood, the Author being desirous that what he intended as real Respect to the noble Lord, when living, should now be considered, as a Testimony of Gratitude to his Memory.

DEDICATION.

of Business, you have still found time to cultivate. With regard to myself, if what I have written be the fruits of that Security and Leisure, obtained by living under a mild and free Government; to whom for this am I more indebted, than to your Lordship, whether I consider you as a Legislator, or as a Magistrate, the first both in dignity and reputation? Permit me therefore thus publicly to assure your Lordship, that with the greatest gratitude and respect I am, My Lord,

*Your Lordship's most obliged,
and most obedient humble Servant,*

*Closet of Salisbury,
Oct. 1, 1751.*

James Harris.

P R E F A C E.

THE chief End, proposed by the Author of this Treatise in making it public, has been to excite his Readers to curiosity and inquiry; not to teach them himself by prolix and formal Lectures, (from the efficacy of which he has little expectation) but to induce them, if possible, to become Teachers to themselves, by an impartial use of their own understandings. He thinks nothing more absurd than the common notion of Instruction, as if Science were to be poured into the Mind, like water into a cistern, that passively waits to receive all that comes. The growth of Knowledge he rather thinks to resemble the growth of Fruit; however external causes may in some degree co-operate, it is the internal vigour, and virtue of

the tree, that must ripen the juices to their just maturity.

This then, namely, the exciting men to inquire for themselves into subjects worthy of their contemplation, this the Author declares to have been his first and principal motive for appearing in print. Next to that, as he has always been a lover of Letters, he would willingly approve his studies to the liberal and ingenuous. He has particularly named these, in distinction to others; because, as his studies were never prosecuted with the least regard to lucre, so they are no way calculated for any lucrative End. The liberal therefore and ingenuous (whom he has mentioned already) are those, to whose perusal he offers what he has written. Should they judge favourably of his attempt, he may not perhaps hesitate to confess,

Hoc juvat et melli est.—

For

*For tho' he hopes he cannot be charged
with the foolish love of vain Praise,
he has no desire to be thought indif-
ferent, or insensible to honest Fame.*

*From the influence of these senti-
ments, he has endeavoured to treat his
subject with as much order, correct-
ness, and perspicuity as in his power ;
and if he has failed, he can safely
say (according to the vulgar phrase)
that the failure has been his misfor-
tune, and not his fault. He scorns
those trite and contemptible methods
of anticipating pardon for a bad per-
formance, that " it was the hasty
fruits of a few idle hours ; written
merely for private amusement ;
never revised ; published against
consent, at the importunity of
friends, copies (God knows how)
having by stealth gotten abroad ;"
with other stale jargon of equal fals-
hood and inanity. May we not ask
such Prefacers, If what they allege*

be true, what has the world to do with them and their crudities ?

As to the Book itself, it can say this in its behalf, that it does not merely confine itself to what its title promises, but expatiates freely into whatever is collateral ; aiming on every occasion to rise in its inquiries, and to pass, as far as possible, from small matters to the greatest. Nor is it formed merely upon sentiments that are now in fashion, or supported only by such authorities as are modern. Many Authors are quoted, that now-a-days are but little studied ; and some perhaps, whose very names are hardly known.

The Fate indeed of antient Authors (as we have happened to mention them) is not unworthy of our notice. A few of them survive in the Libraries of the learned, where some venerable Folio, that still goes by their name, just

P R E F A C E.

just suffices to give them a kind of nominal existence. The rest have long fallen into a deeper obscurity, their very names, when mentioned, affecting us as little, as the names, when we read them, of those subordinate Heroes,

Alcandrumque, Haliumque, Nemonaque, Prytanimque.

Now if an Author, not content with the more eminent of ancient Writers, should venture to bring his reader into such company as these last, among people (in the fashionable phrase) that nobody knows; what usage, what quarter can he have reason to expect? Should the Author of these speculations have done this (and it is to be feared he has) what method had he best take in a circumstance so critical? — Let us suppose him to apologize in the best manner he can, and in consequence of this, to suggest as follows—

He

P R E F A C E.

He hopes there will be found a pleasure in the contemplation of ancient sentiments, as the view of ancient Architecture, tho' in ruins, has something venerable. Add to this, what from its antiquity is but little known, has from that very circumstance the recommendation of novelty; so that here, as in other instances, Extremes may be said to meet. Farther still, as the Authors, whom he has quoted, lived in various ages, and in distant countries; some in the full maturity of Grecian and Roman Literature; some in its declension; and others in periods still more barbarous, and depraved; it may afford perhaps no unpleasing speculation, to see how the SAME REASON has at all times prevailed; how there is ONE TRUTH, like one Sun, that has enlightened human Intelligence through every age, and saved it from the darkness both of Sophistry and Error.

Nothing

Nothing can more tend to enlarge the Mind, than these extensive views of Men, and human Knowledge ; nothing can more effectually take us off from the foolish admiration of what is immediately before our eyes, and help us to a juster estimate both of present Men, and present Literature.

It is perhaps too much the case with the multitude in every nation, that as they know little beyond themselves, and their own affairs, so out of this narrow sphere of knowledge, they think nothing worth knowing. As we BRITONS by our situation live divided from the whole world, this perhaps will be found to be more remarkably our case. And hence the reason, that our studies are usually satisfied in the works of our own Countrymen ; that in Philosophy, in Poetry, in every kind of subject, whether serious or ludicrous, whether sacred or profane, we think per-

*perfection with ourselves, and that it
is superfluous to search farther.*

*The Author of this Treatise would
by no means detract from the just
honours due to those of his Country-
men, who either in the present, or
preceding age, have so illustriously
adorned it. But tho' he can with
pleasure and sincerity join in celebra-
ting their deserts, he would not have
the admiration of these, or of any
other few, to pass thro' blind excess
into a contempt of all others. Were
such Admiration to become universal,
an odd event would follow; a few
learned Men, without any fault of
their own, would contribute in a man-
ner to the extinction of Letters.*

*A like evil to that of admiring
only the authors of our own age, is
that of admiring only the authors of
one particular Science. There is in-
deed in this last prejudice something
pecu-*

peculiarly unfortunate, and that is, the more excellent the Science, the more likely it will be found to produce this effect.

There are few Sciences more intrinsically valuable, than MATHEMATICS. It is hard indeed to say, to which they have more contributed, whether to the Utilities of Life, or to the sublimest parts of Science. They are the noblest Praxis of LOGIC, or UNIVERSAL REASONING. It is thro' them we may perceive, how the stated Forms of Syllogism are exemplified in one Subject, namely the Predicament of Quantity. By marking the force of these Forms, as they are applied here, we may be enabled to apply them of ourselves elsewhere. Nay farther still—by viewing the MIND, during its process in these syllogistic employments, we may come to know in part, what kind of Being it is; since MIND, like other Powers, can-

be only known from its Operations. Whoever therefore will study Mathematics in this view, will become not only by Mathematics a more expert Logician, and by Logic a more rational Mathematician, but a wiser Philosopher, and an acuter Reasoner, in all the possible subjects either of science or deliberation.

But when Mathematics, instead of being applied to this excellent purpose, are used not to exemplify Logic, but to supply its place; no wonder if Logic pass into contempt, and if Mathematics, instead of furthering science, become in fact an obstacle. For when men, knowing nothing of that Reasoning which is universal, come to attach themselves for years to a single Species, a species wholly involved in Lines and Numbers only; they grow insensibly to believe these last as inseparable from all Reasoning, as the poor Indians thought.

every horseman to be inseparable from his borse.

And thus we see the use, nay the necessity of enlarging our literary views, lest even Knowledge itself should obstruct its own growth, and perform in some measure the part of ignorance and barbarity.

Such then is the Apology made by the Author of this Treatise, for the multiplicity of antient quotations, with which he has filled his Book. If he can excite in his readers a proper spirit of curiosity; if he can help in the least degree to enlarge the bounds of Science; to revive the decaying taste of antient Literature; to lessen the bigotted contempt of every thing not modern; and to assert to Authors of every age their just portion of esteem; if he can in the least degree contribute to these ends, he hopes it may be allowed, that he has done a service

Service to mankind. Should this service be a reason for his Work to survive, he has confess already, it would be no unpleasing event. Should the contrary happen, he must acquiesce in its fate, and let it peaceably pass to those destined regions, whither the productions of modern Wit are every day passing,

—*in vicum vendentem tus et
odores.*

A D V E R T I S E M E N T.

The Reader is desired to take notice, that as often as the author quotes V. I. p. &c. he refers to Three Treatises published first in one Volume, Octavo, in the year 1745.

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E R R A T A.

Page 80, line 17, for *υποτάξιον*, read *υποτάξιαν*.

131, Note, l. 1, for *Roman*, read *Români*.

252, l. 2 from the bottom, for *An*, read *And*.

328, l. 3 from the bottom, for *ογγαραν*, read *ογγαρον*.

332, l. last, for *i*, read *it*.

369, Note, l. 15, for *uncleaving*, read *unceasing*.

384, Note, l. 4, for *οιδε πε*, read *οιδη πε*.

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*An Account of the Arabic Manuscripts be-
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Second, *Concerning the Manuscripts of Livy,
in the same Library.* Third, *Concerning the
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HERMES

OR A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY
CONCERNING UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR.

BOOK I.

CHAP. I.

INTRODUCTION.

Design of the Whole.

IF Men by nature had been framed for Solitude, they had never felt an Impulse to converse one with another: And if, like lower Animals, they had been by nature irrational, they could not have recognized the proper Subjects of Discourse. Since SPEECH then is the joint Energie of our best and noblest Faculties (a), (that is to say, of our Reason

B

son

(a) See V. I. p. 147 to 169. See also Note xv. p. 292, and Note xix. p. 296, of the same Volume.

Ch. I. *son and our social Affection) being withal our peculiar Ornament and Distinction, as Men;* those Inquiries may surely be deemed interesting as well as liberal, which either search how SPEECH may be naturally *resolved*; or how, when resolved, it may be again *combined*.

HERE a large field for speculating opens before us. We may either behold SPEECH, as divided into *its constituent Parts*, as a Statue may be divided into its several Limbs; or else, as resolved into its *Matter* and *Form*, as the same Statue may be resolved into its Marble and Figure.

THESE different *Analyſings* or *Resolutions* constitute what we call (b) PHILOSOPHICAL, OR UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR.

WHEN

(b) Grammaticam *etiam bipartitam ponemus, ut alia fit literaria, alia philosophica, &c.* Bacon, *de Augm. Scient.* VI. 1. And soon after he adds—*Verum tamen hæc iſſa re moniti, cogitatione complexi sumus Grammaticam quandam, quæ non analogiam verborum ad invicem, sed analogiam inter verba et res frue rationem sedulū inquirat.*

WHEN we have viewed SPEECH thus analysed, we may then consider it, as compounded. And here in the first place we may contemplate that (c) *Syntesis*, which *by combining simple Terms* produces a *Truth*; then *by combining two Truths* produces a *third*; and thus others, and others, in continued Demonstration, till we are led, as by a road, into the regions of SCIENCE.

Now this is that *superior* and most excellent *Synthesis*, which alone applies itself to our *Intellect* or *Reason*, and which to

B 2 conduct

(c) Aristotle says—τῶν δὲ καὶ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων οὐδὲν ἔτει ἀληθὲς ἔτει φευδός ἐστιν· τοῖον ἀνθρωπῷ, λεῦκῷ, τρέχει, νικᾷ—Of those words which are spoken without Connection, there is no one either true or false; as for instance, *Man*, *white*, *runneth*, *conquereth*. Cat. C. 4. So again in the beginning of his Treatise *De Interpretatione*, περὶ γὰρ σύνθεσιν καὶ διάίρεσιν ἐστι τὸ φευδός τε καὶ τὸ ἀληθές. *True and False are seen in Composition and Division.* Composition makes affirmative Truth, Division makes negative, yet both alike bring Terms together, and so far therefore may be called synthetical.

Ch. I. ~~conduct~~ according to Rule, constitutes
the Art of LOGIC.

AFTER this we may turn to those
(d) *inferior* Compositions, which are pro-
ductive

(d) *Ammonius* in his Comment on the Treatise
Περὶ Ερμηνείας, p. 53, gives the following Extract
from *Theophrastus*, which is here inserted at length, as
well for the Excellence of the Matter, as because it is
not (I believe) elsewhere extant.

Διτῆς γὰρ ἔστι τῇ λόγῳ σχέσεως, (καθ' ἀδιώριστεν
ὁ φιλόσοφος Θεόφραστος)¹ τῆς τε ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΥΣ
ΑΚΡΟΩΜΕΝΟΥΣ, οἵς καὶ σημαίνει τί, καὶ τῆς
ΠΡΟΣ ΤΑ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΑ, ὑπὲρ ὃν ὁ λέγων τεί-
σαι προτίθηται τὰς ἀκροωμένας, τερὶ μὲν ἐν τὴν σχέ-
σιν ἀντὶ τὴν ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΥΣ ΑΚΡΟΑΤΑΣ καλα-
γίνοιται ποιητικὴ καὶ ῥητορικὴ, διότι ἔργον ἀνταῖς ἐκλέ-
γεσθαι τὰ σεμνότερα τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ κοινὰ
καὶ δεδημευμένα, καὶ ταῦτα ἐναρμονίως συμπλέκειν ἀλ-
λήλους, ὡς διὰ τέτων καὶ τῶν τέτοις ἐπομένων, οἷον
σαφνείας, γλυκύτητος, καὶ τῶν ἀλλων ἴδεων, ἐτι τε μα-
κρολογίας, καὶ βραχυλογίας, καὶ καὶ καιρὸν πάντων πα-
ραλαμβανομένων, οἵσαι τε τὸν ἀκροατὴν, καὶ ἐκπλῆξαι.
καὶ πρὸς τὴν πείθω χειρωθέντα ἔχειν τῆς δέ γέ ΠΡΟΣ
ΤΑ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΑ, τῇ λόγῳ σχέσεως ὁ φιλόσοφος
προηγμένως ἐπιμελήσειαι, τό, τε ψεῦδος διελέγχων,

BOOK THE FIRST.

5

ductive of the *Pathetic*, and the *Pleasant* in all their kinds. These latter Com-
positions

Ch. I.

τὸ τὸ αληθὶς ἀποδεικνύει. The Relation of Speech being twofold (as the Philosopher Theophrastus hath settled it) one to the HEARERS, to whom it explains something, and one to the THINGS, concerning which the Speaker proposes to persuade his Hearers: With respect to the first Relation, that which regards the HEARERS, are employed Poetry and Rhetoric. Thus it becomes the business of these two, to select the most respectable Words, and not those that are common and of vulgar use, and to connect such Words harmoniously one with another, so as thro' these things and their consequences, such as Perspicuity, Delicacy, and the other Forms of Eloquence, together with Copiousness and Brevity, all employed in their proper season, to lead the Hearer, and strike him, and hold him vanquished by the power of Persuasion. On the contrary, as to the Relation of Speech to THINGS, here the Philosopher will be found to have a principal employ, as well in refuting the False, as in demonstrating the True.

Sanctius speaks elegantly on the same Subject. Creavit Deus hominem rationis participem; cui, quia Sociabilem esse voluit, magno pro munere dedit Seminem. Sermoni autem perficiendo tres opifices adhibuit. Prima est Grammatica, quae ab oratione sollicitos & barbarismos expellit; secunda Dialectica, quae in Sermonis veritate versatur; tertia Rhetorica, quae ornatum Sermonis tantum exquirit. Min. l. 1.

§. 2.

B 3

Ch. I. positions aspire not to the Intellect, but
being addressed to the *Imagination*, the
Affections, and the *Sense*, become from
their different heightnings either RHE-
TORIC or POETRY.

Nor need we necessarily view these Arts distinctly and apart; we may observe, if we please, how perfectly they co-incide. GRAMMAR is equally requisite to every one of the rest. And though LOGIC may indeed subsist without RHE-TORIC or POETRY, yet so necessary to these last is a sound and correct LOGIC, that without it, they are no better than warbling Trifles.

Now all these Inquiries (as we have said already) and such others arising from them as are of still sublimer Contemplation, (of which in the Sequel there may be possibly not a few) may with justice be deemed Inquiries both interesting and liberal.

AT

At present we shall postpone the whole Ch. I.
 synthetical Part, (that is to say, *Logic* and
Rhetoric) and confine ourselves to the
 analytical, that is to say, **UNIVERSAL
 GRAMMAR.** In this we shall follow
 the Order, that we have above laid down,
 first dividing **SPEECH**, as a **WHOLE**, into
 its **CONSTITUENT PARTS**; then resolving
 it, as a **COMPOSITE**, into its **MATTER**
 and **FORM**; two Methods of Analysis
 very different in their kind, and which
 lead to a variety of very different Specu-
 lations.

SHOULD any one object, that in the
 course of our Inquiry we sometimes de-
 scend to things, which appear trivial and
 low; let him look upon the effects, to
 which those things contribute, then from
 the Dignity of the Consequences, let him
 honour the Principles.

THE following Story may not impro-
 perly be here inserted. "When the Fame

Ch. I. " of *Heraclitus* was celebrated through-
 " out *Greece*, there were certain persons,
 " that had a curiosity to see so great a
 " Man. They came, and, as it happen-
 " ed, found him warming himself in a
 " Kitchen. The meanness of the place
 " occasioned them to stop; upon which
 " the Philosopher thus accosted them—
 " ENTER (says he) BOLDLY, FOR HERE
 " TOO THERE ARE GODS (ε)."

We shall only add, that as there is no part of Nature too mean for the Divine Presence; so there is no kind of Subject, having its foundation in Nature, that is below the Dignity of a philosophical Inquiry.

(ε) See *Aristot. de Part. Animal.* l. 1. c. 5.

BOOK THE FIRST,

9

C H A P. II.

*Concerning the Analyzing of Speech into its
smallest Parts.*

THOSE things, which are *first to Nature*, are not *first to Man*. *Nature* begins from *Causes*, and thence descends to *Effects*. *Human Perceptions* first open upon *Effects*, and thence by slow degrees ascend to *Causes*. Often had Mankind seen the Sun in Eclipse, before they knew its Cause to be the Moon's Interposition; much oftner had they seen those unceasing Revolutions of Summer and Winter, of Day and Night, before they knew the Cause to be the Earth's double Motion (a).

Ch. II.

Even

(a) This Distinction of *first to Man*, and *first to Nature*, was greatly regarded in the Peripatetic Philosophy. See *Arist. Phys. Auctul.* l. 1. c. 1. *Themistius's* Comment on the same, *Posterior. Analyt.* l. 1. c. 2. *De Anima*, l. 2. c. 2. It leads us, when properly regarded, to a very important Distinction between

Ch. II. Even in Matters of Art and *human Creation*, if we except a few Artists and critical

tween Intelligence *Divine* and Intelligence *Human*. God may be said to view the First, as first; and the Last, as last; that is, he views *Effects* thro' *Causes* in their *natural Order*. MAN views the Last, as first; and the First, as last; that is, he views *Causes* thro' *Effects*, in an *inverse Order*. And hence the Meaning of that Passage in *Aristotle*: ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰ τῶν νυκτερίων ὅμιλα πρὸς τὸ φύγειν τὸ μεθ' ἡμέραν, ὅπως καὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς ὁ Νῦς πρὸς τὰ τῆς φύσει φανερώτατα πάνταν. *As are the Eyes of Bats to the Light of the Day, so is Man's Intelligence to those Objects, that are by Nature the brightest and most conspicuous of all Things.* Metaph. I. 2. c. 1. See also I. 7. c. 4. and *Ethic. Nicom.* I. I. c. 4. Ammonius, reasoning in the same way, says very pertinently to the Subject of this Treatise—Αγαπητὸν τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει, ἐκ τῶν ἀτελεστῶν καὶ συνθέτων ἐπὶ τὰ ἀπλάντερα καὶ τελεότερα προΐέναι· τὰ γὰρ σύνθετα μᾶλλον συνήθη ἡμῖν, καὶ γνωριμώτερο· "Οὐτω γένι καὶ ὁ παῖς εἴραι μὲν λόγου, καὶ ἐιπεῖν, Σωκράτης περιπάλεῖ, οἴδετῶν δὲ ἀναλύσαι εἰς ὄντας καὶ ψῆμα, καὶ ταῦτα εἰς συλλαβάς, κακεῖνα εἴς σοιχεῖα, ὡκέτι" *Human Nature may be well contented to advance from the more imperfect and complex to the more simple and perfect; for the complex Subjects are more familiar to us, and better known.* Thus therefore it is that even a Child knows how to put a Sentence together, and say, Socrates

tical Observers, the rest look no higher Ch. II. than to the *Practice* and mere *Work*, knowing nothing of those *Principles*, on which the whole depends.

Thus in SPEECH for example—All men, even the lowest, can speak their Mother-Tongue. Yet how many of this multitude can neither write, nor even read? How many of those, who are thus far literate, know nothing of that Grammar, which respects the Genius of their own Language? How few then must be those, who know GRAMMAR UNIVERSAL; that Grammar, which without regarding the several Idioms of particular Languages, *only respects those Principles, that are essential to them all?*

"Tis our present Design to inquire about this Grammar; in doing which we shall

walketh; but how to resolve this Sentence into a Noun and Verb, and these again into Syllables, and Syllables into Letters or Elements, here he is at a loss. Am. in Com. de Prædic. p. 29.

Ch. II. shall follow the Order consonant to *human Perception*, as being for that reason the more easy to be understood.

We shall begin therefore first from a *Period* or *Sentence*, that combination in Speech, which is obvious to all, and thence pass, if possible, to those its *primary Parts*, which, however essential, are only obvious to a few.

WITH respect therefore to the different Species of Sentences, who is there so ignorant, as if we address him in his Mother-Tongue, not to know when 'tis we *assert*, and when we *question*; when 'tis we *command*, and when we *pray* or *wish*?

FOR example, when we read in *Shakespeare**,

*The Man, that bath no music in himself;
And is not mov'd with concord of sweet
ounds,
Is fit for Treasons*—

Or

* Merchant of *Venice*.

BOOK THE FIRST.

13

Or in Milton *,

Ch. II.

*O Friends, I hear the tread of nimble
feet,
Hastening this way—*

'tis obvious that these are *assertive Sentences*, one founded upon Judgment, the other upon Sensation.

WHEN the Witch in *Macbeth* says to her Companions,

*When shall we three meet again
In thunder, lightning, and in rain?*

this 'tis evident is an *interrogative Sentence*.

WHEN *Macbeth* says to the Ghost of Banquo,

*—Hence, horrible Shadow,
Unreal Mock'ry hence!—*

he speaks an *imperative Sentence*, founded upon the passion of hatred.

WHEN

* P. L. IV. 866.

Ch. II. WHEN Milton says in the character of his *Allegro*,

*Haste thee, Nymph, and bring with thee
Fest and youthful Jollity,*

he too speaks an *imperative Sentence*, tho' founded on the passion, not of hatred but of love.

WHEN in the beginning of the *Paradise Lost* we read the following address,

*And chiefly thou, O Spirit, that dost prefer
Before all temples th' upright heart, and
pure,
Instruct me, for thou know'st—*

this is not to be called an *imperative Sentence*, tho' perhaps it bear the same Form, but rather (if I may use the Word) 'tis a Sentence *precative* or *optative*.

WHAT then shall we say? Are Sentences to be quoted in this manner without ceasing, all differing from each other in their

their stamp and character? Are they no Ch.II.
way reducible to certain definite Classes? If not, they can be no objects of *rational*
comprehension.—Let us however try.

'Tis a phrase often applied to a man, when speaking, that *he speaks his MIND*; as much as to say, that his Speech or Discourse is *a publishing of some Energie or Motion of his Soul*. So it indeed is in every one that speaks, excepting alone the Dissembler or Hypocrite; and he too, as far as possible, affects the appearance.

Now the POWERS OF THE SOUL (over and above the meer † nutritive) may be included all of them in those of PERCEPTION, and those of VOLITION. By the Powers of PERCEPTION, I mean the *Senses* and the *Intellect*; by the Powers of VOLITION, I mean, in an extended sense, not only the *Will*, but the several *Passions* and *Appetites*; in short, *all that moves to Action, whether rational or irrational*.

IP

† Vid. Aristot. de An. II. 4.

Ch.II. If then the leading Powers of the Soul
be these two, 'tis plain that every Speech
or Sentence, as far as it exhibits the Soul,
must of course respect one or other of
these.

If we *assert*, then is it a Sentence which
respects the Powers of PERCEPTION. For
what indeed is to *assert*, if we consider the
examples above alleged, but *to publish*
some Perception either of the Senses or
the Intellect?

AGAIN, if we *interrogate*, if we *com-mand*, if we *pray*, or if we *wish*, (which
in terms of Art is to speak Sentences *in-terrogative*, *imperative*, *precative*, or *op-tative*) what do we but publish so many
different VOLITIONS?—For who is it that
questions? He that has a *Desire* to be in-
formed.—Who is it that *commands*? He
that has a *Will*, which he would have
obey'd.—What are those Beings, who
either *wish* or *pray*? Those, who feel
certain

certain wants either for themselves, or Ch. II.
others.

IF then the *Soul's leading Powers* be the two above mentioned, and it be true that *all Speech is a publication of these Powers*, it will follow that **EVERY SENTENCE WILL BE EITHER A SENTENCE OF ASSERTION, OR A SENTENCE OF VIGATION.** And thus, by referring all of them to one of these two classes, have we found an expedient to reduce their infinitude (b).

THE

(b) Πηλέον δν ὅτι τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἡμετέρας διτίας ἔχεται δυνάμεις, τὰς μὲν γνωσικὰς, τὰς δὲ ζωτικὰς, τὰς καὶ ὀρεκτικὰς λεγομένας. (λέγω δὲ γνωσικὰς μὲν, καθ' ἃς γινώσκομεν ἔκαστον τῶν ὄντων, οἷον νῦν, διανοιαν, δόξαν, φαντασίαν καὶ αἰσθησιν ὀρεκτικὰς δὲ, καθ' ἃς ὀρεγόμεθα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ή τῶν ὄντων, ή τῶν δοκάντων, οἷον βιάλησι λέγω, προαιρεσιν, θυμὸν, καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν) τὰ MEN τέτλαρα εἴδη τῷ λόγῳ (τὰ παρὰ τὸν ἀποφαντικὸν) ἀπὸ τῶν ὀρεκτικῶν δυνάμεων προέρχονται τῆς ψυχῆς, ψκ ἀυτῆς καθ' ἀυτὴν ἐνεργέστης, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἔτερον ἀποτεινομένης (τὸν συμβάλλεσθαι δοκάντα πρὸς τὸ τυχεῖν τῆς ὀρέκεως) καὶ ἦτοι λόγου παρὰ αὐτῆς

Ch.II. THE Extensions of Speech are quite
indefinite, as may be seen if we compare
the

ζητεόντες, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῷ ΠΤΣΜΑΤΙΚΟΤ ἡ
ΕΡΩΤΗΜΑΤΙΚΟΤ καλεμένης λόγυς, ἢ ὡρᾶγμα,
ἢ εἰς ὡρᾶγμα, ἢ τοις ἀντί ἐκείνης τυχεῖν ἐφιεμένης, ὡρὸς
ἢν ὁ λόγος, ἀσπερ ἐπὶ τῷ ΚΛΗΤΙΚΟΤ, ἢ τινὸς
ταρ' ἀντί ὡρᾶξεως· ἢ τάυτης, ἢ ὡς ταρὰ χρείτονος,
ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς ΕΤΧΗΣ, ἢ ὡς ταρὰ χείρονος, ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς
χυρίως καλεμένης ΠΡΟΣΤΑΞΕΩΣ· μόνον ΔΕ τὸ
ΑΠΟΦΑΝΤΙΚΟΝ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωσικῶν, ἢ ἐσι τῷ
ἔξαγελτικὸν τῆς γενομένης ἐν ἡμῖν γνώσεως τῶν ὡραγ-
μάτων ἀληθῶς, ἢ φανομένως, διὸ ἢ μόνον τέτο δεκι-
κόν ἐσιν ἀληθείας ἢ ψεύδεις, τῶν δὲ ἀλλων ἀδέν. The
Meaning of the above passage being implied in the
Text, we take its translation from the *Latin Interpreter*. *Dicendum igitur est, cum anima nostra duplicitate*
potestatem habeat, cognitionis, & uitæ, quæ etiam appeti-
tionis ac cupiditatis appellatur, quæ vero cognitionis est,
vis est, quæ res singulas cognoscimus, ut mens, cogitatio,
opinio, phantasia, sensus: appetitus vero facultas est, quæ
bona, vel quæ sunt, vel quæ videntur, concupiscimus, ut
sunt voluntas, consilium, ira, cupiditas: quatuor orationis
species, præter enunciantem, a partibus animi proficiuntur,
quæ concupiscunt; non cum animus ipse per se agit,
sed cum ad alium se convertit, qui ei ad consequendum id,
quod cuius, conducere posse videatur; atque etiam vel ra-
tionem ab eo exquirit, ut in oratione, quam Percunctan-
tem.

the Eneid to an Epigram of *Martial*. But Ch. II. the *longest Extension*, with which Grammar has to do, is the Extension here considered, that is to say, a SENTENCE. The greater Extensions (such as Syllogisms, Paragraphs, Sections, and complete Works) belong not to Grammar, but to Arts of higher order; not to mention that all of them are but Sentences repeated.

Now a SENTENCE (*c*) may be sketch'd in the following description—*a compound*

C 2

Quantity

tem, aut Interrogantem vocant; vel rem: siue rem, vel cum ipsum consequi cupit, quicum loquitur, ut in optante oratione, vel aliquam ejus actionem: atque in hac, vel ut a praestantiore, ut in Deprecatione; vel ut ab inferiore, ut in ea, qui proprie Jussus nominatur. Sola autem Enuncians a cognoscendi facultate proficitur: haecque nunciat rerum cognitionem, que in nobis est, aut veram, aut simulatam. Itaque Haec sola verum falsumque capit: praeterea vero nulla. Ammon. in Libr. de Interpretatione.

(c) Λόγῳ δὲ φωνὴ συνθετὴ σημαντικὴ, τὸς ἔνος μέρην καθ' αὐτὰ σημαίνει τι. Arist. Poet. c. 20.
See also de Interpret. c. 4.

Ch. II. *Quantity of Sound significant, of which certain Parts are themselves also significant.*

THUS when I say [*the Sun shineth*] not only the *whole quantity* of sound has a meaning, but *certain Parts* also, such as [*Sun*] and [*shineth*.]

BUT what shall we say? Have these Parts again other Parts, which are in like manner significant, and so may the progress be pursued to infinite? Can we suppose all Meaning, like Body, to be divisible, and to include within itself other Meanings without end? If this be absurd, then must we necessarily admit, that there is such a thing as *a Sound significant, of which no Part is of itself significant*. And this is what we call the proper character of a (*d*) WORD. For thus, though the Words

(d) Φωνὴ σημαντικὴ, — τὸ μέρες δὲν εἰς καθ' αὐτὸν σημαντικόν. De Poetic. c. 20. De Interpret. c. 2 & 3. Priscian's Definition of a Word (Lib. 2.) is as follows

Words [*Sun*] and [*shineth*] have each a Ch. II.
Meaning, yet is there certainly no Meaning
in any of their Parts, neither in the
Syllables of the one, nor in the Letters of
the other.

If therefore ALL SPEECH, whether in
prose or verse, every Whole, every Section,
every Paragraph, every Sentence,
imply a certain Meaning, *divisible into
other Meanings*, but WORDS imply a
Meaning, *which is not so divisible*: it fol-
lows that WORDS will be the *smallest parts
of speech*, in as much as nothing less has
any Meaning at all.

C 3

To

follows—*Dicitio est pars minima orationis construenda, id
est, in ordine compositæ. Pars autem, quantum ad totum
intelligendum, id est, ad totius sensus intellectum. Hoc
autem, ideo dictum est, ne quis conetur vires in duas partes
dividere, hoc est, in vi & res; non enim ad totum intelligi-
endum hæc sit divisio.* To Priscian we may add Theodo-
dore Gaza.—Λέξις δὲ, μέρος ἐλάχιστον κατὰ σύνταξιν
λόγια. Introd. Gram. l. 4. Plato shewed them this
characteristic of a Word—See *Oratylus*, p. 385. Edjt.
Serr.

Ch. II. *To know therefore the species of Words,*
must needs contribute to the knowledge of
Speech, as it implies a knowledge of its
minutest Parts.

THIS therefore must become our next
Inquiry.

C H A P. III.

*Concerning the species of Words, the smallest
Parts of Speech.*

LE T us first search for the *Species* Ch.III. of Words among those Parts of *Speech*, commonly received by Grammarians. For example, in one of the passages above cited.—

*The Man, that hath no music in himself,
And is not mov'd with concord of sweet
sounds,
Is fit for treasons—*

Here the Word [*The*] is an **ARTICLE**;— [*Man*] [*No*] [*Music*] [*Concord*] [*Sweet*] [*Sounds*] [*Fit*] [*Treasons*] are all **NOUNS**, some **Substantive**, and some **Adjective**— [*That*] and [*Himself*] are **PRONOUNS**— [*Hath*] and [*is*] are **VERBS**— [*moved*] a **PARTICIPLE**— [*Not*] an **ADVERB**— [*And*] a **CONJUNCTION**— [*In*] [*with*]

C 4 and

Ch. III. and [For] are PREPOSITIONS. In one ~~one~~ sentence we have all those Parts of Speech, which the *Greek* Grammarians are found to acknowledge. The *Latin*s only differ in having no Article, and in separating the INTERJECTION, as a Part of itself, which the *Greeks* include among the Species of *Adverbs*.

WHAT then shall we determine? why are there not more Species of Words? why so many? or if neither more nor fewer, why these and not others?

To resolve, if possible, these several Queries, let us examine any Sentence that comes in our way, and see what differences we can discover in its Parts. For example, the same Sentence above,

The Man that hath no Music, &c.

ONE Difference soon occurs, that some Words are *variable*, and others *invariable*. Thus the Word *Man* may be varied into *Man's* and *Men*; *Hath*, into *Have*, *Hast*, *Had*,

*Had, &c. Sweet into Sweeter and Sweet-
est; Fit into Fitter and Fittest.* On the ~~contrary~~
contrary, the Words, *The, In, And*, and
some others, remain as they are, and *can-
not be altered*.

AND yet it may be questioned, how far this Difference is essential. For in the first place, there are Variations, which can be hardly called necessary, because only some Languages have them, and others have them not. Thus the *Greeks* have the *dual* Variation, which is unknown both to the Moderns and to the ancient *Latins*. Thus the *Greeks* and *Latins* vary their Adjectives by the *triple Variation* of Gender, Case, and Number; whereas the *English* never vary them in any of those ways, but thro' all kinds of Concord preserve them still the same. Nay even those very Variations, which appear most necessary, may have their places supplied by other methods; some by *Auxiliars*, as when *for Brutus*, or *Bruto*, we say, *of Brutus*, to *Brutus*;

Ch.III. *Brutus*; some by meer Position, as when for ~~Brutum~~ *Brutum amavit Cassius*, we say, *Cassius lov'd Brutus*. For here the *Accusative*, which in *Latin* is known *any where* from its *Variation*, is in *English* only known from its *Position* or place.

If then the Distinction of Variable and Invariable will not answer our purpose, let us look farther for some other more essential.

SUPPOSE then we should dissolve the Sentence above cited, and view its several *Parts* as they stand *separate* and detached. Some 'tis plain *still preserve a Meaning* (such as *Man*, *Music*, *Sweet*, &c.) others on the contrary *immediately lose it* (such as, *And*, *The*, *With*, &c.) Not that these last have no meaning at all, but in fact they never have it, but when *in company*, or *associated*.

Now it should seem that this Distinction, if any, was essential. For all Words

Words are significant, or else they would Ch.III.
not be Words; and if every thing not *absolute*,
is of course *relative*, then will all
Words be significant either *absolutely* or
relatively.

WITH respect therefore to this Distinction, the first sort of Words may be call'd *significant by themselves*; the latter may be call'd *significant by relation*; or if we like it better, the first sort may be call'd *Principals*, the latter *Accessories*. The first are like those stones in the basis of an Arch, which are able to support themselves, even when the Arch is destroyed; the latter are like those stones in its Summit or Curve, which can no longer stand, than while the whole subsists (e).

§ THIS

(e) *Apollonius of Alexandria* (one of the acutest Authors that ever wrote on the subject of Grammar) illustrates the different power of Words, by the different power of Letters. "Ετι, ὅν τρόπον τῶν σοιχείων τὰ μέν ἰσι φωνήεστα, ἀ τὸν καθ' ἵαντα φωνὴν ἀποτελεῖ"

Ch.III. § This Distinction being admitted, we
 thus pursue our Speculations. All things
 what-

τὰ δὲ σύμφωνα, ἀπέρ ἀνευ τῶν φωνέων ἐκ ἔχει ῥητὴν
 τὴν ἐκφώνησιν. τὸν ἀυτὸν τρόπον ἐσὶν ἐπινοῆσαι καὶ πὶ^τ
 τῶν λέξεων. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀντίτινοι, τρόπον τινὰ τῶν φωνέω-
 των, ῥηταὶ ἔστι· καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ῥημάτων, ὄνομάτων,
 ἀντωνυμιῶν, ἐπιρρήματων·—οἱ δὲ, ὡσπερεὶ σύμφωνα,
 ἀναμένεται τὰ φωνέντα, ἢ δυνάμενα κατ' ιδίαν ῥητὰ
 εἶναι· καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν προθέσεων, τῶν ἄρθρων, τῶν
 συνδέσμων· τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα ἀεὶ τῶν μορίων συστηματίνεται.
In the same manner, as of the Elements or Letters, some
are Vowels, which of themselves complete a Sound; others
are Consonants, which without the help of Vowels have no
express Vocality; so likewise may we conceive as to the
nature of Words. Some of them, like Vowels, are of them-
selves expressive, as is the case of Verbs, Nouns, Pro-
nouns, and Adverbs; others, like Consonants, wait for
their Vowels, being unable to become expressive by their
own proper strength, as is the case of Prepositions, Arti-
cles, and Conjunctions; for these parts of Speech are al-
ways Consignificant, that is, are only significant, when as-
sociated to something else. Apollon. de Syntaxi. L. I.
 c. 3. *Itaque quibusdam philosophis placuit NOMEN &*
VERBUM SOLAS ESSE PARTES ORATIONIS; cætera
vero, ADMINICULA vel JUNCTURAS earum: quomodo
nāvium partes sunt tabulae & trabes, cætera autem (id est,
cera, stuppa, & clavi & similia) vincula & conglutina-
tiones

whatever either exist as the Energies, or Ch.III. Affections, of some other thing, or without being the Energies or Affections of some other thing. If they exist as the Energies or Affections of something else, then are they called ATTRIBUTES. Thus to think is the attribute of a Man; to be white, of a Swan; to fly, of an Eagle; to be four-footed, of a Horse. If they exist not after this manner, then are they call'd SUBSTANCES*. Thus *Man*, *Swan*, *Eagle*, and *Horse*, are none of them Attributes, but all Substances, because however they may exist in Time and Place, yet neither of these, nor of any thing else, do they exist as Energies or Affections.

AND

tiones partium navis (hoc est, tabularum & trabium) non partes navis dicuntur. Prisc. L. XI. 913.

* SUBSTANCES.] Thus Aristotle. Νῦν μὲν ἐν τύπῳ εἰρηται, τι ποτ' εἰσὶν οἱ οὐσίαι, οἵτι τὸ μὴ καθ' ὑποκείμενος, ἀλλὰ καθ' οὗ τὰ ἀλλα. Metaph. Z. γ. p. 106. Ed. Sylb.

Ch.III. **AND** thus all things whatsoever, being either (*f*) *Substances* or *Attributes*, it follows of course that all Words, *which are significant as Principals*, must needs be significant of either the one or the other. If they are *significant of Substances*, they are call'd *Substantives*; if of *Attributes*, they are call'd *Attributives*. So that **ALL WORDS whatever, significant as Principals, are either SUBSTANTIVES or ATTRIBUTIVES.**

AGAIN, as to Words, which are only significant as *Accessories*, they acquire a Signification either from being associated to one Word, or else to many. If to one Word alone, then as they can do no more than in some manner *define* or *determine*, they may justly for that reason be called

DE-

(*f*) This division of things into *Substance* and *Attribute* seems to have been admitted by Philosophers of all Sects and Ages. See *Categor.* c. 2. *Metaphys.* L. VII. c. 1. *De Cœlo*, L. III. c. 1.

DEFINITIVES. If *so many Words at Ch.III.* once, then as they serve to no other purpose than *to connect*, they are called for that reason by the name of CONNECTIVES.

AND thus it is that all WORDS whatever are either *Principals* or *Accessories*; or under other Names, either *significant from themselves*, or *significant by relation*. —If *significant from themselves*, they are either *Substantives* or *Attributives*; if *significant by relation*, they are either *Definitives* or *Connectives*. So that under one of these four Species, SUBSTANTIVES, ATTRIBUTIVES, DEFINITIVES, and CONNECTIVES, are ALL WORDS, however different, in a manner included.

IF any of these Names seem new and unusual, we may introduce others more usual, by calling the *Substantives*, **NOUNS**; the *Attributives*, **VERBS**; the *Definitives*,

ARTI-

Ch. III. ARTICLES; and the *Connectives, Con-*
junctions.

SHOU'D it be ask'd, what then becomes of *Pronouns, Adverbs, Prepositions, and Interjections*; the answer is, either they must be found included within the Species above-mentioned, or else must be admitted for so many Species by themselves.

§ THERE were various opinions in ancient days, as to the *number* of these Parts, or Elements of Speech.

Plato in his * *Sophist* mentions only two, the *Noun* and the *Verb*. *Aristotle* mentions no more, where he treats of † *Propositions*. Not that those acute Philosophers were ignorant of the other Parts, but they spoke with reference to *Logic* or *Dia-*

* Tom. I. p. 261. Edit. Ser.

† *De Interpr.* c. 2 & 3.

Dialectic (g), considering the Essence of Ch. III. Speech as contained in these two, because *these alone* combined make a perfect *affirmative Sentence*, which none of the rest without them are able to effect. Hence therefore *Aristotle* in his * *treatise of Poetry* (where he was to lay down the elements

(g) *Partes igitur orationis sunt secundum Dialecticos* *duae, NOMEN & VERBUM; quia haec sole etiam per* *se conjunctae plenam faciunt orationem; alias autem partes* *τύπαληγόματα, hoc est, consignificantia appellantur.* *Priscian.* l. 2. p. 574. *Edit. Putschii.* *Exigit hic qua-* *dam quæfio, cur duo tantum, NOMEN & VERBUM,* *se (Aristoteles sc.) determinare promittat, cum plures par-* *tes orationis esse videantur. Quibus hoc dicendum est, tan-* *tum Aristotelem hoc libro diffinisse, quantum illi ad id,* *quod instituerat tractare, sufficit. Tractat namque de* *simplici enuntiativa oratione, quæ scilicet hujusmodi est, ut* *junctis tantum Verbis et Nominibus componatur.—Quare* *superfluum est querere, cur alias quoque, quæ videntur* *orationis partes, non proposuerit, qui non totius simpliciter* *orationis, sed tantum simplicis orationis instituit elementa* *partiri.* *Boetius in Libr. de Interpretat. p. 295.* *Apollonius* from the above principles elegantly calls the *NOUN* and *VERB*, τὰ ἐμψυχότατα μέρη τῆς λόγου, *the most animated parts of Speech.* *De Syntaxi,* l. 1. c. 3. p. 24. See also *Plutarch.* *Quæst. Platon.* p. 1009.

* Poet. Cap. 20.

Ch. III. ments of a more variegated speech) adds the *Article* and *Conjunction* to the Noun and Verb, and so adopts the same Parts, with those established in this Treatise. To *Aristotle's* authority (if indeed better can be required) may be added that also of the elder *Stoics* (b).

THE latter *Stoics* instead of four Parts made five, by dividing the Noun into the *Appellative* and *Proper*. Others increased the number, by detaching the *Pronoun* from the Noun; the *Participle* and *Adverb* from the Verb; and the *Preposition* from the Conjunction. The *Latin Grammarians* went farther, and detached the *Interjection* from the Adverb, within which by the *Greeks* it was always included, as a Species.

WE

(b) For this we have the authority of *Dionysius of Halicarnassus*, *De Struct. Orat. Sect. 2.* whom *Quintilian* follows, *Inst. l. 1. c. 4.* *Diogenes Laertius* and *Priscian* make them always to have admitted five Parts. See *Priscian*, as before, and *Laertius*, *Lib. VII. Segm. 57.*

We are told indeed by (*i*) *Dionysius* of Ch. III. *Halicarnassus* and *Quintilian*, that *Aristotle*, with *Theodectes*, and the more early writers, held but *three* Parts of speech, the *Noun*, the *Verb*, and the *Conjunction*. This, it must be owned, accords with the oriental Tongues, whose Grammars (we are (*k*) told) admit no other. But as to *Aristotle*, we have his own authority to assert the contrary, who not only enumerates the *four* Species which we have adopted, but ascertains them each by a proper Definition *.

(i) See the places quoted in the note immediately preceding.

(k) *Antiquissima eorum est opinio, qui tres classes faciunt. Etsique hæc Arabum quoque sententia—Hebræi quoque (qui, cum Arabes Grammaticam scribere desinarent, artem eam demum scribere cœperunt, quod ante annos contigit circiter quadringentos) Hebræi, inquam, hac in re secuti sunt magistros suos Arabes.—Immo vero trium classium numerum alia etiam Orientis linguae retinente. Dubium, utrum eā in re Orientales imitati sunt anticos Græcorum, an hi potius secuti sunt Orientalium exemplum. Utut est, etiam veteres Græcos tres tantum partes agnoscisse, non solum autor est Dionysius, &c. Voss. de Analog. l. I. c. I. See also Sancti Minerv. l. I. c. 2.*

* Sup. p. 34.

Ch.III. To conclude—the Subject of the following Chapters will be a distinct and separate consideration of the NOUN, the VERB, the ARTICLE, and the CONJUNCTION; which four, the better (as we apprehend) to express their respective natures, we chuse to call SUBSTANTIVES, ATTRIBUTIVES, DEFINITIVES, and CONNECTIVES.

C H A P. IV.

Concerning Substantives, properly so called.

SUBSTANTIVES are all those principal Ch. IV. Words, which are significant of Substances, considered as Substances.

THE first sort of Substances are the NATURAL, such as Animal, Vegetable, Man, Oak.

THERE are other Substances of our own making. Thus by giving a Figure not natural to natural Materials, we create such Substances, as House, Ship, Watch, Telescope, &c.

AGAIN, by a more refined operation of our Mind alone, we abstract any Attribute from its necessary subject, and consider it apart, devoid of its dependence. For example, from Body we abstract to Fly;

D 3 from

Ch. IV. from Surface, *the being White*; from Soul,
 — *the being Temperate.*

AND thus it is we convert even *Attributes* into *Substances*, denoting them on this occasion by proper *Substantives*, such as *Flight*, *Whiteness*, *Temperance*; or else by others more general, such as *Motion*, *Colour*, *Virtue*. These we call ABSTRACT SUBSTANCES; the second sort we call ARTIFICIAL.

Now all those several Substances have their Genus, their Species, and their Individuals. For example, in *natural Substances*, *Animal* is a Genus; *Man*, a Species; *Alexander*, an Individual. In *artificial Substances*, *Edifice* is a Genus; *Palace*, a Species; *the Vatican*, an Individual. In *abstract Substances*, *Motion* is a Genus; *Flight*, a Species; *this Flight* or *that Flight* are Individuals.

As therefore every (*a*) GENUS may be Ch.IV. found *whole and intire in each one of its Species*; (for thus Man, Horse, and Dog, are each of them distinctly a complete and intire Animal) and as every SPECIES may be found *whole and intire in each one of its Individuals*; (for thus Socrates, Plato, and Xenophon, are each of them completely and distinctly *a Man*) hence it is, that every Genus, tho' ONE, is multiplied into MANY; and every Species, tho' ONE, is also multiplied into MANY, by reference to those beings, which are their proper subordinates. Since then no individual has any such subordinates, it can never in strictness be considered as MANY, and so is truly an INDIVIDUAL as well in Nature as in Name.

D 4

FROM

(a) This is what *Plato* seems to have expressed in a manner somewhat mysterious, when he talks of *μίαν ίδέαν διὰ τολλῶν, ἵνος ἐκάστη κειμένη χωρὶς, ταύτην διατεταμένην—καὶ τολλὰς, ἐτέρας ὀλλήλων, ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἔξωθεν περιεχομένας.* *Sophist.* p. 253. *Edit. Serrani.* For the common definition of Genus and Species, see the *Utagoge* or *Introduction of Porphyry to Aristotle's Logic.*

Ch.IV. From these Principles it is, that *Words* following the nature and genius of *Things*, such *Substantives* admit of *NUMBER* as denote *Genera* or *Species*, while those, which denote (b) *Individuals*, in strictness admit it not.

BESIDES

(b) Yet sometimes *Individuals* have plurality or *Number*, from the causes following. In the first place the *Individuals* of the human race are so large a multitude, even in the smallest nation, that it would be difficult to invent a new *Name* for every new-born *Individual*. Hence then instead of *one* only being call'd *Marcus*, and *one* only *Antonius*, it happens that *many* are called *Marcus* and *many* called *Antonius*; and thus 'tis the *Romans* had their *Plurals*, *Marci* and *Antonii*, as we in later days have our *Marks* and our *Antonies*. Now the *Plurals* of this sort may be well called *accidental*, because it is merely by chance that the *Names* coincide.

There seems more reason for such *Plurals*, as the *Ptolemies*, *Scipios*, *Catos*, or (to instance in modern names) the *Howards*, *Pelhams*, and *Montagues*; because a *Race* or *Family* is like a *smaller sort of Species*; so that the *family Name* extends to the *Kindred*, as the *specific Name* extends to the *Individuals*.

A third cause which contributed to make proper *Names* become *Plural*, was the *high Character* or *Eminence* of some one *Individual*, whose *Name* became afterwards a kind of *common Appellative*, to denote all

BESIDES *Number*, another character- Ch.IV.
istic, visible in Substances, is that of *Sex*.
Every Substance is either *Male* or *Female* ;
or both *Male* and *Female* ; or neither one
nor the other. So that with respect to
Sexes and their *Negation*, all Substances
conceiveable are comprehended under this
fourfold consideration.

Now the existence of *Hermaprodites*
being rare, if not doubtful ; hence Lan-
guage, only regarding those distinctions
which

those, who had pretensions to merit in the same way.
Thus every great *Critic* was call'd an *Aristarchus* ;
every great *Warrior*, an *Alexander* ; every great *Beauty*,
a *Helen*, &c.

A DANIEL come to Judgment ! yea a DANIEL,
cries *Shylock* in the Play, when he would express the
wisdom of the young Lawyer.

So *Martial* in that well known verse,

Sint MÆCENATES, non deerunt, Flacce, MARONES,

So *Lucilius*,

ΑΙΓΑΛΙΠΟΙ mantes, ΑΞΗΝΑ omnes, asperi A-
THONES.

πέτοι ΦΑΕΘΟΝΤΕΣ, η ΔΕΥΚΑΛΙΩΝΕΣ. Lucian
in *Timon*. T. I. p. 108,

Ch. IV. which are more obvious, considers *Words*
 denoting *Substances* to be either **MASCULINE**, **FEMININE**, or **NEUTER** *.

As to our own Species, and all those animal Species, *which have reference to common Life*, or of which the Male and the Female, by their size, form, colour, &c. are *eminently distinguished*, most Languages have different Substantives, to denote the Male and the Female. But as to those animal Species, which either *less frequently occur*, or of which one Sex is *less apparently distinguished* from the other, in these a single Substantive commonly serves for both Sexes.

IN

* After this manner they are distinguished by *Aristotle*. Τῶν ὀνομάτων τὰ μὲν ἄρρενα, τὰ δὲ θῆλεα, τὰ δὲ μεταξύ. Poet. cap. 21. *Protagoras* before him had established the same Distinction, calling them ἄρρενα, θῆλεα, καὶ σκέυη. *Aristot. Rhet. L. III. c. 5.* Where mark what were afterwards called ἄδετερα, or Neuters, were by these called τὰ μεταξύ καὶ σκέυη.

† IN the *English Tongue* it seems a general rule (except only when infringed by a figure of Speech) that no Substantive is *Masculine*, but what denotes a *Male animal Substance*; none *Feminine*, but what denotes a *Female animal Substance*; and that where the Substance has no *Sex*, the Substantive is always *Neuter*.

BUT 'tis not so in *Greek*, *Latin*, and many of the *modern Tongues*. These all of them have Words, some masculine, some feminine (and those too in great multitudes) which have reference to Substances, where Sex never had existence. To give one instance for many. *MIND* is surely neither male, nor female; yet is *NOTE*, in *Greek*, masculine, and *MENS*, in *Latin*, feminine.

IN

†*Nam quicquid per Naturam Sexui non adsignatur, neutrum haberi oporteret, sed id Ars, &c. Consent. apud Putsch. p. 2023, 2024.*

The whole Passage from *Genera Hominum, quae naturalia sunt, &c.* is worth perusing.

Ch. IV. In some Words these distinctions seem
 owing to nothing else, than to the mere
 casual structure of the Word itself: It is
 of such a Gender, from having such a
 Termination; or from belonging perhaps
 to such a Declension. In others we may
 imagine a more subtle kind of reasoning,
 a reasoning which discerns, even *in things*
without Sex, a distant analogy to that great
 NATURAL DISTINCTION, which (ac-
 cording to *Milton*) *animates the World* ‡.

In this view we may conceive such
 SUBSTANTIVES to have been considered
 as MASCULINE, which were "conspicu-
 "ous for the Attributes of imparting or
 "communicating; or which were by na-
 "ture active, strong, and efficacious, and
 "that indiscriminately whether to good
 "or to ill; or which had claim to Emi-
 "nence, either laudable or otherwise."

THE

‡ Mr. *Linnæus*, the celebrated Botanist, has traced
 the *Distinction of Sexes* throughout the whole *Vegetable*
World, and made it the Basis of his Botanic Method.

THE FEMININE on the contrary were Ch.IV.
“ such, as were conspicuous for the At-
“ tributes either of receiving, of con-
“ taining, or of producing and bringing
“ forth ; or which had more of the pas-
“ sive in their nature, than of the active;
“ or which were peculiarly beautiful
“ and amiable ; or which had respect to
“ such Excesses, as were rather Femi-
“ nine, than Masculine.”

UPON these Principles the two greater Luminaries were considered, one as Masculine, the other as Feminine ; the SUN (“*Ἥλιος, Sol*”) as *Masculine*, from communicating Light, which was native and original, as well as from the vigorous warmth and efficacy of his Rays ; the Moon (*Σελήνη, Luna*) as *Feminine*, from being the Receptacle only of another’s Light, and from shining with rays more delicate and soft.

THUS

Ch.IV. *Thus Milton,*

*First in his East the glorious Lamp was seen,
Regent of Day, and all th' Horizon round
Invested with bright rays; jocund to run
His longitude thro' Heav'n's high road:
the gray*

*Dawn, and the Pleiades before him danc'd,
Shedding sweet influence. Less bright the
Moon*

*But opposite, in levell'd West was set;
His mirror, with full face borrowing her
Light*

From him; for other light she needed none.

P. L. VII. 370.

By Virgil they were considered as *Brother* and *Sister*, which still preserves the same distinction.

Nec FRATRIS radiis obnoxia surgere LUNA.

G. I. 396.

THE SKY or ETHER is in Greek and Latin *Masculine*, as being the source of those showers, which impregnate the Earth.

The

* The EARTH on the contrary is universally *Feminine*, from being the grand *Receiver*, the grand *Container*, but above all from being the *Mother* (either mediately or immediately) of every sublunary Substance, whether animal or vegetable.

THUS *Virgil*,

*Tum PATER OMNIPOTENS fæcundis im-
bribus ÆTHER
CONJUGIS in gremium LÆTÆ descendit,
Et omnes
Magnus alit magno commixtus corpore fætus.*

G. II. 325.

THUS *Shakespear*,

—† COMMON MOTHER, *Thou*
Whose Womb unmeasurable, and infinite
Breast

Teems and feeds all—Tim. of Athens.

So *Milton*,

*Whatever Earth, ALL-BEARING Mo-
THER, yields.* P. L. V.

So

* *Senecæ Nat. Quæst. III. 14.*

† Παμπτερ γῆ χαῖρε—*Græc. Anth.* p. 281.

Ch. IV. So *Virgil*.

*Non jam MATER ait TELLUS, viresque
ministrat (c). Aen. XI. 71.*

AMONG artificial Substances the SHIP (*Naüs, Navis*) is feminine, as being so eminently a *Receiver* and *Container* of various things, of Men, Arms, Provisions, Goods, &c. Hence Sailors, speaking of their Vessel, say always, “*SHE rides at anchor*,” “*SHE is under sail*.”

A CITY (*Πόλις, Civitas*) and a COUNTRY (*Πατρίς, Patria*) are feminine also, by being (like the Ship) *Containers* and *Receivers*, and farther by being as it were the *Mothers* and *Nurses* of their respective Inhabitants.

THUS

(c) —διὸ καὶ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ τὴν ΓΗΣ φύσιν, ὡς ΘΗΛΥ
καὶ ΜΗΤΕΡΑ νομίζεσσιν. ΟΤΡΑΝΟΝ δὲ καὶ ΗΛΙΟΝ,
τοὺς ἐστι τῶν ἀλλων τῶν τοιέστων, ὡς ΓΕΝΩΝΤΑΣ καὶ
ΠΑΤΕΡΑΣ προσαγορεύεσσι. Arist. de Gener. Anim.

I. C. 2.

Thus Virgil,
Salve, MAGNA PARENTS FRUGUM, Satur-
nia Tellus,
MAGNA VIRUM— Geor. II. 173.

Ch.IV.

So, in that Heroic Epigram on those
 brave Greeks, who fell at *Gbaeronea*,

Γαῖα δὲ Πάτρις ἔχει κόλποις τῶν πλεῖστα κα-

μοντων

Σώματα—

Their PARENT COUNTRY in her bosom
 holds

Their wearied bodies.—*

So Milton,
The City, which Thou seeft, no other deem
Than great and glorious Rome, QUEEN of
the Earth. Par. Reg. L. IV.

As to the OCEAN, tho' from its being
 the Receiver of all Rivers, as well as the
 Container

* Demost. in *Orat. de Coronâ.*

Ch.IV. *Container and Productress of so many Vegetables and Animals*, it might justly have been made (like the Earth) *Feminine*; yet its *deep Voice and boisterous Nature* have, in spight of these reasons, prevailed to make it *Male*. Indeed the very sound of Homer's

—μέγα σθένος Ωκεανοῖο,

would suggest to a hearer, even ignorant of its meaning, that the Subject was incompatible with *female delicacy and softness*.

TIME (Χρόνος) from his mighty *Effacy upon every thing around us*, is by the Greeks and English justly considered as *Masculine*. Thus in that elegant distich, spoken by a decrepit old Man,

* Ο γάρ Χρόνος μὲν ἔκαμψε, τέκτων δὲ φοῖος,

Ἄπαντα δὲ ἐργαζόμενος ἀσθενέσερα. †

*Me TIME bath bent, that sorry Artift, he
That surely makes, whate'er be bandles,
worse.*

So

* Ω Χρόνε, παντοίως θυμῶν πανεπίσχοπε Δαῆμον.
Græc. Anth. p. 290.

† Steb. Ecl. p. 591.

So too *Shakespear*, speaking likewise of Ch.IV.
TIME,

Orl. *Whom doth he gallop withal?*

Ros. *With a thief to the gallows.* —

As you like it.

THE Greek Θάνατος or Άιδης, and the English DEATH, seem from the same irresistible Power to have been considered as *Masculine*. Even the Vulgar with us are so accustomed to this notion, that a FEMALE DEATH they would treat as ridiculous (*d*).

TAKE a few examples of the masculine Death.

E 2

Calli-

(*d*) Well therefore did *Milton* in his *Paradise Lost* not only adopt DEATH as a *Person*, but consider him as *Masculine*: in which he was so far from introducing a Phantom of his own, or from giving it a *Gender not supported by Custom*, that perhaps he had as much the *Sanction of national Opinion* for his *Masculine Death*, as the ancient Poets had for many of their Deities.

Ch.IV. *Callimachus* upon the Elegies of his
 Friend *Herachitus*—

Ἄι δὲ τεαὶ ζώσιν αἰδονες, οὐσιν ὁ πάντων
 Ἀρπάκτηρ Ἀΐδης ἐκ ἐπὶ χεῖρα βαλεῖ.

—yet thy sweet warbling strains
 Still live immortal, nor on them shall DEATH
 His band e'er lay, tho' Ravager of all.

IN the *Alcestis* of *Euripides*, Θάνατος or DEATH is one of the Persons of the drama; the beginning of the play is made up of dialogue between *Him* and *Apollo*; and towards its end, there is a fight between *Him* and *Hercules*, in which *Hercules* is conqueror, and rescues *Alcestis* from his hands.

IT is well known too, that SLEEP and DEATH are made Brothers by *Homer*. It was to this old *Gorgias* elegantly alluded, when at the extremity of a long life he lay slumbering on his Death-bed. A Friend asked him, “How he did?”—

“SLEEP.

“ SLEEP (replied the old Man) is just Ch.IV.
 “ upon delivering me over to the care of —
 “ his BROTHER (e).”

THUS Shakespear, speaking of Life,
 —merely Thou art Death's Fool;
 For him Thou labour'st by thy flight to
 shun,
 And yet run'st towards him still.

Meas. for Meas.

So Milton,
 Dire was the tossing, deep the groans;
 Despair
 Tended the sick, busiest from couch to couch:
 And over them triumphant DEATH his
 dart
 Shook; but delay'd to strike—

P. L. XI. 489 (f).

THE

(e) Ἡδη με Ο ΤΠΝΟΣ ἀρχεται· παρακατατιθεται· T' ΑΔΕΛΦΩΙ. Stob. Ecl. p. 600.

(f) Suppose in any one of these examples we introduce a female Death; suppose we read,

Ch. IV. THE supreme Being (God, Θεὸς, *Deus*, *Dieu*, &c.) is in all languages *Masculine*, in as much as the masculine Sex is the superior and more excellent; and as He is the Creator of all, the Father of Gods and Men. Sometimes indeed we meet with such words as Τὸ Πρῶτον, Τὸ Θεῖον, *Numen*, *Deity* (which last we English join to a neuter, saying *Deity itself*) sometimes I say we meet with these *Neuters*. The reason in these instances seems to be, that as God is prior to all things, both in dignity and in time, this Priority is better characterized and express by a *Negation*, than by any of those Distinctions which are *co-ordinate with some Opposite*, as *Male* for example is

*And over them triumphant Death HER dart
Shook, &c.*

*What a falling off! How are the nerves and strength
of the whole Sentiment weakened!*

is co-ordinate with Female, Right with Ch. IV.
Left, &c. &c. (g).

VIRTUE ('Αρετὴ, *Virtus*) as well as most of its Species, are all *Feminine*, perhaps from their Beauty and amiable Appearance, which are not without effect even upon the most reprobate and corrupt.

E 4

— *aba/jb'd*

(g) Thus *Ammonius*, speaking on the same Subject —
ΤΟ ΠΡΩΤΟΝ λέγομεν, ὅτι μὴ δὲ τῶν δια μυθολογίας παραδότων ἡμῖν τὰς θεολογίας ἐτόλμησε τις ἡ ἀρρενωπὸν, ἡ θυληπρεπῆ (lege θυλυπρεπῆ) δια μόρφωσιν φέρειν· καὶ τέτο εἰκότως· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀρρενι τὸ θῆλυ σύνοιχον· τὸ (lege τῷ) δὲ ΠΑΝΤΗΙ ΑΠΛΩΣ ΑΙΤΙΩΙ σύνοιχον εἰδέν. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅταν ἀρσενικῶς ΤΟΝ ΘΕΟΝ ὀνομάζομεν, [τρόπος] τὸ σεμινότερον τῶν γενῶν τὸ ὑφειμένης προτιμῶντες, καὶ τῶς αὐτὸν προσαγορέουμεν. PRIMUM dicimus, quod nemo etiam eorum, qui theologiam nobis fabularum integumentis obvolutam tradiderant, vel maris vel fæmitiae specie fingere ausus est: idque merito: conjugatum enim mari fæmitium est. CAUSÆ autem omnino ABSOLUTÆ AC SIMPLICI nihil est conjugatum. Immo vero cum Dicimus masculino genere appellamus, ita ipsum nominamus, genus præstantius submissò atque humili præferentes. Ammonius in Lib. de Interpr. p. 30. b.—οὐ γὰρ ἐναντίον τῷ Ηρώτῳ εἰδέν. Aristot. Metaph. A. p. 210. Sylb.

Ch. IV. —— *abash'd the Devil stood,
 And felt how awful Goodness is, and saw
 VIRTUE in her shape how lovely ; saw,
 and pin'd
 His loss—*

P. L. IV. 846.

THIS being allowed, VICE (*Kaxia*) becomes Feminine of course, as being, in the *eucoxia*, or Co-ordination of things, Virtue's natural Opposite (*b*).

THE Fancies, Caprices, and fickle Changes of FORTUNE would appear but awkwardly under a Character that was Male: but taken together they make a very

(b) They are both represented as Females by Xenophon, in the celebrated Story of Hercules, taken from Prodicus. See *Memorab.* L. II. c. 1. As to the *eucoxia* here mentioned, thus *Varro*—Pythagoras Samius ait omnium rerum initia effa bina : ut finitum & infinitum, bonum & malum, vitam & mortem, diem & noctem. *De Ling. Lat.* L. IV. See also *Arist. Metaph.*, L. I. c. 5, and *Ecclesiasticus*, Chap. Ixii, ver. 24.

very natural *Female*, which has no small resemblance to the Coquette of a modern Comedy, bestowing, withdrawing, and shifting her favours, as different Beaus succeed to her good graces.

*Transmutat incertos honores,
Nunc mibi, nunc alii benigna.* Hor.

WHY the FURIES were made *Female*, is not so easy to explain, unless it be that female Passions of all kinds were considered as susceptible of greater excess, than male Passions ; and that the *Furies* were to be represented, as Things superlatively outrageous.

*Talibus Alecto dictis exarfit in iras.
At Juveni oranti subitus tremor occupat
artus :
Diriguere oculi : tot Erinnys fibilat Hy-
dris,
Tantaque se facies aperit : tum flammnea
torquens*

Lumina

Ch. IV. *Lumina cunctantem & querentem dicere
plura*
*Repulit, & geminos erexit crinibus an-
gues,*
*Verberaque insonuit, rabidoque bæc ad-
didit ore :*
En ! Ego victa situ, &c.

Æn. VII. 455 (i).

HE

(i) The Words above mentioned, *Time*, *Death*, *Fortune*, *Virtue*, &c. in *Greek*, *Latin*, *French*, and most modern Languages, though they are diversified with Genders in the manner described, yet never vary the Gender which they have once acquired, except in a few instances, where the Gender is doubtful. We cannot say *ἡ ἀρετὴ* or *ἡ ἀρετὴν*, *hæc Virtus* or *hic Virtus*, *la Vertu* or *le Vertu*, and so of the rest. But it is otherwise in *English*. We in our own language say, *Virtue* is *its* own Reward, or *Virtue* is *her* own Reward; *Time* maintains *its* wonted Pace, or *Time* maintains *his* wonted Pace.

There is a singular advantage in this liberty, as it enables us to mark, with a peculiar force, the Distinction between the severe or *Logical* Stile, and the ornamental or *Rhetorical*. For thus when we speak of the above Words, and of all others naturally devoid of Sex,

He, that would see more on this Sub- Ch.IV.
ject, may consult *Ammonius the Peripatetic,*

as *Neuters*, we speak of them *as they are*, and as becomes a *logical Inquiry*. When we give them *Sex*, by making them *Male* or *Feminine*, they are from thenceforth *personified*; are a kind of *intelligent Beings*, and become, as such, the proper *ornaments* either of *Rhetoric* or of *Poetry*.

Thus *Milton*,

—*The Thunder,*
Wing'd with red light'ning and impetuous rage,
Perhaps hath spent his shafts— P. L. I. 174.

The Poet, having just before called the *Hail*, and *Thunder*, God's *Ministers of Vengeance*, and so personified them, had he afterwards said *its Shafts* for *his Shafts*, would have destroyed his own Image, and approached withal so much nearer to Prose.

The following Passage is from the same Poem.

Should intermitting Vengeance arm again
His red right hand— P. L. II. 174.

In this Place *His Hand* is clearly preferable either to *Her's* or *Its*, by immediately referring us to *God himself*, the Avenger.

I shall

Ch. IV. tic, in his Commentary on the Treatise
de Interpretatione, where the Subject is
 treated at large with respect to the Greek
 Tongue. We shall only observe, that as
 all such Speculations are at best but Con-
 jectures, they should therefore be receiv-
 ed

I shall only give one instance more, and quit this
 Subject.

*At his command th' up-rooted Hills retir'd
 Each to HIS place: they heard his voice and went
 Obsequious: Heav'n HIS wonted face renew'd,
 And with fresh florets Hill and Valley smil'd.*

P. L. VI.

See also ver. 54, 55, of the same Book.

Here all things are personified; the Hills *hear*, the
 Valleys *smile*, and the *Face* of Heaven is renewed.
 Suppose then the Poet had been necessitated by the laws
 of his Language to have said—*Each Hill retir'd to ITS
 Place—Heaven renewed ITS wonted face*—how prosaic
 and lifeless would these Neuters have appeared; how
 detrimental to the *Protopoepia*, which he was aiming to
 establish! In this therefore he was happy, that the
 Language, in which he wrote, imposed no such neces-
 sity; and he was too wise a Writer, to impose it on
 himself. It were to be wished, his Correctors had been
 as wise on their parts.

ed with candour, rather than scrutinized Ch. IV. with rigour. *Varro's* words on a Subject near akin are for their aptness and elegance well worth attending. *Non mediocres enim tenebræ in silvâ, ubi bæc captanda; neque eð, quð pervenire volumus, semitæ tritæ; neque non in tramitibus quædam ob-jecta, quæ euntem retinere possunt* *.

To conclude this Chapter. We may collect from what has been said, that both NUMBER and GENDER appertain to WORDS, because in the first place they appertain to THINGS; that is to say, because Substances are Many, and have either Sex, or no Sex; therefore Substantives have Number, and are Masculine, Feminine, or Neuter. There is however this difference between the two Attributes: NUMBER in strictness descends no lower, than

to

* De Ling. Lat. L. IV.

Ch. IV. to the last Rank of Species (k) : GENDER on the contrary stops not here, but descends to every *Individual*, however diversified. And so much for SUBSTANTIVES, PROPERLY SO CALLED.

(k) The reason why *Number* goes no lower, is that it does not naturally appertain to *Individuals*; the cause of which see before, p. 39.

C H A P. V.

Concerning Substantives of the Secondary Order.

WE are now to proceed to a SECONDARY RACE of SUBSTANTIVES, Ch.V. a Race quite different from any already mentioned, and whose Nature may be explained in the following manner.

EVERY Object which presents itself to the Senses or the Intellect, is either then perceived for the *first time*, or else is recognized as having been perceived *before*. In the former case it is called an 'Object τῆς πρώτης γνώσεως, of the first knowledge or acquaintance (a); in the lat-

ter

(a) See *Apoll. de Syntaxi*, l. 1. c. 16. p. 49. l. 2. c. 3. p. 103. Thus *Priscian*—*Interest autem inter demonstrationem & relationem hoc; quod demonstratio, in interrogacioni reddita, Primam Cognitionem ostendit;*
Quis

Ch. V. ter it is called an Object τῆς δευτέρας γνώσεως, of the second knowledge or acquaintance.

Now as all Conversation passes between *Particulars* or *Individuals*, these will often happen to be reciprocally Objects τῆς πρότης γνώσεως, that is to say, till that instant unacquainted with each other. What then is to be done? How shall the Speaker address the other, when he knows not his Name? or how explain himself by his own Name, of which the other is wholly ignorant? Nouns, as they have been described, cannot answer the purpose. The first expedient upon this occasion seems to have been Δεῖξις, that is, *Pointing*, or *Indication by the Finger or Hand*, some traces of which are still to be observed, as a part of that Action, which naturally attends our speaking. But the Authors of

Language

Quis fecit? Ego: *relatio vero Secundam Cognitionem significat, ut, Is, de quo jam dixi. Lib. XII. p. 936. Edit. Putschii.*

Language were not content with this: Ch. V. They invented a race of *Words to supply this Pointing*; which Words, as they always stood for *Substantives or Nouns*, were characterized by the Name of 'Αντωνυμίαι, or PRONOUNS (b). These also they distinguished into three several sorts, calling them *Pronouns of the First, the Second, and the Third Person*, with a view to certain distinctions, which may be explained as follows.

SUPPOSE the Parties conversing to be wholly unacquainted, neither Name nor Countenance on either side known, and the

(b) Ἐκεῖνο ἡν 'Αντωνυμία, τὸ μετὰ ΔΕΙΣΘΕΩΣ ἡ ἀναφορᾶς 'ANTONOMAZOMENON. Apoll. de Synt. L. II. c. 5. p. 106. Priscian seems to consider them so peculiarly destined to the expression of *Individuals*, that he does not say they supply the place of any Noun, but that of the *proper Name* only. And this undoubtedly was their original, and still is their true and natural use. PRONOMEN est pars orationis, quæ pro nomine proprio uniuscujusque accipitur. Prisc. L. XII. See also Apoll. L. II. c. 9. p. 117, 118.

Ch. V. the Subject of the Conversation to be *the Speaker himself*. Here, to supply the place of Pointing by a Word of *equal* Power, they furnished the Speaker with the *Pronoun*, I. *I write, I say, I desire, &c.* and as the Speaker is always principal with respect to his own discourse, this they called for that reason *the Pronoun of the First Person.*

AGAIN, suppose the Subject of the Conversation to be *the Party addrest*. Here for similar reasons they invented the *Pronoun*, Thou. *Thou writeſt, Thou walkeſt, &c.* and as the Party addrest is next in dignity to the Speaker, or at least comes next with reference to the discourse; this Pronoun they therefore called *the Pronoun of the Second Person.*

LASTLY, suppose the Subject of Conversation neither the Speaker, nor the Party addrest, but *some Third Object, different from both*. Here they provided another *Pronoun*, He, She, or It, which in

in distinction to the two former was called Ch. V.
the Pronoun of the Third Person.

AND thus it was that *Pronouns* came to be distinguished by their respective PERSONS (c).

As

(c) The Description of the different PERSONS here given is taken from *Priscian*, who took it from *Apollonius*. *Personæ Pronominum sunt tres*; *prima, secunda, tertia*. *Prima est, cum ipsa, quæ loquitur, de se pronuntiat*; *Secunda, cum de eâ pronunciat, ad quam directo sermone loquitur*; *Tertia, cum de eâ, quæ nec loquitur, nec ad se directum accipit Sermonem*. L. XII. p. 940. *Theodore Gaza* gives the same Distinctions. *Πρῶτον* (*πρόσωπον sc.*) ὃ *τερὶ ξανθὸν φράζει*, ὃ *λέγων* *δεύτερον*, ὃ *τερὶ τῷ, τρὶς ὣν* ὃ *λόγος τρίτον*, ὃ *τερὶ* *ἴτερον*. *Gaz. Gram. L. IV. p. 152.*

This account of *Persons* is far preferable to the common one, which makes the First the *Speaker*; the Second, the *Party addrest*; and the Third, the *Subject*. For tho' the First and Second be as commonly described, one the *Speaker*, the other the *Party addrest*; yet till they become *subjects of the discourse*, they have no existence. Again as to the Third Person's being the *subject*, this is a character, which it *shares in common*

Ch. V. As to NUMBER, the Pronoun of each Person has it: (I) has the plural (WE), because

with both the other Persons, and which can never therefore be called a peculiarity of its own. To explain by an instance or two. When *Eneas* begins the narrative of his adventures, the second Person immediately appears, because he makes *Dido*, whom he addresses, the immediate subject of his Discourse.

Infandum, Regina, jubes, renovare dolorem.

From hence forward for 1500 Verses (tho' she be all that time the party address'd) we hear nothing farther of this Second Person, a variety of other Subjects filling up the Narrative.

In the mean time the First Person may be seen every where, because the Speaker every where is himself the Subject. They were indeed Events, as he says himself,

—*quæque ipse miserrima vidi,*
Et quorum pars magna fui—

Not that the Second Person does not often occur in the course of this Narrative; but then it is always by a Figure of Speech, when those, who by their absence are in fact so many Third Persons, are converted into Second

because there may be many Speakers at once of the same Sentiment; as well as one, who, including himself, speaks the Sentiment of many. (*Thou*) has the plural (*you*), because a Speech may be spoken to many, as well as to one. (*He*) has the plural (*they*), because the Subject of discourse is often many at once.

BUT tho' all these Pronouns have Number, it does not appear either in *Greek*, or *Latin*, or any modern Language, that those of the first and second Person carry the distinctions of Sex. The reason seems

F 3 to

cond Persons by being introduced as *present*. The *real* Second Person (*Dido*) is never once hinted.

Thus far as to *Virgil*. But when we read *Euclid*, we find neither *First* Person, nor *Second*, in any Part of the whole Work. The reason is, that neither Speaker nor Party address (in which light we may always view the Writer and his Reader) can possibly become the Subject of pure Mathematics, nor indeed can any thing else, except abstract Quantity, which neither speaks itself, nor is spoken to by another.

Ch. V. to be, that the Speaker and Hearer being generally present to each other, it would have been superfluous to have marked a distinction by Art, which from Nature and even Dress was commonly (*d*) apparent on both sides. But this does not hold with respect to the third Person, of whose Character and Distinctions, (including Sex among the rest) we often know no more, than what we learn from the discourse. And hence it is that in most Languages *the third Person* has its *Genders*, and that even *English* (which allows its *Adjectives* no *Genders* at all) has in this *Pronoun* the triple (*e*) distinction of *He*, *She*, and *It*.

HENCE

(*d*) *Demonstratio ipsa secum genus ostendit.* Priscian. L. XII. p. 942. See *Apoll. de Syntax.* L. II. c. 7. p. 109.

(*e*) The Utility of this Distinction may be better found in supposing it away. Suppose for example we should read in history these words—*He caused him*

to

HENCE too we see the reason why a Ch. V.
singlē Pronoun (f) to each Person, an *I*

F 4 to

to destroy him—and that we were to be informed the [He], which is here thrice repeated; stood each time for something different, that is to say, for a Man, for a Woman, and for a City, whose Names were *Alexander*, *Thais*, and *Persepolis*. Taking the Pronoun in this manner, divested of its Genders, how would it appear, which was destroyed; which was the destroyer; and which the cause, that moved to the destruction? But there are not such doubts, when we hear the Genders distinguished; when instead of the ambiguous Sentence, *He caused him to destroy him*, we are told with the proper distinctions, that *SHE caused HIM to destroy IT*. Then we know with certainty, what before we could not: that the Promoter was the Woman; that her Instrument was the Hero; and that the Subject of their Cruelty was the unfortunate City.

(f) *Quæritur tamen cur prima quidem Persona & secunda singula Pronomina habeant, tertiam vero sex diversæ indicent voces? Ad quod respondendum est, quod prima quidem & secunda Persona ideo non agent diversis vocibus, quod semper praesentes inter se sunt, & demonstrativa; tertia vero Persona modo demonstrativa est, ut, Hic, Iste; modo relativa, ut Is, Iste, &c.* Priscian. L. XII. p. 933.

Ch. V. to the *First*, and à *Thou* to the *Second*, are abundantly sufficient to all the purposes of Speech. But it is not so with respect to the *Third Person*. The various relations of the various Objects exhibited by this (I mean relations of near and distant, present and absent, same and different, definite and indefinite, &c.) made it necessary that here there should not be one, but *many* Pronouns, such as *He*, *This*, *That*, *Other*, *Any*, *Some*, &c.

IT must be confessed indeed, that all these Words do not always appear as *Pronouns*. When they stand by themselves, and represent some Noun, (as when we say, *THIS* is *Virtue*, or $\delta\epsilon\mu\tau\kappa\omega\varsigma$, *Give me THAT*) then are they *Pronouns*. But when they are associated to some Noun (as when we say, *THIS Habit* is *Virtue*; or $\delta\epsilon\mu\tau\kappa\omega\varsigma$, *THAT Man* defrauded me) then as they supply not the place of a Noun, but only serve to ascertain one, they fall rather into the Species of *Definitives* or *Articles*. That there is indeed

indeed a near relation between *Pronouns* Ch. V.
and *Articles*, the old Grammarians have
all acknowledged, and some words it has
been doubtful to which Class to refer.
The best rule to distinguish them is this
—The genuine PRONOUN *always stands*
by *itself*, assuming the *Power* of a Noun,
and supplying its *place*—The genuine
ARTICLE *never stands* by *itself*, but
appears at all times associated to some-
thing else, requiring a Noun for its sup-
port, as much as *Attributives* or (g) Ad-
jectives.

As

(g) Τὸ Ἀρθρὸν μετὰ ὄνοματῷ, καὶ οὐ Ἀνθρωπία-
αντὶ ὄνοματῷ. THE ARTICLE stands WITH a
Noun; but THE PRONOUN stands FOR a Noun.
Apoll. L. I. c. 3. p. 22. Ἀυτὰ ἐν τὰ ἀρθρα, τῆς
πρὸς τὰ ὄνοματα συναρτήσεως ἀποσάντα, εἰς τὴν
ὑποτεταγμένην ἀγωνυμίαν μεταπίπτει. Now Arti-
cles themselves, when they quit their Connection with
Nouns, pass into such Pronoun, as is proper upon the occa-
sion. Ibid. Again—Οταν τὸ Ἀρθρον μὴ μετ' ὄνο-
ματῷ παραλαμβάνηται, πεινάσθαι δὲ σύνταξιν ὄνο-
ματῷ

Ch. V. As to the *Coalescence* of these Pronouns, it is, as follows. The First or Second

ματ^ῷ ἦν ἀροεκτείνειμεθα, ἐκ πάσης ἀνάγκης εἰς αὐτωνύμιαν μεταληφθήσεται, εἴγε ωκείγμινόμενον μετ' ὄνοματ^ῷ δυνάμει αὐτὶ ὄνοματ^ῷ ταρελήφθη. When the Article is assumed without the Noun, and has (as we explained before) the same Syntax, which the Noun has; it must of absolute necessity be admitted for a Pronoun, because it appears without a Noun, and yet is in power assumed for one. Ejusd. L. II. c. 8. p. 113. L. I. c. 45. p. 96. Inter Pronomina & Articulos hoc interest, quod Pronomina ea putantur, quae, cum sola sint, vicem nominis complent, ut *QUIS, ILLE, ISTE*: Articuli vero cum Pronominibus, aut Nominibus, aut Participiis adjunguntur. Donat. Gram. p. 1753.

Priscian, speaking of the Stoics, says as follows: **ARTICULIS autem PRONOMINA connumerantes, FINITOS ea ARTICULOS appellabant; ipsos autem Articulos, quibus nos caremus, INFINITOS ARTICULOS dicebant.** *Vel, ut alii dicunt, Articulos connumerabant Pronominibus, & ARTICULARIA eos PRONOMINA vocabant, &c.* Prisc. L. I. p. 574. Varro, speaking of *Quisque* and *Hic*, calls them both ARTICLES, the first *indefinite*, the second *definite*. *De Ling. Lat. L. VII.* See also L. IX. p. 132. Vossius indeed in his *Analogia* (L. I. c. 1.) opposes this Doctrine, because *Hic* has not the same power with the Greek Article,

Second will, either of them, by themselves coalesce with the Third, but not with each other. For example, it is good sense, as well as good Grammar, to say in any Language—I AM HE—THOU ART HE—but we cannot say—I AM THOU—nor THOU ART I. The reason is, there is no absurdity for the *Speaker* to be the *Subject* also of the Discourse, as when we say, *I am He*; or for the *Person address*; as when we say, *Thou art He*. But for the same Person, in the same circumstances; to be at once the *Speaker*, and the *Party address*, this is impossible; and so therefore is the Coalescence of the First and Second Person.

AND now perhaps we have seen enough of *Pronouns*, to perceive how they differ from

ticle, &c. But he did not enough attend to the antient Writers on this Subject, who considered all Words, as ARTICLES, which being associated to Nouns (and not standing in their place) served in any manner to ascertain, and determine their Signification.

Ch. V. from other Substantives. The others are Primary, these are their *Substitutes*; a kind of secondary Race, which were taken in aid, when for reasons already (b) mentioned the others could not be used. It is moreover by means of these, and of *Articles*, which are nearly allied to them, that

(b) See these reasons at the beginning of this chapter, of which reasons the principal one is, that "no Noun, properly so called, implies its own Presence. It is therefore to ascertain such Presence, that the Pronoun is taken in aid; and hence it is it becomes equivalent to *διηγήσις*, that is, to *Pointing or Indication by the Finger.*" It is worth remarking in that Verse of *Persius*,

' *Sed pulchrum est DIGITO MONSTRARI, & dicier,
HIC EST.*

how the *διηγήσις*, and the *Pronoun* are introduced together, and made to co-operate to the same end.

Sometimes by virtue of *διηγήσις* the Pronoun of the third Person stands for the first.

Quod si militibus parcer, erit HIC quoque Miles.

That is, *I also will be a Soldier.*

Tibul. L. II. El. 6. v. 7. See *Vulpinus*.

It

that " **LANGUAGE**, tho' in itself only Ch. V. " significant of *general Ideas*, is brought " down to denote *that infinitude of Particulars*, which are for ever arising, and " ceasing to be." But more of this hereafter in a proper place.

As to the three orders of Pronouns already mentioned, they may be called *Prepositive*, as may indeed all Substantives, because they are capable of introducing or leading a Sentence, without having reference to any thing previous. But besides those there is **ANOTHER PRONOUN**
(in

It may be observed too, that even in Epistolary Correspondence, and indeed in all kinds of Writing, where the Pronouns I and You make their appearance, there is a sort of *implied Presence*, which they are supposed to indicate, though the parties are in fact at ever so great a distance. And hence the rise of that distinction in *Apollonius*, τας μὲν τὴν ὄψεων εἶναι δύξεις, τας δὲ τὴν νόη, that *some Indications are ocular, and some are mental*. *De Syntaxi*, L. II. c. 3. p. 104.

Ch. V. (in Greek ὁ, ὅσις (i); in Latin, *Qui*; in English, *Who, Which, That*) a Pronoun having a character peculiar to itself, the nature of which may be explained as follows.

SUPPOSE I was to say—**LIGHT is a Body, LIGHT moves with great celerity.**—

These

(i) The Greeks, it must be confess, call this Pronoun ὑποτακτικὸν ἄρθρον, the *subjunctive Article*. Yet, as it should seem, this is but an improper Appellation. *Apollonius*, when he compares it to the ὑποτακτικὸν or true *prepositive Article*, not only confesses it to differ, as being express by a different Word, and having a different place in every Sentence; but in Syntax he adds, *it is wholly different*. *De Syntax.* L. I. c. 43. p. 91. *Theodore Gaza* acknowledges the same, and therefore adds—ὅτεν δὴ καὶ ἡ κυρίως ἀντὶ τοῦ ἄρθρου ταῦτι—*for these reasons this (meaning the Subjunctive) cannot properly be an Article.* And just before he says, *κυρίως γε μὴν ἄρθρον τὸ ὑποτακτικόν*—*however properly speaking it is the Prepositive is the Article.* *Gram. Introd. L. IV.* The Latins therefore have undoubtedly done better in ranging it with the Pronouns.

These would apparently be two distinct Ch. V. Sentences. Suppose, instead of the Second, **LIGHT**, I were to place the prepositive Pronoun, **IT**, and say—**LIGHT** is a *Body*; **IT** moves with great celerity—the Sentences would still be distinct and two. But if I add a *Connective* (as for Example an **AND**) saying—**LIGHT** is a *Body*, **AND** it moves with great celerity—I then by Connection make the two into one, as by cementing many Stones I make one Wall.

Now it is in the *united Powers of a Connective, and another Pronoun*, that we may see the force, and character of the Pronoun here treated. Thus therefore, if in the place of **AND IT**, we substitute **THAT**, or **WHICH**, saying **LIGHT** is a *Body*, **WHICH** moves with great celerity—the Sentence still retains its *Unity* and *Perfection*, and becomes if possible more compact than before. We may with just reason therefore call this Pronoun the **SUBJUNCTIVE**, because it cannot (like the

Ch. V. the Prepositive) - introduce an original
 Sentence, but only serves to subjoin one to
 some other, which is previous (k).

THE

(k) Hence we see why the Pronoun here mentioned is always *necessarily* the Part of some *complex* Sentence, which Sentence contains, either express or understood, *two* Verbs, and *two* Nominatives.

Thus in that Verse of *Horace*,

Qui metuens vivit, liber mibi non erit unquam.

Ille non erit liber—is one Sentence; *qui metuens vivit*—is another. *Ille* and *Qui* are the *two Nominatives*; *Erit* and *Vivit*, the *two Verbs*; and so in all other instances.

The following passage from *Apollonius* (though somewhat corrupt in more places than one) will serve to shew, whence the above Speculations are taken.

Τὸ ὑποτκλικὸν ἄρθρον ἐπὶ ῥῆμα ἴδιον φέρεται, συνδεδεμένον διὰ τῆς ἀναφορᾶς τῷ προκειμένῳ ὄνόματι· καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἀπλεῖν λόγον ἐπιτριβάνει καὶ τὴν τῶν δύο ῥημάτων σύνταξιν (λέγω τὴν ἐν τῷ ὄνόματι, καὶ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἄρθρῳ) ὅπερ παλιν παρείπετο τῷ ΚΑΙ συνδέσμῳ. Κοινὸν μὲν (lege ΤΟ ΚΑΙ γὰρ κοινὸν μὲν) παρε-

THE Application of this SUBJUNCTIVE, Ch. V.
like the other Pronouns, is universal. It
may

ταρελάμεσσε τὸ ὄνομα τὸ προκείμενον, σύμπλεκον
δὲ ἔτερον λόγου τάντως καὶ ἔτερον ρῆμα ταρελάμεσσε,
καὶ γάτῳ τὸ, ΠΑΡΕΓΕΝΕΤΟ Ο ΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ,
ΟΣ ΔΙΕΛΕΞΑΤΟ, δυνάμει τὸν αὐτὸν αποτελεῖ τὸ
(fori. τῷ) Ο ΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ ΠΑΡΕΓΕΝΕΤΟ,
ΚΑΙ ΔΙΕΛΕΞΑΤΟ. The subjunctive Article, (that
is, the Pronoun here mentioned) is applied to a Verb of
its own, and yet is connected withal to the antecedent
Noun. Hence it can never serve to constitute a simple
Sentence, by reason of the Syntax of the two Verbs, I mean
that which respects the Noun or Antecedent, and that
which respects the Article or Relative. The same too fol-
lows as to the Conjunction, AND. This Copulative af-
firms the Antecedent Noun, which is capable of being ap-
plied to many Subjects, and by connecting to it a new Sen-
tence, of necessity assumes a new Verb also. And hence it
is that the Words—the Grammarians came, who dis-
coursed—form in power nearly the same sentence, as if
we were to say—the Grammarians came, AND dis-
coursed. *Apoll. de Syntaxi, L. I. c. 43. p. 92.* See
also an ingenious French Treatise, called *Grammaire
générale & raisonnée*, Chap. IX.

The Latins, in their Structure of this Subjunctive,
seem to have well represented its compound Nature of
part Pronoun, and part Connective, in forming their

Ch. V. may be the Substitute of all kinds of Substantives, natural, artificial, or abstract; as well as general, special, or particular. We may say, the *Animal*, *Whicb*, &c. the *Man*, *Whom*, &c. the *Ship*, *Whicb*, &c. *Alexander*, *Wbo*, &c. *Bucephalus*, *That*, &c. *Virtue*, *Whicb*, &c. &c.

NAY, it may even be the Substitute of all the other Pronouns, and is of course therefore expressive of all three Persons. Thus we say, *I, who now read, have near finished this Chapter*; *THOU, WHO now readest*: *HE, WHO now readeth*, &c. &c.

AND thus is THIS SUBJUNCTIVE truly a *Pronoun* from its *Substitution*, there being

qui and quis from que and is, or (if we go with Scaliger to the Greek) from KAI and 'ΟΣ, KAI and 'Ο. *Scal. de Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 127.*

HOMER also expresses the Force of this *Subjunctive, Pronoun or Article*, by help of the *Prepositive* and a *Connective*, exactly consonant to the Theory here established. See *Iliad*, Λ. ver. 270, 553. Ν. 571. Π. 54, 157, 158.

ing no Substantive existing, in whose Ch. V. place it may not stand. At the same time, it is *essentially distinguished* from the other Pronouns, by this peculiar, that it is not only a *Substitute*, but withal a *Connective* (!).

AND

(!) Before we quit this Subject, it may not be improper to remark, that in the Greek and Latin Tongues the two principal Pronouns, that is to say, the First and Second Person, the *Ego* and the *Tu*, are *implied* in the very Form of the Verb itself ($\gamma\varphi\alpha\phi\psi$, $\gamma\varphi\alpha\phi\epsilon\iota\varsigma$, *scribo*, *scribis*) and are for that reason never *express*, unless it be to mark a Contradistinction; such as in *Virgil*,

*Nos patriam fugimus; Tu, Tityre, latus in umbrâ
Formosam resonare doces, &c.*

This however is true with respect only to the *Casus rectus*, or *Nominative* of these Pronouns, but not with respect to their *oblique Casus*, which must always be added, because tho' we see the *Ego* in *Amo*, and the *Tu* in *Amas*, we see not the *Tu* or *Me* in *Amat*, or *Amant*.

Yet even these *oblique Casus* appear in a different manner, according as they mark Contradistinction, or not. If they contradictinguish, then are they *commonly* placed at the beginning of the Sentence, or at least before the Verb, or leading Substantive.

G 2

Thus

Ch. V. AND now to conclude what we have
 said concerning Substantives. All Sub-
 STANTIVES

Thus *Virgil*,

— *Quid Theseia, magnum
 Quid memorem Alciden? Et mi genus ab Jove summo.*

Thus *Homer*,

‘*ΤΜΙΝ μὲν θεοὶ δοῖεν* —
Παῖδα δὲ ΜΟΙ λύτας φίλαν — I. A.

where the *Τμῖν* and the *Μοὶ* stand, as contradistinguished, and both have precedence of their respective Verbs, the *Τμῖν* even leading the whole Sentence. In other instances, these Pronouns commonly take their place behind the Verb, as may be seen in examples every where obvious. The Greek Language went farther still. When the oblique Case of these Pronouns happened to contradict the Verb, they assumed a peculiar Accent of their own, which gave them the name of *ορθοτονεμέναι*, or *Pronouns uprightly accented*. When they marked no such opposition, they not only took their place behind the Verb, but even gave it their Accent, and (as it were) *inclined themselves upon it*. And hence they acquired the name of *Εγκλιτικαὶ*, that is, *Leaning* or *Inclining* Pronouns. The Greeks too had in the first person *Ἐμοὶ*, *Ἐμοι*, *Ἐμέ* for *Contradistinctives*, and *Με*, *Μοὶ*, *Μὲ* for *Enclitics*. And hence it was that *Apollonius* contended, that in the passage above quoted from the first *Iliad*, we should read *παῖδα δὲ ΕΜΟΙ*, for

STANTIVES are either *Primary*, or *Secondary*, that is to say, according to a Language more familiar and known, are either **NOUNS** or **PRONOUNS**. The **NOUNS** denote *Substances*, and those either *Natural*, *Artificial*, or *Abstract* *. They moreover denote Things either *General*, or *Special*, or *Particular*. The **PRONOUNS**, their Substitutes, are either *Prepositive*, or *Subjunctive*. THE **PREPOSITIVE** is distinguished into *three Orders* called the *First*, the *Second*, and the *Third Person*. THE **SUBJUNCTIVE** includes

G 3

the

for $\tau\alpha\imath\delta\alpha\ \delta\pi\text{ MOI}$, on account of the Contradistinction, which there occurs between the *Grecians* and *Chryses*. See *Apoll. de Syntaxi*, *L. I. c. 3. p. 20. L. II. c. 2. p. 102, 103.*

This Diversity between the Contradistinctive **Pronouns**, and the **Enclitic**, is not unknown even to the *English Tongue*. When we say, *Give me Content*, the (*Me*) in this case is a perfect Enclitic. But when we say, *Give Mé Content*, *Give Him his thousands*, the (*Me*) and (*Him*) are no Enclitics, but as they stand in opposition, assume an Accent of their own, and so become the true $\dot{\alpha}\theta\sigma\tau\alpha\imath\mu\epsilon\gamma\alpha\imath$.

* See before, p. 37, 38.

Ch. V. the powers of all those three, having
superadded, as of its own, the peculiar
force of a *Connective*.

HAVING done with **S U B S T A N T I V E S**,
we now proceed to **A T T R I B U T I V E S**.

C H A P. VI.

Concerning *Attributives*.

ATTRIBUTIVES are *all those principal Words, that denote Attributes, considered as Attributes.* Such for example are the Words, *Black, White, Great, Little, Wise, Eloquent, Writeth, Wrote, Writing, &c.* (a).

How-

(a) In the above list of Words are included what Grammarians called *Adjectives, Verbs, and Particles*, in as much as *all of them equally denote the Attributes of Substance*. Hence it is, that as they are all from their very nature the Predicates in a Proposition (being all predicated of some Subject or Substance, *Snow is white, Cicero writeth, &c.*) hence I say the Appellation PHMA or VERB is employed by Logicians in an extended Sense to denote them all. Thus Ammonius explaining the reason, why Aristotle in his Tract de Interpretatione calls λευκὸς a Verb, tells us πᾶσαν φωνὴν, κατηγορύμενον ὄρον εἰς τροτασει τοισταν, 'PHMA καλεῖθαι, that every Sound articulate, that forms the

Ch.VI. HOWEVER, previously to these, and to every other possible Attribute, whatever a thing may be, whether black or white, square or round, wise or eloquent, writing or thinking, it must *first* of necessity **EXIST**, before it can possibly be any thing else. For **EXISTENCE** may be considered as *an universal Genus*, to which all things of all kinds are at all times to be referred. The Verbs therefore, which denote it, claim precedence of all others, as being essential to the very being of every Proposition, in which they may still be found, either *express*, or by *implication*; express, as when we say, *The Sun is bright*; by im-

Predicate in a Proposition, is called a VERB, p. 24. Edit. Ven. Priscian's observation, though made on another occasion, is very pertinent to the present. *Non Declinatio, sed proprietas excutienda est significacionis*. L. II. p. 576. And in another place he says — *non similitudo declinationis omnimodo conjungit vel discernit partes orationis inter se, sed vis ipsius significacionis*. L. XIII. p. 970.

implication, as when we say, *The Sun Ch. VI. rises*, which means, when resolved, *The Sun is rising (b)*.

THE Verbs, *Is*, *Groweth*, *Becometh*, *Eſt*, *Fit*, ὑπάρχει ἐσί, πέλει, γίγνεται, are all of them used to express this general *Genus*. The *Latins* have called them *Verba Substantiva*, *Verbs Substantive*, but the *Greeks* Ρήματα Ἐπαρκτικὰ, *Verbs of Existence*, a Name more apt, as being of greater latitude, and comprehending equally as well Attribute, as Substance. The principal of those Verbs, and which we shall particularly here consider, is the Verb, *Ἐſi*, *Eſt*, *Is*.

Now all EXISTENCE is either absolute or qualified—*absolute*, as when we say, *B is*; *qualified*, as when we say, *B IS AN ANIMAL; B IS BLACK, IS ROUND, &c.*

WITH

(b) See *Metaphys. Aristot.* L. V. c. 7. Edit. *Du-Vall.*

Ch.VI. WITH respect to this difference, the Verb (*is*) can by itself express *absolute Existence*, but never the *qualified*, without subjoining the particular Form, because the Forms of Existence being in number infinite, if the particular Form be not express, we cannot know which is intended. And hence it follows, that when (*is*) only serves to subjoin some such Form, it has little more force, than that of *a mere Assertion*. It is under the same character, that it becomes a latent part in every other Verb, by expressing that Assertion, which is one of their Essentials. Thus, as was observed just before, *Risetb* means, *is rising*; *Writeth*, *is writing*.

AGAIN—As to EXISTENCE in general, it is either *mutable*, or *immutable*; *mutable*, as in the *Objects of Sensation*; *immutable*, as in the *Objects of Intellec^{tion} and Science*. Now *mutable* Objects exist all in *Time*, and admit the several Distinctions

stinctions of present, past, and future. Ch. VI.
But *immutable Objects* know no such ~~Di-~~
~~stinctions~~, but rather stand opposed to all
things temporary.

AND hence two different Significations
of the substantive Verb (*is*) according
as it denotes *mutable*, or *immutable* Be-
ing.

FOR example, if we say, *This Orange*
is ripe, (*is*) meaneth, *that it existeth* *so*
now at this present, in opposition to *past*
time, when it was green, and to *future*
time, when it will be rotten.

BUT if we say, *The Diameter of the*
Square is incommensurable with its side,
we do not intend by (*is*) that it is incom-
mensurable *now*, having been *formerly*
commensurable, or being to become so
bereafter; on the contrary we intend that
Perfection of Existence, to which *Time*
and *its Distinctions* are utterly unknown.
It is under the same meaning we employ
this

Ch. VI. this Verb, when we say, **TRUTH IS**,
 or, **GOD IS**. The opposition is not of
Time present to other Times, but of *necessary Existence* to *all temporary Existence*
whatever (c). And so much for *Verbs of Existence*, commonly called *Verbs Substantive*.

WE are now to descend to the common Herd of *Attributives*, such as *black* and *white*, *to write*, *to speak*, *to walk*, &c. among which, when compared and opposed to each other, one of the most eminent distinctions appears to be this. Some, by being joined to a proper *Substantive*

(c) *Cum enim dicimus, DEUS EST, non eum dicimus NUNC ESSE, sed tantum IN SUBSTANTIA ESSE, ut hoc ad immutabilitatem potius substantiae, quam ad tempus aliquod referatur. Si autem dicimus, DIES EST, ad nullam diei substantiam pertinet, nisi tantum ad temporis constitutionem; hoc enim, quod significat, tale est, tanquam si dicamus, NUNC EST. Quare cum dicimus ESSE, ut substantiam designemus, simpliciter EST addimus; cum vero ita ut aliquid praesens significetur, secundum Tempus. Boeth. in Lib. de Interpr. p. 307. See also Plat. Tim. p. 37, 38. Edit. Serrani.*

stantive *make* without farther help a perfect assertive Sentence; while the rest, tho' otherwise perfect, are in this respect deficient.

To explain by an example. When we say, *Cicero eloquent, Cicero wise*, these are imperfect Sentences, though they denote a Substance and an Attribute. The reason is, that they want an Assertion, to shew that such Attribute appertains to such Substance. We must therefore call in the help of an Assertion elsewhere, an (*is*) or a (*was*) to complete the Sentence, saying *Cicero is wise, Cicero was eloquent*. On the contrary, when we say, *Cicero writeth, Cicero walketh*, in instances like these there is no such occasion, because the Words (*writeth*) and (*walketh*) imply in their own Form not an Attribute only, but an Assertion likewise. Hence it is they may be resolved, the one into *Is* and *Writing*, the other into *Is* and *Walking*.

Now

Ch. VI. Now all those **Attributives**, which have this complex Power of denoting both an **Attribute** and an **Assertion**, make that Species of Words, which Grammarians call **VERBS**. If we resolve this complex Power into its distinct Parts, and take *the Attribute alone* without the Assertion, then have we **PARTICIPLES**. All other **Attributives**, besides the two Species before, are included together in the general Name of **ADJECTIVES**.

AND thus it is, that **ALL ATTRIBUTIVES** are either **VERBS**, **PARTICIPLES**, or **ADJECTIVES**.

BESIDES the Distinctions abovementioned, there are others, which deserve notice. Some **Attributes** have their Essence in *Motion*; such are *to walk*, *to fly*, *to strike*, *to live*. Others have it in the *privation of Motion*; such are *to stop*, *to rest*, *to cease*, *to die*. And lastly, others have it in subjects, *which have nothing to*

do with either Motion or its Privation; Ch.VI. such are the Attributes of, Great and Little, White and Black, Wise and Foolish, and in a word the several Quantities and Qualities of all Things. Now these last are ADJECTIVES; those which denote Motions, or their Privation, are either VERBS or PARTICIPLES.

AND this Circumstance leads to a farther Distinction, which may be explained as follows. That *all Motion is in Time*, and therefore, wherever it exists, implies Time as its concomitant, is evident to to all, and requires no proving. But besides this, *all Rest or Privation of Motion implies Time likewise*. For how can a thing be said to rest or stop, by being in *one* Place for *one* Instant only?—so too is that thing, which moves with the greatest velocity. † To stop therefore or rest, is to be in *one* Place for *more than one* Instant,

† Thus *Proclus* in the Beginning of his Treatise concerning Motion. Ηρεμεν ἐσὶ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὑπερον
ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ ὅν, καὶ αὐτὸ, καὶ τὰ μέρη.

Ch. VI. Instant, that is to say, *during an Extension* between two *Instants*, and this of course gives us the Idea of TIME. As therefore *Motions* and their *Privation* imply Time as their concomitant, so *VERBS*, which denote them, come to denote Time also. (d). And hence the origin and use of *TENSES*, " which are so many different forms, as signed to each Verb, to shew, without altering its principal meaning, the various TIMES in which such meaning may exist." Thus *Scribit*, *Script*, *Scriperat*, and *Scribet*, denote all equally the Attribute, *To Write*, while the difference between them, is, that they denote *Writing in different Times*.

SHOULD

(d) The antient Authors of Dialectic or Logic have well described this Property. The following is part of their Definition of a Verb—*πημα δι ει τὸ ωροσημαῖνον χρόνον*, a Verb is something, which signifies Time OVER AND ABOVE (for such is the force of the Preposition, Πρὸς.) If it should be asked, over and above what? It may be answered, over and above its principal Signification, which is to denote some moving and energizing Attribute. See *Arist. de Interpret.* c. 3. together with his Commentators *Ammonius* and *Boethius*.

SHOULD it be asked, whether *Time* it- Ch. VI.
self may not become upon occasion the ~~—~~
Verb's *principal* Signification; it is an-
swered, No. And this appears, because
the same Time may be denoted by diffe-
rent verbs (as in the words, *writeth* and
speaketh) and *different Times* by the same
Verb (as in the words, *writeth* and *wrote*)
neither of which could happen, were
Time any thing more, than a mere *Conco-
mitant*. Add to this, that when words
denote *Time*, not collaterally, but prin-
cipally, they cease to be verbs, and be-
come either *adjectives*, or *substantives*.
Of the *adjective* kind are *Timely*, *Yearly*,
Dayly, *Hourly*, &c. of the *substantive* kind
are *Time*, *Year*, *Day*, *Hour*, &c.

THE most obvious division of *TIME* is
into *Present*, *Past*, and *Future*, nor is any
language complete, whose verbs have
not *TENSES*, to mark these distinctions.
But we may go still farther. *Time past*
and *future* are both *infinitely* extended.

H

Hence

Ch.VI. Hence it is that in *universal Time past* we may assume *many particular Times past*, and in *universal Time future*, *many particular Times future*, some more, some less remote, and corresponding to each other under different relations. Even *present Time itself* is not exempt from these differences, and as necessarily implies *some degree of Extension*, as does every given line, however minute.

HERE then we are to seek for the reason, which first introduced into language that variety of Tenses. It was not it seems enough to denote *indefinitely* (or by Aorists) mere Present, Past, or Future, but it was necessary on many occasions to define with more precision, *what kind* of Past, Present, or Future. And hence the multiplicity of Futures, *Præterits*, and even Present Tenses, with which all languages are found to abound, and without which it would be difficult to ascertain our Ideas.

How-

HOWEVER as the knowledge of TEN- Ch.VI.
TES depends on the Theory of TIME, ~~—~~
and this is a subject of no mean specula-
tion, we shall reserve it by itself for the
following chapter.

C H A P. VII.

Concerning Time, and Tenses.

C.VII. **T**IME and SPACE have this in common, that they are both of them by nature things *continuous*, and as such they both of them imply *Extension*. Thus between *London* and *Salisbury* there is the Extension of Space, and between *Yesterday* and *To-morrow*, the Extension of Time. But in this they differ, that all the parts of Space exist *at once and together*, while those of Time only exist *in Transition or Succession* (a). Hence then we may gain some Idea of TIME, by considering it under the notion

(a) See Vol. I. p. 275. Note XIII. To which we may add, what is said by Ammonius—οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ χρόνος ὅλος ἀμα νοίσαται, ἀλλ' ἡ κατὰ μόνον τὸ ΝΤΝ· ἐν γὰρ τῷ γίνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι τὸ εἶναι ἔχει. TIME doth not subsist the whole at once, but only in a single Now or INSTANT; for it bath its Existence in becoming and in ceasing to be. Amm. in *Predicam.* p. 82. b.

notion of *a transient Continuity*. Hence C. VII. also, as far as the affections and properties of *Transition* go, Time is *different* from Space; but as to those of *Extension* and *Continuity*, they perfectly coincide.

LET us take, for example, such a part of Space, as a Line. In every given Line we may assume any where a *Point*, and therefore in every given Line there may be assumed infinite Points. So in every given Time we may assume any where a *Now* or *Instant*, and therefore in every given Time there may be assumed infinite *Nows* or *Instants*.


FARTHER still—A POINT is the *Bound* of every finite Line; and A Now or Instant, of every finite Time. But altho' they are *Bounds*, they are neither of them *Parts*, neither the *Point* of any Line, nor the *Now* or *Instant* of any Time. If this appear strange, we may remember, that the *parts* of any thing *extended* are necessarily

C.VII. *safily extended also, it being essential to*
~~length~~ *their character, that they should measure*
their Whole. But if a *Point* or *Now* were
extended, each of them would contain
within itself infinite other Points, and in-
finite other Nows (for these may be assu-
med infinitely within the minutest Exten-
*sion) and this, it is evident, would be ab-
*surd and impossible.**

THESE assertions therefore being ad-
mitted, and both Points and Nows being
taken as Bounds, but not as Parts (b), it will
follow,

(b) — φανερὸν ὅτι ἐδὲ μόριον τὸ ΝΤΝ τὸ χρόνον
 ἔσπειρ ἐδὲ αἱ σιγμαὶ τῆς γραμμῆς· αἱ δὲ γραμμαὶ δύο
 τῆς μίας μόρια. It is evident that A Now or Instant
 is no more a part of Time, than Points are of a Line,
 The parts indeed of one Line are two other Lines. Natur.
 Auct. L. IV. c. 17. And not long before. Τὸ δὲ
 ΝΤΝ εἰ μέρος μετρεῖ, τε γὰρ τὸ μέρος, καὶ σύγ-
 κεισθαι δεῖ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν ὁ δὲ ΧΡΟΝΟΣ δὲ
 δοκεῖ σύγκεισθαι ἐκ τῶν ΝΤΝ. A Now is no Part of
 Time; for a Part is able to measure its Whole, and the
 Whole is necessarily made up of its Parts; but TIME doth
 not appear to be made up of Nows. Ibid. c. 14.

follow, that in the same manner as *the same* C. VII. *Point* may be the *End* of one Line, and the *Beginning* of another, so the *same Now* or *Instant* may be the *End* of one Time, and the *Beginning* of another. Let us suppose for example, the Lines, A B, B C.



I say that the Point B is the End of the Line A B, and the Beginning of the Line, B C. In the same manner let us suppose A B, B C to represent certain Times, and let B be a *Now* or *Instant*. In such case I say that the *Instant* B is the End of the Time A B, and the Beginning of the Time B C. I say likewise of these two Times, that with respect to the *Now* or *Instant*, which they include, the first of them is necessarily PAST TIME, as being *previous* to it; the other is necessarily FUTURE, as being *subsequent*. As therefore

C.VII. every Now or Instant always exists in Time, and without being Time, is Time's Bound; the Bound of Completion to the Past, and the Bound of Commencement to the Future: from hence we may conceive its nature or end, which is to be the Medium of Continuity between the Past and the Future, so as to render Time, thro' all its Parts, one Intire and Perfect Whole (c).

FROM the above speculations, there follow some conclusions, which may be perhaps called paradoxes, till they have been attentively considered. In the first place there cannot (strictly speaking) be any such

(c) Τὸ δὲ ΝΤΝ ἐστι συνέχεια χρόνου, ὥσπερ ἐλέχει. Συνέχεια γὰρ τὸν χρόνον, τὸν παρεθόντα καὶ ἐσόμενον, καὶ ὅλως τέρας χρόνος ἐσίν. ἐστι γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἀρχὴ, τὸ δὲ τελευτή. A Now or Instant is (as was said before) the Continuity or holding together of Time; for it makes Time continuous, the past and the future, and is in general its boundary, as being the beginning of one Time and the ending of another. Natur. Auscult. L. IV. c. 19. Συνέχεια in this place means not Continuity, as standing for Extension, but rather that Function or Holding together, by which Extension is imparted to other things.

such thing as Time present. For if all Time C.VII.
be *transient* as well as *continuous*, it cannot
like a Line be present all together, but
part will necessarily be gone, and part be
coming. If therefore any portion of its
continuity were to be present *at once*, it
would so far quit its *transient* nature, and
be *Time* no longer. But if no portion of
its continuity can be thus present, how
can *Time* possibly be *present*, to which
such Continuity is essential?

FARTHER than this—If there be no
such thing as *Time Present*, there can be *no*
Sensation of Time by any one of the senses.
For ALL SENSATION is of the [†]Present on-
ly, the Past being preserved not by Sense but
by *Memory*, and the Future being antici-
pated by *Prudence* only and wise *Fore-sight*.

BUT if *no Portion* of Time be the ob-
ject of *any Sensation*; farther, if the Pre-
sent

[†] Ταυτὴ γὰρ (αισθήσει sc.) ὅυτε τὸ μέλλον, ὅυτε
τὸ γιγνόμενον γνωρίζομεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ παρὸν μόνον.
Αρις. περὶ Μνημ. Α. α.

C. VII. sent *never* exist ; if the Past be *no more* ;
 if the Future be not *as yet* ; and if these
 are all the parts, out of which TIME is
 compounded : how strange and shadowy
 a Being do we find it ? How nearly ap-
 proaching to a perfect Non-entity (*d*) ?
 Let us try however, since the senses fail
 us, if we have not faculties of higher
 power, to seize this fleeting Being.

THE World has been likened to a va-
 riety of Things, but it appears to resem-
 ble no one more, than some moving spec-
 tacle

(*d*) "Οτι μὲν οὐ δλως ἐκ ἐσίν, οὐ μόγις καὶ αἰμυδρῶς,
 ἐκ τῶν δὲ τις ἀν υποπλέυστε" τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς γέγονε,
 καὶ ἐκ ἐσίν τὸ δὲ μέλλει, καὶ ὅπω ἐσίν ἐκ δὲ τέτων καὶ
 ὁ ἀπειρός καὶ ὁ αἰεὶ λαμβανόμενός χρόνος σύγκειται·
 τὸ δὲ ἐκ μὴ ὄντων συγκείμενον, ἀδύνατον ἀν δοξειε κατέ-
 χειν τοτὲ ποτασ. That therefore TIME exists not at all,
 or at least has but a faint and obscure existence, one may
 suspect from hence. A part of it has been, and is no more ;
 a part of it is coming, and is not as yet ; and out of these
 is made that infinite Time, which is ever to be assumed still
 farther and farther. Now that which is made up of no-
 thing but Non-entities, it should seem was impossible ever to
 participate of Entity. Natural. Ause. L. IV. c. 14.
 See also Philop. M. S. Com. in Nicomach. p. 10.

tacle (such as a procession or a triumph) C.VII.
 that abounds in every part with splendid
 objects, some of which are still departing,
 as fast as others make their appearance.
 The Senses look on, while the sight passes,
 perceiving as much as is *immediately present*,
 which they report *with tolerable accuracy* to
 the Soul's superior powers. Having done
 this, they have done their duty, being con-
 cerned with nothing, save what is present
 and instantaneous. But to the *Memory*, to
 the *Imagination*, and above all to the *Intel-
 lect*, the several *Nows* or *Instants* are not lost,
 as to the *Senses*, but are preserved and made
 objects of *steady* comprehension, however in
 their own nature they may be *transitory* and
passing. "Now it is from contemplating
 "two or more of these Instants under one
 "view, together with that Interval of
 "Continuity, which subsists between
 "them, that we acquire insensibly the
 "Idea of TIME (e)." For example; *The*

Sun

(e) Τότε φαμὲν γεγονόντας χρόνον, σταύ τῷ προτέρῳ
 καὶ ἕτερῳ ἐν τῇ κινήσει οἰσθησιν λαβῶμεν. Ὁρίζομεν

C.VII. *Sun rises; this I remember: it rises again; this too I remember. These Events are not together; there is an Extension between*

ἢ τῷ ἄλλῳ καὶ ἄλλῳ ὑπολαβεῖν αὐτὰ, καὶ μεταξὺ τι
αὐτῶν ἔτερον ὅταν γὰρ τὰ ἄκρα ἔτερα τῷ μέσῳ νοῆσ-
μεν, καὶ δύο ἔπιπη ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ NTN, τὸ μὲν πρότερον,
τὸ δὲ ὑπερόν, τότε καὶ τέτα φαμὲν εἶναι ΧΡΟΝΟΝ.
It is then we say there has been TIME, when we can ac-
quire a Sensation of prior and subsequent in Motion. But
we distinguish and settle these two, by considering one first,
then the other, together with an interval between them dif-
ferent from both. For as often as we conceive the Extremes
so to be different from the Mean, and the Soul talks of two
Now, one prior and the other subsequent, then it is we say
there is TIME, and this it is we call TIME. Natural
Auscult. L. IV. c. 16. Themistius's Comment upon
this passage is to the same purpose. "Οταν γὰρ ὁ νῦς
αναμνησθεὶς τῷ NTN, δὲ χθὲς ἔπιπεν, ἔτερον πάλιν ἔπιπη
τὸ τήμερον, τότε καὶ χρόνον ἐνθύς ἐνεύόστεν, ὑπὸ τῶν δύο
NTN ὁριζόμενον, οἷον ὑπὸ περάτων δυοῖν καὶ ἡτο λέγειν
ἔχει, ὅτι ποσόν ἔρι τεντεκάιδεκα ὥρῶν, ἢ ἑκατόδεκα,
ὅπον ἔξ απέιρε γραμμῆς πτυχαίσιν δύο σημείοις ἀπο-
τεμνόμενος. For when the Mind, remembering the
Now, which it talked of yesterday, talks again of another
Now to-day, then it is it immediately has an idea of TIME,
terminated by these two Nows, as by two Boundaries; and
thus is it enabled to say, that the Quantity is of fifteen, or
of sixteen hours, as if it were to sever a Cubit's length
from an infinite Line by two Points. Themist. Op. edit.
Aldi. p. 45. b.

tween them—not however of *Space*, for C.VII. we may suppose the place of rising the same, or at least to exhibit no sensible difference. Yet still we recognize *some Extension* between them. Now what is this Extension, *but a natural Day?* And what is that, *but pure Time?* It is after the same manner, by recognizing two new Moons, and the Extension between these: two vernal Equinoxes, and the Extension between these; that we gain Ideas of other Times, such as *Months* and *Years*, which are all so many Intervals, described as above; that is to say, *paffing Intervals of Continuity between two Instants viewed together.*

AND thus it is THE MIND acquires the Idea of TIME. But this Time it must be remembered is PAST TIME ONLY, which is always the *first Species*, that occurs to the human intellect. How then do we acquire the Idea of TIME FUTURE? The answer is, we acquire it by *Anticipation*. Should it be demanded still farther, *And what is Anticipation?* We answer, that in this

C.VII. this case it is a kind of reasoning by analogy from similar to similar ; from successions of events, that are past already, to similar successions, that are presumed hereafter. For example : I observe as far back as my memory can carry me, how every day has been succeeded by a night ; that night, by another day ; that day, by another night ; and so downwards in order to the Day that is now. Hence then I *anticipate a similar succession* from the present Day, and thus gain the Idea of days and nights *in futurity*. After the same manner, by attending to the periodical returns of New and Full Moons ; of Springs, Summers, Autumns and Winters, all of which in Time past I find never to have failed, I *anticipate a like orderly and diversified succession*, which makes Months, and Seasons, and Years, *in Time future*.

We go farther than this, and not only thus anticipate in these *natural Periods*, but even in matters of *human and civil concern*. For example : Having observed in many

past instances how health had succeeded C. VII.
to exercise, and sickness to sloth; we an-
ticipate *future* health to those, who, being
now sickly, use exercise; and *future* sick-
ness to those, who, being *now* healthy, are
slothful. It is a variety of such observa-
tions, all respecting one subject, which when
systematized by just reasoning, and made
habitual by due practice, form the charac-
ter of a Master-Artist, or Man of *practical*
Wisdom. If they respect the human body
(as above) they form the Physician; if mat-
ters military, the General; if matters na-
tional, the Statesman; if matters of private
life, the Moralist; and the same in other
subjects. All these several characters in
their respective ways may be said to possess
a kind of prophetic discernment, which not
only presents them *the barren prospect* of
futurity (a prospect not hid from the mean-
est of men) but shews withal those events,
which are likely to attend it, and thus en-
ables them to act with superior certainty
and rectitude. And hence it is, that (if we
except those, who have had diviner assist-
ances)

C. VII. ~~ances~~) we may justly say, as was said of old,
 —————— *He's the best Prophet, who conjectures
 well (f).*

FROM

(f) Μάρτις δ' ἀριστος, δεις ἵκαδει παλαις.
 So Milton.

*Till old Experience do attain
 To something like Prophetic Strain.
 Et facile existimari potest, Prudentiam esse quodam-
 modo Divinationem.*

Corn. Nep. in Vit. Attici.

There is nothing appears so clearly an object of the MIND or INTELLECT ONLY, as the Future does, since we can find no place for its existence any where else. Not but the same, if we consider, is equally true of the Past. For tho' it may have once had another kind of being, when (according to common Phrase) it *actually was*, yet was it then something Present, and not something Past. As Past, it has no existence but in THE MIND or MEMORY, since had it in fact any other, it could not properly be called Past. It was this intimate connection between TIME, and the SOUL, that made some Philosophers doubt, *whether if there was no Soul, there could be any Time*, since Time appears to have its Being in no other region. Πότερον δὲ μὴ ἔστις ψυχῆς ἔιν ἀν δὲ χρόνος, ἀπορήσειν ἀν τις, κ. τ. λ. Natur. Auscult. L. IV. c. 20. Themistius, who comments the above passage, expresses himself more positively. Εἰ τοίνυν διχῶς λέγεται τότε ἀριθμητὸν καὶ τὸ ἀριθμά- μενον, τὸ μὲν τὸ ἀριθμητὸν δηλαδὴ δυνάμει, τὸ δὲ ἐν- σργείᾳ, ταῦτα δὲ ἀν ὑποσάιη, μὴ ὅντος τὸ ἀριθμη- σοντος

FROM what has been reasoned it appears, that knowledge of *the Future* comes from knowledge of *the Past*; as does knowledge of *the Past* from knowledge of *the Present*, so that their *Order to us* is that of PRESENT, PAST, and FUTURE.

OF these Species of knowledge, that of the *Present* is the lowest, not only as *first in perception*, but as far the more extensive, being necessarily common to all *animal* Beings, and reaching even to *Zoo-phytes*, as far as they possess *Sensation*. Knowledge of *the Past* comes next, which is superior to the *former*, as being confined to those animals, that have *Memory* as well as *Senses*. Knowledge of *the Future*

σοντος μάτε δυνάμεις μάτε ἐνεργεία, φανερὸν ὡς οὐκ ἀν
ο χρόνος εἴη, μὴ σοντος ψυχῆς. Them. p. 48. Edit.
Aldi. Vid. etiam ejusd. Comm. in Lib. de An. p. 94.

C.VII. *Future* comes last, as being derived from
the the other two, and which is for that rea-
 Arist. de An.II.3. son *the most excellent* as well as *the most*
 p. 28. *rare*, since Nature in her superadditions
 rises from worse always to better, and is
 never found to sink from better down to
 worse *.


AND now having seen, how we acquire
 the knowledge of *Time past*, and *Time fu-
 ture*; which is first in perception, which
 first in dignity; which more common,
 which more rare; let us compare them
 both to the *present Now* or *Instant*, and
 examine what relations they maintain to-
 wards it.

IN the first place there may be *Times*
 both *past* and *future*, in which the *present*
Now has no existence, as for example in
Yesterday, and *To-morrow*.

AGAIN,

* See below, Note (r) of this Chapter.

AGAIN, the *present Now* may so far belong to *Time* of either sort, as to be *the End* of the past, and *the Beginning* of the future ; but it cannot be included *within* the limits of either. For if it were possible, let us suppose C the *present Now* included



within the limits of the *past Time* A D. In such case C D, part of the past Time A D, will be subsequent to C the *present Now*, and so of course be *future*. But by the Hypothesis it is *past*, and so will be both *Past* and *Future* at once, which is absurd. In the same manner we prove that C cannot be included within the limits of a *future Time*, such as B E.

WHAT then shall we say of such *Times*, as *this Day, this Month, this Year, this*

C.VII. Century, all which include within them
 the *present Now*? They cannot be *past*
Times or *future*, from what has been
 proved ; and *present Time has no existence*,
 as has been proved likewise *. Or shall
 we allow them to be *present*, from the
present Now, which exists within them ;
 so that from the presence of *that* we call
these also *present*, tho' the shortest among
 them has infinite parts always *absent*? If
 so, and in conformity to custom we allow
 such *Times present*, as *present Days, Months,*
Years, and Centuries, each must of neces-
 sity be a *compound of the Past and the Future*,
 divided from each other by some *present*
Now or Instant, and jointly called PRESENT,
while that Now remains within them. Let us
 suppose for example the Time XY, which

f . . . X A B C D E Y . . . *g*

let

* Sup. p. 104.

let us call a Day, or a Century ; and let C.VII. the present *Now* or *Instant* exist at A. I say, in as much as A exists within XY, that therefore XA is Time past, and AY Time future, and the whole XA, AY, *Time present*. The same holds, if we suppose the present Now to exist at B, or C, or D, or E, or any where before Y. When the present Now exists at Y, then is the whole XY *Time past*, and still more so, when the Now gets to g, or onwards. In like manner before the Present Now entered X, as for example when it was at f, then was the whole XY *Time future*; it was the same, when the present Now was at X. When it had past that, then XY became *Time present*. And thus it is that TIME IS PRESENT, while passing, in its PRESENT Now or INSTANT. It is the same indeed here, as it is in *Space*. A Sphere passing over a Plane, and being for that reason present to it, is only present to that Plane *in a single Point at once*,

C.VII. while during the whole progression its
 ↙ parts absent are infinite (g).

FROM what has been said, we may perceive that ALL TIME, of every denomination,

(g) PLACE, according to the antients, was either mediate, or immediate. I am (for example) in *Europe*, because I am in *England*; in *England*, because in *Wiltshire*; in *Wiltshire*, because in *Salisbury*; in *Salisbury*, because in *my own house*; in *my own house*, because in *my study*. Thus far MEDIATE PLACE. And what is my IMMEDIATE PLACE? It is the internal Bound of that containing Body (whatever it be) which co-incides with the external Bound of my own Body. Τοις τερπιέχοντος τοῖς, καθ' ὁ τερπιέχει τὸ τερπιέχομενον. Now as this immediate Place is included within the limits of all the former Places, it is from this relation that those mediate Places also are called each of them *my Place*, tho' the least among them so far exceed my magnitude. To apply this to TIME. The *Present Century* is present in the *present Year*; that, in the *present Month*; that, in the *present Day*; that, in the *present Hour*; that, in the *present Minute*. It is thus by circumscription within circumscription that we arrive at THAT REAL AND INDIVISIBLE INSTANT, which by being itself the *very Essence of the Present* diffuses PRESENCE throughout all

mination, is divisible and extended. But if C.VII. so, then whenever we suppose a definite Time, even though it be a Time present, it must needs have a Beginning, a Middle, and an End. And so much for TIME.

Now from the above doctrine of TIME, we propose by way of Hypothesis the following Theorie of TENSES.

THE TENSES are used to mark Present, Past, and Future Time, either *indefinitely*

all even the largest of Times, which are found to include it within their respective limits. Nicephorus Blemides speaks much to the same purpose. Ἐνεσώς ἐν χρόνος ἐσὶν ὁ ἐφ' ἐκάτερα παραχείμενος τῷ χριώς NTN χρόνος μερικὸς, ἐν παρεληλυθότος καὶ μέλλοντος συνεσώς, καὶ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ χριώς NTN γεινίασιν, NTN λεγόμενος καὶ αὐλός. PRESENT TIME therefore is that which adjoins to the REAL Now or INSTANT on either side, being a limited Time made up of Past and Future, and from its vicinity to that REAL Now said to be Now also itself. Ἐπιλ. φυσικῆς Κεφ. Ζ. See also Arij. Physic. L. VI. c. 2, 3, &c.

C.VII. without reference to any Beginning,
 Middle, or End; or else *definitely*, in reference to such distinctions.

If *indefinitely*, then have we THREE TENSES, an Aorist of the Present, an Aorist of the Past, and an Aorist of the Future. If *definitely*, then have we three Tenses to mark the *Beginnings* of these three Times; three, to denote their *Middles*; and three to denote their *Ends*; in all NINE.

THE three first of these Tenses we call the Inceptive Present, the Inceptive Past, and the Inceptive Future. The three next, the Middle Present, the Middle Past, and the Middle Future. And the three last, the Completive Present, the Completive Past, and the Completive Future.

AND thus it is, that the TENSES in their natural number appear to be TWELVE;
 three

three to denote *Time absolute*, and nine to denote it *under its respective distinctions*. C.VII.

Aorist of the Present.

Γράφω. *Scribo.* I write.

Aorist of the Past.

*Εγράψα. *Scripti.* I wrote.

Aorist of the Future.

Γράψω. *Scribam.* I shall write.

Inceptive Present.

Μέλλω γράφειν. *Scripturus sum.* I am going to write.

Middle or extended Present.

Τυγχάνω γράφων. *Scribo or Scribens sum.* I am writing.

Compleutive Present.

Τέγραψα. *Scripti.* I have written.

Inceptive Past.

*Εμελλον γράφειν. *Scripturus eram.* I was beginning to write.

Middle

C.VII.

Middle or extended Past.

Ἐγράφον ορ ἐτύγχανον γράφων. *Scribebam.*
I was writing.

Compleutive Past.

Ἐγεγράφειν. *Scripseram.* I had done
writing.

Inceptive Future.

Μελλόσω γράφειν. *Scripturus ero.* I
shall be beginning to write.

Middle or extended Future.

Ἐσομαί γράφων. *Scribens ero.* I shall
be writing.

Compleutive Future.

Ἐσομαί γεγράφως. *Scripsero.* I shall
have done writing.

IT is not to be expected that the above
Hypothesis should be justified through all
instances in every language. It fares with
Tenses,

Tenses, as with other affections of speech; C.VII.
be the Language upon the whole ever so
perfect, much must be left, in defiance of
all analogy, to the harsh laws of mere
authority and chance.

IT may not however be improper to inquire, what traces may be discovered in favour of this system, either in languages themselves, or in those authors who have written upon this part of Grammar, or lastly in the nature and reason of things.

IN the first place, as to AORISTS. *Aorists* are usually by Grammarians referred to the *Past*; such are $\eta\lambda\theta\sigma\tau$, *I went*; $\xi\pi\epsilon\sigma\tau$, *I fell*, &c. We seldom hear of them in the *Future*, and more rarely still in the *Present*. Yet it seems agreeable to reason, that wherever Time is signified without any farther circumscription, than that of Simple present, past, or future, the Tense is AN AORIST.

THUS

C.VII. *Thus Milton,*

Millions of spiritual creatures WALK the earth

Unseen, both when we wake, and when we sleep. P. L. IV. 277.

Here the verb (WALK) means not that they were walking *at that instant only, when Adam spoke, but always indefinitely, take any instant whatever.* So when the same author calls *Hypocrisy,*

*— the only Evil, that WALKS
Invisible, except to God alone,*

the Verb (WALKS) hath the like *aoristical or indefinite application.* The same may be said in general of all Sentences of the *Gnomologic* kind, such as

*Ad paenitendum PROPERAT, cito qui
judicat.*

*Avarus, nisi cum moritur, nil recte
FACIT, &c.*

ALL

**ALL these Tenses are so many AORISTS C. VII.
OF THE PRESENT.**

**Gnomologic Sentences after the same
manner make likewise AORISTS OF THE
FUTURE.**

*Tu nihil ADMITTES in te, formidine
pænæ.* Hor.

So too *Legislative Sentences*, *Thou
SHALT not kill, Thou SHALT not steal,
&c.* for this means no one *particular* fu-
ture Time, but is a prohibition extend-
ed *indefinitely* to every part of Time fu-
ture (b).

WE

(b) The *Latin Tongue* appears to be more than or-
dinarily deficient, as to the article of *Aorists*. It has no
peculiar Form even for *an Aorist of the Past*, and there-
fore (as *Priscian* tells us) the *Præteritum* is forced to do
the double duty both of *that Aorist*, and of the *perfect
Present*, its application in particular instances being to
be

C.VII. WE pass from *Aorists*, to THE INCEP-
TIVE TENSES.

THESE may be found in part supplied (like many other Tenses) by verbs auxiliar. ΜΕΛΛΩ γράφειν. *Scripturus sum*. I AM GOING to write. But the Latins go farther, and have a species of Verbs, derived from others, which do the duty of these Tenses, and are themselves for that reason called *Inchoatives* or *Inceptives*. Thus from *Caleo*, I am warm, comes *Calesco*, I begin to grow warm; from *Tumeo*, I swell, comes *Tumesco*, I begin to swell. These *Inchoative* Verbs are so peculiarly appropriated to the *Beginnings* of Time, that they are defective as to all Tenses, which denote it in its *Completion*, and there-

be gathered from the Context. Thus it is that *fecit* means (as the same author informs us) both *πεποίησα* and *ιποίησα*, I have done it, and I did it; *VIDI* both *ἴδης* and *εἶδον*, I have just seen it, and I saw it once. *Prisc. Gram. L. VIII. p. 814, 838. Edit. Putsch.*

therefore have neither *Perfectum, Plus quam-perfectum, or Perfect Future*. There is likewise a species of Verbs called in Greek Ἐφετικὰ, in Latin *Defiderativa*, the *Defideratives* or *Meditatives*, which if they are not strictly *Inceptives*, yet both in Greek and Latin have a near affinity with them. Such are πολεμησεῖω, *Bellaturio*, *I have a desire to make war*; βρωσεῖω, *Efurio*, *I long to eat.* (i). And so much for the **INCEPTIVE TENSES.**

THE two last orders of Tenses which remain, are those we called (k) **THE MIDDLE TENSES** (which express Time as *extended* and

(i) As all *Beginnings* have reference to what is *future*, hence we see how properly these Verbs are formed, the Greek ones from a future Verb, the Latin from a future Participle. From πολεμήσω and βρώσω come πολεμησεῖω and βρωσεῖω; from *Bellatus* and *Efurus* come *Bellaturio* and *Efurio*. See *Macrobius*, p. 691. Ed. Var. εἰ πάντι γέ με νῦν δὴ ΓΕΛΑΣΕΙΟΝΤΑ εποίησας γελάσαι. *Plato in Phædone.*

(k) Care must be taken not to confound these *middle* Tenses, with the Tenses of those Verbs, which bear the same name among Grammarians.

C. VII. and *passing*) and the **PERFECT** or **COMPLETIVE**, which express its *Completion* or *End*.

Now for these the authorities are many. They have been acknowledged already in the ingenious Accidence of Mr. *Hoadly*, and explained and confirmed by Dr. *Samuel Clarke*, in his rational edition of *Homer's Iliad*. Nay, long before either of these, we find the same scheme in *Scaliger*, and by him (*l.*) ascribed to † *Grocinus*, as its author. The learned *Gaza*

(who

(*l.*) *Ex his percipimus Grocinum acutè admodum Tempora divisiisse, sed minus commodè. Tria enim constituit, ut nos, sed quæ bisariam fecat, Perfectum & Imperfectum: sic, Præteritum imperfectum, Amabam: Præteritum perfectum, Amaveram. Rectè sani. Et Præsens imperfectum, Amo. Rectè hactenus; continuat enim amorem, neque absolvit. At Præsens perfectum, Amavi: quis hoc dicat?—De Futuro autem ut non malè sentit, ita controversum est. Futurum, inquit, imperfectum, Amabo: Perfectum, Amavero. Non malè, inquam: significat enim Amavero, amorem futurum & absolutumiri: Amabo perfectiōnē nullam indicat.* De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 113.

† His Name was *William Grocin*, an *Englishman*, contemporary with *Erasmus*, and celebrated for his learning. He went to *Florence* to study under *Landin*, and was Professor at *Oxford*. *Spec. Lit. Flor.* p. 205.

(who was himself a *Greek*, and one of the ablest restorers of that language in the western world) characterizes the Tenses in nearly the same manner (*m*). What *Apollonius* hints, is exactly consonant (*n*).

Priscian

(*m*) The PRESENT TENSE (as this Author informs us in his excellent Grammar) denotes τὸ ἐνεσάμενον καὶ ἀτελὲς, that which is now *Instant and incomplete*; THE PERFECTUM, τὸ παρεληλυθὸς ἄρτι, καὶ ἐντελὲς τὸ ἐνεσῶτος, that which is now *immediately past, and is the Completion of the Present*; THE IMPERFECTUM, τὸ παρατελλαμένον καὶ ἀτελὲς τὸ παρωχημένος, the *extended and incomplete part of the Past*; and THE PLUSQUAM-PERFECTUM, τὸ παρεληλυθὸς τάλαι, καὶ εντελὲς τὸ παραχειμένος, that which is *past long ago, and is the completion of the præteritum*. Gram. L. IV.

(*n*) Ἐντεῦθεν δὲ τειθόμεθα, δτι ἡ παρωχημένη συντέλειαν σημαίνει ὁ παραχειμένος, τὴν γε μὴν ἐνεσῶσαν —Hence we are persuaded that the *Perfectum* doth not signify the completion of the *Past*, but *PRESENT COMPLETION*. *Apollon.* L. III. c. 6. The Reason, which persuaded him to this opinion, was the application and use of the Particle *αν*, of which he was then treating, and which, as it denoted *Potentiality* or *Contingence*, would afford (he says) with any of the *passing, extended, and incomplete Tenses*, but never with this *PERFECTUM*, because this implied such a *complete and indefeasible existence*, as never to be qualified into the nature of a *Contingent*.

C.VII. *Priscian* too advances the same doctrine from the *Stoics*, whose authority we esteem greater than all the rest, not only from the more early age when they lived, but from their superior skill in Philosophy, and their peculiar attachment to *Dialectic*, which naturally led them to great accuracy in these *Grammatical Speculations* (o).

BEFORE

(o) By these Philosophers the *vulgar present Tense* was called **THE IMPERFECT PRESENT**, and the *vulgar Præteritum*, **THE PERFECT PRESENT**, than which nothing can be more consonant to the system that we favour. But let us hear *Priscian*, from whom we learn these facts. **PRÆSENS TEMPUS** *proprie dicitur*, *cujus pars* *jam præteriit*, *pars futura est*. *Cum enim Tempus, fluvii more, instabili vobatur cursu, vix punctum habere potest in præsenti, hoc est, in instanti. Maxima igitur pars ejus (sicut dictum est) vel præteriit vel futura est.* — *Unde STOICI jure HOC TEMPUS PRESENS etiam IMPERFECTUM* *vocabant* (*ut dictum est*) *eo quod prior ejus pars, quæ præteriit, transacta est, deest autem sequens, id est, futura.* *Ut si in medio versu dicam, scribo versum, priore ejus parte scripta; cui adhuc deest extrema pars, præsenti utor verbo, dicendo, scribo versum: sed IMPERFECTUM est, quod deest adhuc versui, quod scribatur* — *Ex eodem igitur Præsenti nascitur etiam Perfectum.* *Si enim ad finem perveniat incepsum, statim utimur PRÆTERITO PERFECTO; continuo enim, scripto ad finem versu, dico, scripsi versum.* — *And soon after speaking of the Latin* *Per-*

BEFORE we conclude, we shall add a C. VII. few miscellaneous observations, which will be more easily intelligible from the hypothesis here advanced, and serve withal to confirm its truth.

AND first, the *Latins* used their *Præteritum Perfectum* in some instances after a very peculiar manner, so as to imply the very reverse of the verb in its natural signification. Thus, *VIXIT*, signified, **IS DEAD**; *FUIT*, signified, **NOW IS NOT, IS NO MORE**. It was in this sense that *Cicero* addressed the People of *Rome*, when he had put to death the leaders in the *Catilinarian Conspiracy*. He appeared in the

K 2

Forum,

Perfectum, he says—*sciendum tamen, quod Romanus PRÆTERITO PERFECTO non solum in re modo completa-
tetur, (in quo vim habet ejus, qui apud Græcos παρα-
νείσθεν vocatur, quem STOICI ΤΕΛΕΙΟΝ ΕΝΕΣ-
ΤΩΤΑ nominaverunt) sed etiam pro Ἀριστο τε accipitur,
&c. Lib. VIII. p. 812, 813, 814.*

C.VII. Forum, and cried out with a loud voice,
 ↗ * VIXERUNT. So *Virgil*,

— || *Fuimus Troes, fuit Ilium &*
ingens

Gloria Dardanidum —

Æn. II.

And

* So among the *Romans*, when in a Cause all the Pleaders had spoken, the Cryer used to proclaim **DIXERUNT**, i. e. *they have done speaking*. *Afcon. Pæd.* in *Verr. II.*

|| So *Triballus* speaking of certain Prodigies and evil Omens.

Hæc fuerint olim. Sed tu, jam mitis, Apollo,
Prodigia indomitæ merge sub æquoribus.

Eleg. II. 5. ver. 19.

Let these Events HAVE BEEN in days of old;—by Implication therefore—But HENCEFORTH let them be no more.

So *Eneas* in *Virgil* prays to *Phœbus*.

Hac Trojana tenuis fuerit fortuna secuta.

Let Trojan Fortune (that is, adverse, like that of *Troy*, and its inhabitants,) *HAVE so far FOLLOWED us.* By implication therefore, *but let it follow us no farther, Here let it end, Hic sit Finis*, as *Servius* well observes in the place.

In which instances, by the way, mark not only the force of the *Tense*, but of the *Mood*, the *PRECATIVE* or *IMPERATIVE*, not in the *Future* but in the *PAST*. See p. 154, 155, 156.

And again,

C. VII.

— *Locus Ardea quondam*
Dictus avis, & nunc magnum manet
Ardea nomen,

* *Sed fortuna FUIT* — *Æn. VII.*

THE reason of these significations is derived from THE COMPLETIVE POWER of the Tense here mentioned. We see that the periods of Nature, and of human affairs, are maintained by the reciprocal succession of *Contraries*. It is thus with Calm and Tempest; with Day and Night; with Prosperity and Adversity; with Glory and Ignominy; with Life and Death. Hence then, in the instances above, the *completion* of one contrary is put for the *commencement* of the other, and to say, HATH LIVED, or, HATH BEEN, has the same meaning with, IS DEAD, or, IS NO MORE.

K 3

IT

* *Certus in hospitibus non est amor; errat, ut ipsi:*

Cumque nihil speres firmius effe, FUIT.

Epist. Ovid. Helen. Paridi. ver. 190.

Sive erimus, seu nos Fata FUISSE volent.

Tibull. III. 5. 32.

C. VII. IT is remarkable in * *Virgil*, that he frequently joins in the same sentence this complete and perfect *Present* with the extended and passing *Present*; which proves that he considered the two, as belonging to the same species of *Time*, and therefore naturally formed to co-incide with each other.

— *Tibi jam brachia contrahit ardens
Scorpios, & cœli justâ plus parte reliquit.*

G. I.

Terra tremit; fugere feræ — G. I.

*Præsertim si tempestas a vertice sylvis
Incubuit, glemeratque ferens incendia
ventus.* G. II.

— *illa noto citius, volucrique sagittâ,
Ad terram fugit, & portu se condidit
alto.* AEn. V.

IN

* See also *Spencer's Fairy Queen*, B. I. C. 3. St. 19.
C. 3. St. 39. C. 8. St. 9.

*He hath his Shield redeem'd, and forth his Savord he
draws.*

IN the same manner he joins the same C. VII.
 two modifications of *Time in the Past*, that
 is to say, the *complete* and *perfect* Past with
 the *extended* and *passing*.

— *Inruerant Danai, & tectum omne
 tenebant.* AEn. II.

*Tris imbris torti radios, tris nubis aquosae
 Addiderant, rutuli tris ignis, & alitis
 austri.*

*Fulgores nunc terrificos, sonitumque me-
 tumque*

*Miscebant operi, flammisque sequacibus
 iras (p.).* AEn. VIII.

As

(p) The Intention of *Virgil* may be better seen, in rendering one or two of the above passages into *English*.

— *Tibi jam brachia contrahit ardens
 Scorpions, & caeli justâ plus parte reliquit.*

*For thee the scorpion is now contracting his claws,
 and hath already left thee more than a just portion
 of Heaven.* The Poet, from a high strain of poetic adulation, supposes the scorpion so desirous of admitting *Augustus* among the heavenly signs, that though he has already made him more than room enough, yet he still

C.VII. As to the IMPERFECTUM, it is sometimes employed to denote what is *usual* and *customary*. Thus *surgebat* and *scribebat* signify not only, *he was rising*, *he was writing*, but upon occasion they signify, *he USED to rise*, *he USED to write*. The reason of this is, that whatever is *customary*, must be something which has been *frequently repeated*. But what has been *frequently repeated*, must needs require *an Extension of Time past*, and thus we fall insensibly into the TENSE here mentioned.

AGAIN,

continues to be making him more. Here then we have two acts, one *perfect*, the other *pending*, and hence the use of the two different Tenses. Some editions read *relinquit*; but *relinquit* has the authority of the celebrated *Medicean* manuscript.

— *Illa noto citius, volucrique sagittâ,
Ad terram fugit, & portuſe condidit alto.*

The ship, quicker than the wind, or a swift arrow, CONTINUES FLYING to land, and is HID within the lofty harbour. We may suppose this Harbour, (like many others) to have been surrounded with high Land. Hence the Vessel, immediately on entering it, was *completely hid* from those spectators, who had gone out to

see

AGAIN, we are told by *Pliny* (whose authority likewise is confirmed by many gems and marbles still extant) that the ancient painters and sculptors, when they fixed their names to their works, did it *pendenti titulo, in a suspensive kind of Inscription*, and employed for that purpose the Tense here mentioned. It was 'Απελλῆς ἐποίει, *Apelles faciebat*, Πολύκλειτος ἐποίει, *Polycletus faciebat*, and never ἐποίησε or fecit. By this they imagined that they avoided the shew of arrogance, and had in case of censure an apology (as it were) prepared, since it appeared from the work itself, that *it was once indeed in hand*, but no pretension that *it was ever finished* (q).

IT

see the Ship-race, but yet might still continue sailing towards the shore within.

—Inruerant *Danai, & teclum omne tenebant.*

The Greeks HAD ENTERED and WERE THEN POSSESSING the whole House; as much as to say, they had entered, and that was over, but their Possession continued still.

(q) *Plin. Nat. Hist. L. I.* The first Printers (who were most of them Scholars and Critics) in imitation of

the

C.VII. It is remarkable that the very manner, in which the *Latins* derive these tenses from one another, shews a plain reference to the system here advanced. From *the passing Present* come the passing Past, and Future. *Scribo, Scribebam, Scribam.* From *the perfect Present* come the perfect Past, and Future. *Scripsi, Scripseram, Scripsero.* And so in all instances, even where the verbs are irregular, as from *Fero* come *Ferebam* and *Feram*; from *Tuli* come *Tuleram* and *Tulero*.

We shall conclude by observing, that the ORDER of the Tenses, as they stand ranged by the old Grammarians, is not a fortuitous Order, but is consonant to our perceptions, in the recognition of Time, according to what we have explained already

the antient Artists used the same Tense. *Excudebat H. Stephanus. Excudebat Guil. Morslius. Absoluebat Joan. Benenatus*, which has been followed by Dr. *Taylor* in his late valuable edition of *Demosthenes*.

ready (r). Hence it is, that the *Present* C.VII. ~~—~~ *Tense* stands first; then the *Past Tenses*; and lastly the *Future*.

AND now, having seen what authorities there are for Aorists, or those Tenses, which denote Time *indefinitely*; and what for those Tenses, opposed to Aorists, which mark it *definitely*, (such as the Inceptive, the Middle, and the Completive) we here finish the subject of TIME and TENSES, and proceed to consider THE VERB IN OTHER ATTRIBUTES, which it will be necessary to deduce from other principles.

(r) See before p. 109, 110, 111, 112, 113. *Scaliger's* observation upon this occasion is elegant.—*Ordo autem (Temporum scil.) aliter est, quam natura eorum. Quod enim præteriit, prius est, quam quod est, itaque primo loco debere ponи videbatur. Verum, quod primo quoque tempore offertur nobis, id creat primas species in animo: quamobrem Præsens Tempus primum locum occupavit; est enim commune omnibus animalibus. Præteritum autem iis tantum, quæ memoriā prædicta sunt. Futurum vero etiam paucioribus, quippe quibus datum est prudentiæ officium.* De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 113. See also Senecæ Epist. 124. *Mutum animal sensu comprehendit præsentia; præteritorum, &c.*

C H A P. VIII.

Concerning Modes.

C.VIII. **W**E have observed already (*a*) that the Soul's leading powers are those of *Perception* and those of *Volition*, which words we have taken in their most comprehensive acceptation. We have observed also, that *all Speech or Discourse* is a *publishing* or exhibiting some part of our soul, either a certain *Perception*, or a certain *Volition*. Hence then, according as we exhibit it either in *a different part*, or after *a different manner*, hence I say the variety of **Modes** or **Moods** (*b*).

I F

(*a*) See Chapter II.

(*b*) *Gaza* defines a Mode exactly consonant to this doctrine. He says it is—βέλημα, εἰτ' ἐν τάθημα ψυχῆς, διὰ φωνῆς σημαινόμενον—a *Volition or Affection of the Soul, signified through some Voice, or Sound articulate.* Gram. L. IV. As therefore this is the nature of Modes, and Modes belong to Verbs, hence it is *Apollonius*

If we simply declare, or indicate something to be, or not to be, (whether a Perception or Volition; it is equally the same) this constitutes that Mode called the DECLARATIVE OR INDICATIVE. C. VIII.

A Perception.

—*Nosco crinis, incanaque menta
Regis Romani*— Virg. Æn. VI.

A Volition.

*In nova FERT ANIMUS mutatas dicere
formas*
Corpora— Ovid. Metam. I.

If we do not strictly assert, as of something absolute and certain, but as of something *possible* only, and in the number of

Con-

nius observes—*τοῖς πήμασιν ἐξαρέτως παρακεῖται η̄ ψυχικὴ διάθεσις*—the Soul's disposition is in an eminent degree attached to Verbs. De Synt. L. III. c. 13. Thus too Priscian: *Modi sunt diversæ INCLINATIONES ANIMI, quas varia consequitur DECLINATIO VEREI.* L. VIII. p. 821.

C.VIII. *Contingents*, this makes that Mode, which
 Grammarians call the **POTENTIAL**; and
 which becomes on such occasions the
 leading Mode of the sentence.

Sed tacitus pasci si passet Corvus, HA--
 BERET

Plus dapis, &c. Hor.

YET sometimes it is not the leading Mode, but only *subjoined* to the *Indicative*. In such case, it is mostly used to denote the *End*, or *final Cause*; which End, as in human Life it is always a *Contingent*, and may never perhaps happen in despite of all our foresight, is therefore *express* most naturally by the Mode here mentioned. For example,

*Ut JUGULENT homines, surgunt de nocte
 latrones.* HOR.

*Thieves rise by night, that they may cut
 mens throats.*

HERE

HERE that they *rise*, is *positively asserted* C.VIII. in the *Declarative* or *Indicative Mode*; but as to their *cutting mens throats*, this is only *delivered potentially*, because how truly so-ever it may be the *End* of their *rising*, it is still but a *Contingent*, that may never perhaps happen. This Mode, as often as it is in this manner subjoined, is called by Grammarians not the *Potential*, but **THE SUBJUNCTIVE.**

BUT it so happens, in the constitution of human affairs, that it is not always sufficient merely to *declare* ourselves to others. We find it often expedient, from a consciousness of our inability, to address them after a manner more interesting to ourselves, whether to have *some Perception informed*, or *some Volition gratified*. Hence then new Modes of speaking; if we *interrogate*, it is the **INTERROGATIVE MODE**; if we *require*, it is the **REQUISITIVE**. Even the *Requisitive* itself hath its *subordinate Species*: With respect to inferiors, it is an **IMPERATIVE MODE**; with respect to

C.VIII. equals and superiors, it is a PRECATIVE
 or OPTATIVE*.

AND thus have we established a variety of Modes; the INDICATIVE or DECLARATIVE, to assert what we think certain; the POTENTIAL, for the Purposes of whatever we think Contingent; THE INTERROGATIVE, when we are doubtful, to procure us Information; and THE REQUISITIVE, to assist us in the gratification of our Volitions. The Requisitive too appears under two distinct Species, either as it is IMPERATIVE to inferiors, or PRECATIVE to superiors (c).

As

* It was the confounding of this Distinction, that gave rise to a Sophism of *Protagoras*. *Homer* (says he) in beginning his *Iliad* with—Sing, *Muse*, the *Wrath*,—when he thinks to *pray*, in reality *commands*. *εὐχετεῖσι οἱ ἕρεμοι, ἐπιτάττει*. Aristot. Poet. c. 19. The Solution is evident from the Division here established, the Grammatical Form being in both cases the same.

(c) The Species of *Modes* in great measure depend on the Species of *Sentences*. The *Stoics* increased the number of Sentences far beyond the *Peripatetics*. Besides those mentioned in Chapter II. Note (b) they had many

As therefore all these several Modes C. VIII.
have their foundation in nature, so have
certain

many more, as may be seen in *Ammonius de Interpret.* p. 4. and *Diogenes Laertius*, L. VII. 66. The Peripatetics (and it seems too with reason) considered all these additional Sentences as included within those, which they themselves acknowledged, and which they made to be five in number, the Vocative, the Imperative, the Interrogative, the Precative, and the Assertive. There is no mention of a *Potential Sentence*, which may be supposed to co-incide with the Assertive, or Indicative. The Vocative (which the Peripatetics called the *εἶδος κλητικὸν*, but the Stoicks more properly *πρεσευτικὸν*) was nothing more than the Form of address in point of names, titles, and epithets, with which we apply ourselves one to another. As therefore it seldom included any Verb within it, it could hardly contribute to form a verbal Mode. *Ammonius* and *Berthius*, the one a Greek Peripatetic, the other a *Latin*, have illustrated the Species of Sentences from *Homer* and *Virgil*, after the following manner.

Ἄλλα τὰ λόγια πάλι εἰδῶν, τὰ τὰ ΚΛΗΤΙΚΟΥ, ὡς
τὸ, Ὡ μάχαρ Ἀτρείδη —————
ἢ τὰ ΠΡΟΣΤΑΚΤΙΚΟΥ, ὡς τὸ;
Βάσκ' Ίθι, Ἰρι ταχεῖα —————

C.VIII. certain marks or signs of them been introduced into languages, that we may be enabled

τοῦ ΕΡΩΤΗΜΑΤΙΚΟΤ, ὡς τὸ
Τίς, ποθεν εἰς ἀνδρῶν; —
τοῦ ΕΓΚΤΙΚΟΤ, ὡς τὸ;
Δι γάρ οὗτος τοιότερος
ἐπὶ τόντοις, τοῦ ΑΗΟΦΑΝΤΙΚΟΤ, καθετοῦ
παντόμενος τερπὶ ὑπονέν τῶν πραγμάτων, διὸ
— Θεοὶ δέ τε πάντες ἴστοι —
τε τερπὶ παντὸς, &c. Εἰς τὸ τερπὶ Ερμ. p. 4.

Beobius's Account is as follows. *Perfectarum vero
Orationum partes quinque sunt: DEPRECATIVA, ut,*

Jupiter omnipotens, precibus si placteris utile.

Da diende auxilium, Pater, atque haec amina firme.

IMPERATIVA, *u,*

Vade age, Nata, voca Zephyras, & latere penitus.

INTERROGATIVA, ut,

“Dic mihi, Damæta, cujum pecus? —

VOCATIVA, ut,

O! Pater, O! hominum rerumque eterna pater.

ENUNCIATIVA, in qua Veritas vel Falsitas invenitur, sive

Principio arboribus varia est natura creandis.

Boeth. in Lib. de Interp. p. 291.

10

enabled by our discourse to signify them, C.VIII. One to another. And hence those various Modes or Moods, of which we find in common Grammars so prolix a detail, and which are in fact no more than “so many “*literal Forms*, intended to express these “*natural Distinctions*” (d).

Alt

In *Milton* the same Sentences may be found, as follows. **THE PRECATIVE;**

—*Unspurfed Lord! be bounteous still
To give us only Good*—

THE IMPERATIVE;

Go then, Thou mightiest, in thy Father's might.

THE INTERROGATIVE,

Whence; and what art thou, execrable Shape?

THE VOCATIVE;

—*Adam, earth's hallow'd Mold,
Of God inspir'd*—

THE ASSERTIVE OR ENUNCIATIVE;

*The conquer'd also and enslave'd by war
Shall, with their freedom lost, all virtue lose.*

(d) The Greek Language, which is of all the most elegant and complete, expresses these several Modes,

C. VIII. ALL these Modes have this in common, that they exhibit some way or other the

and all distinctions of Time likewise, by an adequate number of Variations in each particular Verb. These Variations may be found, some at the beginning of the Verb, others at its ending, and consist for the most part either in *multiplying* or *diminishing* the number of Syllables, or else in *lengthening* or *shortening* their respective Quantities, which two methods are called by Grammarians the *Syllabic* and the *Temporal*. The *Latin*, which is but a Species of *Greek* somewhat debased, admits in like manner a large portion of those Variations, which are chiefly to be found at the Ending of its Verbs, and but rarely at their Beginning. Yet in its Dependents and Passives it is so far defective, as to be forced to have recourse to the *Auxiliar*, *sum*. The modern Languages, which have still fewer of those Variations, have been necessitated all of them to assume two Auxiliaries at least, that is to say, those which express in each Language the Verbs, *Have*, and *Am*. As to the *English* Tongue, it is so poor in this respect, as to admit no Variation for Modes, and only one for Time, which we apply to express an Aorist of the Past. Thus from *Write* cometh *Wrote*; from *Give*, *Gave*; from *Speak*, *Spake*, &c. Hence to express Time, and Modes, we are compelled to employ no less than seven Auxiliaries, *Do*, *Am*, *Have*, *Shall*, *Will*, *May*, and *Can*; which we use sometimes singly, as when we say, *I am writing*,

the SOUL and its AFFECTIONS. Their C.VIII.
Peculiarities and Distinctions are in part, —
as follows.

THE REQUISITIVE and INTERROGATIVE MODES are distinguished from *the Indicative and Potential*, that whereas these *last seldom call for a Return*, to the two former it is *always necessary*.

IF we compare THE REQUISITIVE MODE with THE INTERROGATIVE, we shall find these also distinguished, and that not only in the *Return*, but in other Peculiarities.

ing, I *have* written; sometimes two together, as, I *have been* writing, I *should have* written; sometimes no less than three, as I *might have been* lost, he *could have been* preferred. But for these, and all other speculations, relative to the Genius of the English Language, we refer the reader, who wishes for the most authentic information, to that excellent Treatise of the learned Dr. Lowth, intitled, *A short Introduction to English Grammar*.

e.viii. *The Return to the Requisitive is sometimes made in Words, sometimes in Deeds.*
 To the request of *Dido* to *Eneas*—

—*q. primā dic, hospes, origine nobis
 Infidias. Dandūm*—

the proper Return was in *Words*, that is, in an historical Narrative. To the Request of the unfortunate Chief—*date obolum Belisario*—the proper Return was in a Deed, that is, in a charitable Relief. But with respect to the Interrogative, the Return is necessarily made in *Words alone*, in *Words*, which are called a *Response* or *Answer*, and which are always actually or by implication some *definitive assertive Sentence*. Take Examples. *Whose Verses are these?*—the Return is a Sentence—*These are Verses of Homer.* *Was Brutus a worthy Man?*—the Return is a Sentence—*Brutus was a worthy Man.*

AND hence (if we may be permitted to digress) we may perceive the

the near affinity of this *Interrogative Mode* C.VIII. with the *Indicative*, in which last its Response or Return is mostly made. So near indeed is this Affinity, that in these two Modes alone the Verb retains the same Form (*e*), nor are they otherwise distinguished, than either by the Addition or Absence of some small particle, or by some minute change in the collocation of the words, or sometimes only by a change in the Tone, or Accent (*f*).

BUT

(*e*) "Ηγε ἦν προκειμένη ὁριστικὴ ἔγκλισις, τὴν ἔγκειμίνην κατάφασιν ἀποβάλλεσσα, μεθίσαται τῇ καλεῖσθαι ὁριστική—ἀναπληρωθεῖσα δὲ τῆς καταφάσεως, ὑπερέφερε εἰς τὸ εἶναι ὁριστική. The *Indicative Mode*, of which we speak, by laying aside that *Assertion*, which by its nature it implies, quits the name of *Indicative*—when it reassumes the *Assertion*, it returns again to its proper Character. Apoll. de Synt. L. III. c. 21. Theodore Gaza says the same, *Introd. Gram.* L. IV.

(*f*) It may be observed of the *INTERROGATIVE*, that as often as the *Interrogation* is *simple* and *definite*, the Response may be made in almost the *same* Words,

C.VIII. BUT to return to our comparison between the *Interrogative Mode* and the *Requisitive*.

THE

by converting them into a sentence affirmative or negative, according as the Truth is either one or the other. For example—*Are these Verses of Homer?*—Response—*These Verses are of Homer.* *Are those Verses of Virgil?*—Response—*Those are not Verses of Virgil.* And here the Artists of Language, for the sake of brevity and dispatch, have provided two Particles, to represent all such Responses; *Yes*, for all the affirmative; *No*, for all the negative.

But when the *Interrogation* is *complex*, as when we say—*Are these Verses of Homer, or of Virgil?*—much more, when it is *indefinite*, as when we say in general—*Whose are these Verses?*—we cannot then respond after the manner above mentioned. The Reason is, that no *Interrogation* can be answered by a simple *Yes*, or a simple *No*, except only those, which are themselves so simple, as of two possible answers to admit only one. Now the least *complex* *Interrogation* will admit of four Answers, two affirmative, two negative, if not perhaps of more. The reason is, a *complex* *Interrogation* cannot consist of less than two simple ones; each of which may be separately affirmed and separately denied. For instance

THE INTERROGATIVE (in the language of Grammarians) has all Persons of

instance—*Are these Verses Homer's, or Virgil's?* (1.) *They are Homer's*—(2.) *They are not Homer's*—(3.) *They are Virgil's*—(4.) *They are not Virgil's*—we may add, (5.) *They are of neither.* The indefinite Interrogations go still farther; for these may be answered by infinite affirmatives, and infinite negatives. For instance—*Whose are these Verses?* We may answer affirmatively—*They are Virgil's, They are Horace's, They are Ovid's, &c.*—or negatively—*They are not Virgil's, They are not Horace's, They are not Ovid's, and so on,* either way, to infinity. How then should we learn from a single *Yes*, or a single *No*, which particular is meant among infinite Possibles? These therefore are Interrogations which must be always answered by a *Sentence*. Yet even here Custom has consulted for Brevity, by returning for Answer only the *single essential characteristic Word*, and retrenching by an Ellipsis all the rest, which rest the Interrogator is left to supply from himself. Thus when we are asked—*How many right angles equal the angles of a triangle?*—we answer in the short monosyllable, *Two*; whereas, without the Ellipsis, the answer would have been—*Two right angles equal the angles of a triangle,*

The

C. VIII. of both *Numbers*. The **REQUISITIVE** or **IMPERATIVE** has no *first Person* of the *singular*, and that from this plain reason; that it is equally absurd in *Modes* for a person to *request* or give *commands to himself*, as it is in *Pronouns*, for the speaker to become *the subject of his own address* *.

AGAIN, we may interrogate as to all Times, both Present, Past, and Future. *Who was Founder of Rome?* *Who is King of China?* *Who will discover the Longitude?*—But *Intreating* and *Commanding* (which are the essence of the Re-

The *Antients* distinguished these two Species of Interrogation by different names. The simple they called 'Ερώτησις, *Interrogatio*; the complex, οὐερά, *Perconatio*. *Ammonius* calls the first of these 'Ερώτησις διαλεξική; the other, 'Ερώτησις οὐερατική. See *Am.* in *Lib. de Interpr.* p. 160. *Diog. Laert.* VII. 66. *Quintil. Inst.* IX. 2.

* Sup. p. 74, 75.

Requisitive Mode) have a necessary respect to the Future (g) only. For indeed ~~what~~ *C. VIII.*

(g) *Apollonius's Account of the Future, implied in all Imperatives, is worth observing.* Ἐπὶ γὰρ μὴ γινομένοις ἡ μὴ γεγονότων ή ΠΡΩΣΤΑΞΙΣ· τὰ δὲ μὴ γινόμενα ἡ μὴ γεγονότα, τιττυδειότητα δὲ ἔχοντα μὲν τὸ ἔστσθαι, ΜΕΛΛΟΝΤΟΣ ἐστι. A COMMAND has respect to those things which either are not doing, or have not yet been done. But those things, which being not now doing, or having not yet been done, have a natural aptitude to exist hereafter, may be properly said to appertain to THE FUTURE. De Syntaxi, L. I. c. 36. Soom before this he says—*Ἄκατη τὰ προσαχθικὰ ἐλεγμένην ὡς τὴν τὰ μέλλοντα διάθεσιν—χρήματα γὰρ οὐ τέλος ἐστιν, οὐ τὸ ΤΤΡΑΝΝΟΚΤΟΝΗΣΑΣ ΤΙΜΑΣΘΩΝ, τῷ, ΤΙΜΗΘΕΣΤΑΙ, κατὰ τὸν χρόνον ἔνοιαιν· τὴν ἐπιλογὴν διπλαχός, καθὸ τὸ μὲν προσαχθικὸν, τὸ δὲ ὄρισικόν.* All IMPERATIVES have a disposition within them, which respects THE FUTURE—with regard therefore to TIME, it is the same thing to say, LET HIM, THAT KILLS A TYRANT, BE HONOURED, or, THAT KILLS ONE, SHALL BE HONOURED; the difference being only in the Mode, in as much as one is IMPERATIVE, the other INDICATIVE or Declarative. Apoll. de Syntaxi, L. I. c. 35. Priscian seems to allow Imperatives a share of Present Time, as well as Future. But if we attend, we shall find his Present to be

C.VIII. what have they to do with the present or
 the past, the natures of which are immutable and necessary?

IT

be nothing else than *an immediate Future*, as opposed to a more distant one. *Imperativus vero Præsens & Futurum [Tempus] naturâli quâdam necessitate videtur posse accipere. Ea etenim imperamus, quæ vel in præsenti statim volumus fieri sine aliquâ dilatione, vel in futuro.* Lib. VIII. p. 806.

It is true the Greeks in their Imperatives admit certain Tenses of the Past, such as those of the *Perfectum*, and of the two *Aorists*. But then these Tenses, when so applied, either totally lose their temporary Character, or else are used to insinuate such a *Speed of execution*, that the deed should be (as it were) *done*, in the very instant when *commanded*. The same difference seems to subsist between our *English Imperative*, BE GONE, and those others of, Go, or BE GOING. The first (if we please) may be styled the *Imperative of the Perfectum*, as calling in the very instant for the completion of our Command: the others may be styled *Imperatives of the Future*, as allowing a reasonable time to begin first, and finish afterward.

It is thus *Apollonius*, in the Chapter first cited, distinguishes between *σχαπίτω τὰς ἀμπέλους*, Go to digging the Vines, and *σχαψάτω τὰς ἀμπέλους*, Get the Vines dug.

It is from this connection of *Futurity* C. VIII. with *Commands*, that the *Future Indicative* is sometimes used for the *Imperative*, and that to say to any one, You **SHALL DO THIS**, has often the same force with the *Imperative*, Do this. So in the Decalogue—**THOU SHALT NOT KILL**—**THOU SHALT NOT BEAR FALSE WITNESS**

dig. The first is spoken (as he calls it) *εἰς ταρατάσιν*, by way of *Extension*, or *allowance of Time* for the work; the second, *εἰς συντελεῖσιν*, with a view to immediate *Completion*. And in another place, explaining the difference between the same Tenses, Σχάπτε and Σχάψος, he says of the last, *καὶ μέροντὸ μὴ γινόμενων προσάστει*, *ἄλλα τὸ τὰ γινόμενον εἰς ταρατάσι απαγορεύει*, that it is not only commands something, which has not been yet done, but forbids also that, which is now doing in an *Extension*, that is to say, in a slow and lengthened progress. Hence, if a man has been a long while writing, and we are willing to hasten him, it would be wrong to say in Greek, ΓΡΑΦΕ, WRITE (for that he is now, and has been long doing); but ΓΡΑΠΟΝ, GET YOUR WRITING done; MAKE NO DELAYS. See Apoll. L. III. c. 24. See also *Macrobius de Diff. Verb. Greec. & Lat.* p. 680. *Edit. Varior. Latini non estimaverunt, &c.*

C. VIII. WITNESS—which denote (we know) the strictest and most authoritative Commands.

As to the POTENTIAL MODE, it is distinguished from all the rest, by its subordinate or subjunctive Nature. It is also farther distinguished from the Requisitive and Interrogative, by implying a kind of feeble and weak Assertion, and so becoming in some degree susceptible of Truth and Falshood. Thus, if it be said potentially, *This may be*, or, *This might have been*, we may remark without absurdity, *It is true*, or *It is false*. But if it be said, *Do this*, meaning, *Fly to Heaven*, or, *Can this be done?* meaning, *to square the Circle*, we cannot say in either case, *it is true* or *it is false*, though the Command and the Question are about things impossible. Yet still the Potential does not aspire to the Indicative, because it implies but a dubious and conjectural Assertion,

Affection, whereas that of the Indicative C. VIII.,
is **absolute**, and without reserve.

THIS therefore (the INDICATIVE I mean) is the Mode, which, as in all Grammars it is the first in order, so is truly first both in dignity and use. It is this, which publishes our sublimest perceptions; which exhibits the Soul in her purest Energies, superior to the Imperfection of desires and wants; which includes the whole of *Time*, and its minutest distinctions; which, in its various *Past* Tenses, is employed by History, to preserve to us the Remembrance of former Events; in its *Futures* is used by Prophecy, or (in default of this) by wise Foresight, to instruct and forewarn us, as to that which is coming; but above all in its *Present* Tense serves Philosophy and the Sciences, by just Demonstrations to establish *necessary Truths*. THAT TRUTH, which from its nature only ex-

C.VIII. *is in the Present*; which knows no distinctions either of Past or of Future, but is every where and always invariably one. (b).

THROUGH

(b) See the quotation, Note (c) Chapter the Sixth.
Cum enim dicimus, Deus est, non cum dicimus nunc esse, sed, &c.

Boethius, author of the sentiment there quoted, was by birth a *Roman* of the first quality; by religion, a *Christian*; and by philosophy, a *Platonic* and *Peripatetic*; which two Sects, as they spring from the same source, were in the latter ages of antiquity commonly adopted by the same Persons, such as *Themistius*, *Porphyry*, *Iamblichus*, *Ammonius*, and others. There were no Sects of Philosophy, that lay greater Stress on the distinction between things existing in *Time* and not in *Time*, than the two above-mentioned. The Doctrine of the Peripatetics on this Subject (since it is these that Boethius here follows) may be partly understood from the following Sketch.

“THE THINGS, THAT EXIST IN TIME, are
 “those whose Existence Time can measure. But if their
 “Existence may be measured by Time, then there
 “may be assumed a Time greater than the Existence
 “of any one of them, as there may be assumed a
 “number greater than the greatest multitude, that is
 “capable

THROUGH all the above Modes, with C. VIII.
their respective Tenses, the Verb being
con-

“ capable of being numbered. And hence it is that
“ *things temporary* have their Existence, as it were li-
“ mited by Time; that they are confined within it, as
“ within some bound; and that in some degree or other
“ they all submit to its power, according to those com-
“ mon Phrases, that *Time is a destroyer*; that *things*
“ *decay through Time*; that *men forget in Time*; and *lose*
“ *their abilities*, and seldom that they improve, or grow
“ *young*, or *beautiful*. The truth indeed is, *Time al-*
“ *ways attends Motion*. Now the natural effect of Mo-
“ *tion is to put something, which now is, out of that state,*
“ *in which it now is*, and so far therefore to destroy that
“ *state*.

“ The reverse of all this holds with THINGS THAT
“ EXIST ETERNALLY. These exist not in Time, be-
“ cause Time is so far from being able to measure their
“ Existence, that no Time can be assumed, which their
“ Existence doth not surpass. To which we may add,
“ that they *feel none of its effects*, being no way obnoxious
“ either to damage or dissolution.

“ To instance in examples of either kind of Being.
“ There are such things at this instant, as *Stonehenge*
“ and the *Pyramids*. It is likewise true at this instant,
“ that the *Diameter of the square is commensurable*
“ *with its side*. What then shall we say? Was there

C. VIII. considered as denoting an ATTRIBUTE,
 has always reference to some Person, or
 SUBSTANCE. Thus if we say, *Went*, or,
Go, or *Whither goeth*, or, *Might have gone*,
 we must add a Person or Substance, to
 make the Sentence complete. Cicero
went; Cæsar *might have gone*; *whither*
goeth the Wind? *Go!* *Thou Traitor!* But
 there is a Mode or Form, under which
 Verbs sometimes appear, where they have
 no reference at all to Persons or Sub-
 stances. For example—*To eat is pleasant*;
 but

“ever a Time, when it was *not incommensurable*, as
 “it is certain there was a Time, when there was no
 “Stonehenge, or Pyramids? or is it *daily growing less*
 “*incommensurable*, as we are assured of Decays in both
 “those massy Structures?” From these unchangeable
 Truths, we may pass to their Place, or Region; to the
 unceasing Intellection of the universal Mind, ever per-
 fect, ever full, knowing no remissions, languors, &c.
 See *Nat. Auct. L. IV. c. 19. Metaph. L. XIV. c. 6, 7,*
8, 9, 10. Edit. Du Val. and Vol. I. p. 262. Note VII.
 The following Passage may deserve Attention.

Ταῦ γάρ Νοῦ ἐ μὲν τοῖν ἀφίσαις, οὐ μὲν τοῦτο ὁ δὲ γέ τερον, οὐ
 τοῦτο. ἀλλὰ γέ δυτος λύπη τέλος, ἀν μὲν ἀρρεσθῆνε διτοῦ τὸ γέ τοῦ
 τοῦ, οὐ πάντα τοῦτο, οὐ μὲν ἀλλοτε ἀλλα. ἀτε εἰν αὐτοῖς ἀντιλίπεται ἐ^τ
 τοῦ τοῦ γέ τοῦτο, οὐ ἄμειν. Max. Tyr. Diff. XVII. p. 201.
 Ed. Lond.

but to fast is wholesome. Here the Verbs, *To eat*, and, *To fast*, stand alone by themselves, nor is it requisite or even practicable to prefix a Person or Substance. Hence the *Latin* and modern Grammarians have called Verbs under this Mode, from this their indefinite nature, **INFINITIVES**. *Sanctius* has given them the name of *Impersonals*; and the *Greeks* that of 'Αταρέν-Φάτα, from the same reason of their *not discovering* either Person or Number.

THESE **INFINITIVES** go farther. They not only lay aside the character of *Attributives*, but they also assume that of *Substantives*, and as such themselves become distinguished with their several *Attributes*. Thus in the instance above, *Pleasant* is the *Attribute*, attending the *Infinitive*, *To Eat*; *Wholesome* the attribute attending the *Infinitive*, *To Fast*. Examples in *Greek* and *Latin* of like kind are innumerable.

Dulce & decorum est pro patria MORI.

SCIRE tuum nihil est—

C.VIII. *Οὐ κατθανεῖν γὰρ δεινὸν, ἀλλ' αἰσχρῶς θανεῖν (i).*

THE Stoics in their grammatical inquiries had this Infinitive in such esteem, that they

(i) It is from the INFINITIVE thus participating the nature of a Noun or Substantive, that the best Grammarians have called it sometimes *Όνομα ρήματικόν*, A VERBAL NOUN; sometimes *Όνομα ρήματος*, THE VERB'S NOUN. The Reason of this Appellation is in Greek more evident, from its taking the prepositive Article before it in all cases; *τὸ γράφειν*, *τῷ γράψιν*, *τῷ γράφειν*. The same construction is not unknown in English.

Thus *Spencer*,

*For not to have been dipt in Lethe lake,
Could save the Son of Thetis FROM TO DIE—*

ἀπὸ τῷ θανεῖν. In like manner we say, *He did it, to be rich*, where we must supply by an Ellipsis the Preposition, FOR. *He did it, for to be rich*, the same as if we had said, *He did it for gain*—*ἴνεια τῷ πλοτεῖν*; *ἴνεια τῷ κέρδει*—in French, *pour s'enricher*. Even when we speak such Sentences, as the following, *I choose TO PHILOSOPHIZE, rather than TO BE RICH*, *τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν βέλομαι, ἢ περ τὸ πλοτεῖν*, the Infinitives are in nature as much Accusatives, as if we were to say, *I choose PHILOSOPHY rather than RICHES*, *τὴν φιλο-*

they held this alone to be the genuine C.VIII. PHMA or VERB, a name, which they denied to all the other Modes. Their reasoning was, they considered the true verbal character to be contained *simple* and *unmixed* in the *Infinitive only*. Thus the Infinitives, Περιπατέν, *Ambulare*, *To walk*, mean *simply* that energy, and *nothing more*. The other Modes, besides expressing this energy, *superadd certain Affections*, which respect persons and circumstances. Thus *Ambulo* and *Ambula* mean not simply *To walk*, but mean, *I walk*, and, *Walk Thou*.

M 3

And

φιλοσοφίαν βέλομαι, ἥπερ τὸν πλάτον. Thus too Priscian, speaking of *Infinitives*—CURRERE enim est CURSUS; & SCRIBERE, SCRIPTURA; & LEGERE, LECTIO. Itaque frequenter & Nominibus adjunguntur, & aliis casualibus, more Nominum; ut Persus,

Sed pulrum est digita monstrari, & dicier, hic est.

And soon after—Cum enim dico, BONUM EST LEGERE, nihil aliud significo, nisi, BONA EST LECTIO. L. XVIII. p. 1130. See also *Apoll.* L. I. c. 8. *Gaza* Gram. L. IV. Τὸ δὲ ἀπαρέμφατον, ὅνομά ἐστι ἡμίαντος π. τ. λ.

C.VIII. And hence they are all of them resolvable into the *Infinitive*, as their Prototype, together with some sentence or word, expressive of their proper Character. *Ambulo*, I-walk; this is, *Indico me ambulare*, I declare myself to walk. *Ambula*, Walk Thou; that is, *Impera te ambulare*, I command thee to walk; and so with the Modes of every other species. Take away therefore the *Assertion*, the *Command*, or whatever else gives a Character to any one of these Modes, and there remains nothing more than THE MERE INFINITIVE, which (as *Priscian* says) significat *ipsam rem*, quam continet *Verbum* (k).

THE

(k) See *Apollon.* L. III. 13. Καθόλες τῶν παρηγόντων ἀπό τινος κ. τ. λ. See also *Gaza*, in the note before. *Igitur a Constructione quoque Vim rei Verborum (id est, Nominis, quod significat ipsam rem) habet INFINITIVUM possimus cognoscere*; res autem in Personas distributa facit alios verbī motus.—*Itaque omnes modi in hunc, id est, Infinitivum, transmutantur sive resolvantur.* *Prisc.* L. XVIII. p. 1131. From these Principles *Apollonius* calls the Infinitive *Πρᾶγμα γενικότατον*, and *Priscian*, *Verbum generale*.

THE application of this Infinitive is somewhat singular. It *naturally coalesces* with all those Verbs, that denote any *Tendence, Desire, or Volition of the Soul*, but not readily with others. Thus it is sense as well as syntax, to say *βέλομαι ζῆν, Cupio vivere, I desire to live*; but not to say *Ἐσθίω ζῆν, Edo vivere*, or even in English, *I eat to live*, unless by an Ellipsis, instead of *I eat for to live*; as we say *Ένεα τῷ ζῆν, or pour vivre*. The reason is, that though *different Actions* may unite in the *same Subject*, and therefore be coupled together (as when we say, *He walked and discoursed*) yet the Actions notwithstanding remain separate and distinct. But it is not so with respect to *Volitions, and Actions*. Here the coalescence is often so intimate, that the *Volition* is unintelligible, till the *Action* be express. *Cupio, Volo, Desidero—I desire, I am willing, I want—What?—The sentences, we see, are defective and imperfect.*

C.VIII. We must help them then by *Infinitives*, which express the proper Actions to which they tend. *Cupio legere, Volo discere, Desidero videre, I desire to read, I am willing to live, I want to see.* Thus is the whole rendered complete, as well in sentiment, as in syntax (1).

AND so much for MODES, and their several SPECIES. We are to attempt to denominate them according to their most eminent characters, it may be done in the following manner. As every necessary truth, and every demonstrative syllogism (which last is no more than a combination of such truths) must always be express under positive assertions, and as positive

(1) *Priscian* calls these Verbs, which naturally precede Infinitives, *Verba Voluntativa*; they are called in Greek Προοιμεῖτα. See L. XVIII. 1129. but more particularly see *Apollonius*, L. III. c. 13. where this whole doctrine is explained with great Accuracy. See also *Macrobius de Diff. Verb. Gr. & Lat.* p. 685. Ed. *Var.*

—*Nec omne ἀπαρέμφατον cuiuscunque Verbo, &c.*

utive assertions only belong to the *Indicative*, we may denominate it for that reason the **MODE OF SCIENCE** (m). Again, as the *Potential* is only conversant about *Contingents*, of which we cannot say with certainty that they will happen or not, we may call this Mode, **THE MODE OF CONJECTURE**. Again, as those that are ignorant and would be informed, must ask of those that already know, this being the natural way of becoming *Proficients*, hence we may call the *Interrogative*, **THE MODE OF PROFICIENCY**.

*Inter cuncta leges; & PERCONTABERE
doctos,*

*Quâ ratione queas traducere leniter ævum,
Quid purè tranquillet, &c.* Hor.

Farther still, as the highest and most excellent use of the *Requisitive* Mode is legislative

(m) *Ob nobilitatem præivit INDICATIVUS, solus Modus aptus Scientiæ, solus Pater Veritatis.* Scal. de Causa L, Lat. c. 116.

C. VIII. legislative command, we may stile it for this reason THE MODE OF LEGISLATURE. *Ad Divos adeunto castè*, says *Cicero* in the character of a Roman law-giver; *Be it therefore enacted*, say the laws of *England*; and in the same *Mode* speak the laws of every other nation. It is also in this *Mode* that the geometrician, with the authority of a legislator, orders lines to be bisected, and circles described, as preparatives to that science, which he is about to establish.

THERE are other *supposed* affections of Verbs, such as *Number* and *Person*. But these surely cannot be called a part of their essence, nor indeed are they the essence of any other Attribute, being in fact the properties, not of Attributes, but of Substances. The most that can be said, is, that Verbs in the more elegant languages are provided with certain terminations, which respect the *Number* and *Person* of every *Substantive*, that we may know

know with more precision, in a complex C. VIII. sentence, each particular substance, with its attendant verbal Attributes. The same may be said of *Sex*, with respect to *Adjectives*. They have terminations which vary, as they respect Being's male or female, tho' *Substances* past dispute are alone susceptible of sex (n). We therefore pass over these matters, and all of like kind,

as

(n) It is somewhat extraordinary, that so acute and rational a Grammian as *Sanctius*, should justly deny *Genders*, or the distinction of *Sex* to *Adjectives*, and yet make *Persons* appertain, not to *Substantives*, but to *Verbs*. His commentator *Perizanius* is much more consistent, who says—*At vero si rem recte consideret, ipsis Nominibus & Pronominibus vel maxime, immo unicè inest ipsa Persona; & Verba se habent in Personarum ratione ad Nomina plane sicuti Adjectiva in ratione Generum ad Substantiva, quibus solis auctor* (*Sanctius* scil. L. I. c. 7.) *& rectè Genus adscribit, exclusis Adjectivis.* *Sanct. Minerv. L. I. c. 12.* There is indeed an exact Analogy between the Accidents of *Sex* and *Person*. There are but two *Sexes*, that is to say, the Male and the Female; and but two *Persons* (or Characters essential to discourse) that is to say, the Speaker, and the Party addressed. The third *Sex* and third *Person* are improperly so called, being in fact but Negations of the other two.

C.VIII. as being rather among the elegancies, than the essentials (o) of language, which essentials are the subject of our present inquiry. The principal of these now remaining is THE DIFFERENCE OF VERBS, AS TO THEIR SEVERAL SPECIES, which we endeavour to explain in the following manner.

(o) Whoever would see more upon a subject of importance, referred to in many parts of this treatise, and particularly in note (b) of this chapter, may consult *Letters concerning Mind*, an Octavo Volume published 1750, the Author Mr. John Petrin, Vicar of Illyington in Devon, a person who, though from his retired situation little known, was deeply skilled in the Philosophy both of the Antients and Moderns, and, more than this, was valued by all that knew him for his virtue and worth.

C H A P. IX.

*Concerning the Species of Verbs, and their
other remaining Properties.*

ALL Verbs, that are strictly so called; Ch.IX. denote (a) Energies. Now as all Energies are *Attributes*, they have reference of course to certain *energizing Substances*. Thus it is impossible there should be such Energies, as *To love, to fly, to wound, &c.* if there were not such beings as *Men, Birds, Swords, &c.* Farther, every Energy doth not only require an Energizer, but is necessarily conversant about some *Subject*. For example, if we say, *Brutus loves*—we must needs supply—*loves Cato, Cassius,*

(a) We use this word ENERGY, rather than *Motion*, from its more comprehensive meaning; it being a sort of Genus, which includes within it both *Motion* and its *Privation*. See before, p. 94, 95.

Ch.IX. *Cassius, Portia, or some one.* *The Sword wounds*—i. e. wounds *Hector, Sarpedon, Priam, or some one.* And thus is it, that every Energy is necessarily situate between two Substantives, an Energizer which is *active*, and a Subject which is *passive*. Hence then, if the Energizer lead the sentence, the Energy follows its character, and becomes what we call A VERB ACTIVE.—Thus we say *Brutus amat*, *Brutus loves.* On the contrary, if the passive Subject be principal, it follows the character of this too, and then becomes what we call A VERB PASSIVE.—Thus we say, *Portia amatur*, *Portia is loved.* It is in like manner that the *same Road* between the summit and foot of the *same mountain*, with respect to the summit is *Ascent*, with respect to the foot is *Descent*, Since then every Energy respects an Energizer or a passive Subject; hence the Reason why every Verb, whether active or passive, has in language a necessary reference

ference to some *Noun* for its *Nominative* Ch.IX.
Case (b). ~~—~~

BUT to proceed still farther from what has been already observed. *Brutus loved Portia*.—Here *Brutus* is the Energizer; *loved*, the *Energy*; and *Portia*, the *Subject*. But it might have been, *Brutus loved Cato*, or *Cassius*, or the *Roman Republic*; for the *Energy* is referable to Subjects infinite. Now among these infinite Subjects, when that happens to occur, which is the Energizer also, as when we say *Brutus loved himself*, *slew himself*, &c., in such Case the *Energy* hath to the *same* being a *double Relation*, both active and passive. And this it is which gave rise

among

(b) The doctrine of Impersonal Verbs has been justly rejected by the best Grammarians, both antient and modern. See *Sand. Min.* L. I. c. 12. L. III. c. 1. L. IV. c. 3. *Priscian.* L. XVIII. p. 1134. *Apoll.* L. III. sub fin. In which places the reader will see a proper *Nominative* supplied to all Verbs of this supposed Character.

Ch. IX. among the Greeks to that species of Verbs, called VERBS MIDDLE (c), and such was their true and original use, however in many instances they may have since happened to deviate. In other languages the Verb still retains its active Form, and the passive Subject (*se* or *himself*) is expressed like other accusatives.

AGAIN, in some Verbs it happens that the Energy *always keeps within* the Energizer, and *never passes out* to any foreign extraneous Subject. Thus when we say, *Cæsar walketh, Cæsar fitteth*, it is impossible

(c) Τὰ γὰρ καλύμενα μετόπτος χήματα συνέμπλωσιν ἀνεδέξατο ἐνεργετικῆς καὶ ταθητικῆς διαθέσεως. The Verbs, called Verbs middle, admit a Coincidence of the active and passive Character. Apollon. L. III. c. 7. He that would see this whole Doctrine concerning the power of THE MIDDLE VERB explained and confirmed with great Ingenuity and Learning, may consult a small Treatise of that able Critic *Küller*, entitled, *De vero Usu Verborum Mediorum*. A neat edition of this scarce piece has been lately published.

ble the *Energy* should pass out (as in the Ch. IX. case of those Verbs called by the Grammarians VERBS TRANSITIVE) because both the *Energizer* and the *Passive Subject* are united in the same *Person*. For what is the cause of this walking or sitting?—It is the *Will* and *Vital Powers* belonging to *Cæsar*. And what is the Subject, made so to move or to sit?—It is the *Body* and *Limbs* belonging also to the same *Cæsar*. It is this then forms that species of Verbs, which grammarians have thought fit to call VERBS NEUTER, as if indeed they were void both of *Action* and *Passion*, when perhaps (like Verbs middle) they may be rather said to *imply both*. Not however to dispute about names, as these Neuters in their *Energizer* always discover their *passive Subject* (c), which other Verbs

(c) This Character of Neuters the Greeks very happily express by the Terms, 'Αὐτοτάθεια and 'Ιδιωτάθεια, which Priscian renders, *qua ex se in seipso sit intrinsecus Passio*. L. VIII. 790. *Concordia Ars apud Putsch.* p. 2051.

Ch. IX. Verbs cannot, their passive Subjects being infinite; hence the reason why it is as superfluous in these Neuters to have the Subject expressed, as in other Verbs it is necessary, and cannot be omitted. And thus it is that we are taught in common grammars

It may be here observed, that even those Verbs, called *Actives*, can upon occasion lay aside their transitive character; that is to say, can drop their subsequent Accusative, and *assume the Form of Neuters*, so as to stand by themselves. This happens, when the Discourse respects the mere *Energy* or *Affection* only, and has no regard to the Subject, be it this thing or that. Thus we say, *αὐτὸς διαγνωσκει τὸν τύπον*, *This Man knows not how to read*, speaking only of the Energy, in which we suppose him deficient. Had the Discourse been upon the Subjects of reading, we must have added them, *αὐτὸς διαγνωσκει τὰ Ὁμήρου*, *He knows not how to read Homer*, or *Virgil*, or *Cicero*, &c.

— *Thus Horace;* —

*Quod CUPIT, aut METUIT, juvat illum sic domine
aut res,*

Ut lippum pīctū tabule —

He that DESIRES or FEARS (not this thing in particular nor that, but in general he within whose breast these

Shows that *Verbs Active* require an *Accusative*, while *Neuters* require none. Ch. IX.

Of the above species of Verbs, the Middle cannot be called necessary, because most languages have done without it. THE SPECIES OF VERBS therefore remaining are the ACTIVE, the PASSIVE and the NEUTER, and those seem essential to all languages whatever (d).

Na THERE

these affections prevail). *has the same joy in a House or Estate, as the Man with bad Eyes has in fine Pictures.* So *Cæsar* in his celebrated *Laconic Epistle* of, *VENI, VIDI, VICI*, where two Actives we see follow one Neuter in the same detached Form, as that Neuter itself. The Glory it seems was in the rapid *Sequel of the Events.* Conquest came as quick, as he could come himself, and look about him. *Whom* he saw, and *whom* he conquered, was not the thing, of which he boasted. See *Apoll.* L. III. c. 31. p. 279.

(d) The Stoics, in their logical view of Verbs, as making part in Propositions, considered them under the four following Sorts.

When

Ch.IX. THERE remains a remark or two farther, and then we quit the Subject of Verbs. It is true in general that the greater part of them denote Attributes of *Energy*

When a *Verb*, co-inciding with the *Nominative of some Noun*, made *without farther help* a perfect assertive Sentence, as *Σωκράτης περιπατεῖ*, *Socrates walketh*; then as the *Verb* in such case implied the Power of a perfect *Predicate*, they called it for that reason *Κατηγόρημα*, *a Predictable*; or else, from its readiness *συμβάνειν*, to co-incide with its *Noun in completing the Sentence*, they called it *Σύμβαμα*, *a Co-incider*.

When a *Verb* was able with a *Noun* to form a perfect assertive Sentence, yet could not associate with such *Noun*, but under some *oblique Case*, as *Σωκράτεις μεταμέλει*, *Socratem pœnitet*: Such a *Verb*, from its *near approach to just Co-incidence, and Predication*, they called *Παρασύμβαμα* or *Παρακατηγόρημα*.

When a *Verb*, though regularly co-inciding with a *Noun* in its *Nominative*, *still required*, to complete the *Sentiment*, *some other Noun under an oblique Case*, as *Πλάτων φιλεῖ Δίωνα*, *Plato loveth Dio*, (where without *Dio* or some other, the *Verb loveth* would rest indefinite:)

Energy and Motion. But there are some Ch.IX. which appear to denote nothing more, than a mere simple *Adjective*, joined to an **Affection**. Thus *ἴσας ει* in *Greek*, and *Equalleth* in *English*, mean nothing more

N 3 than

nite:) Such Verb, from this Defect, they called *ἴτιον* *ἢ σύμβαμα*, or *ἢ κατηγόρημα*, *something less than a Co-incider, or less than a Predicable.*

Lastly, when a Verb required *two Nouns in oblique Cases*, to render the Sentiment complete; as when we say *Σωκράτει Ἀλκιβιάδης μίλει*, *Tædet me Vitæ*, or the like: Such Verb they called *ἴτιον*, or *ἴλατιον* *ἢ ταρασύμβαμα*, or *ἢ ταρανατηγόρημα*, *something less than an imperfect Co-incider, or an imperfect Predicable.*

These were the *Appellations* which they gave to Verbs, when employed along with Nouns to the forming of Propositions. As to the Name of 'PHMA, or VERB, they denied it to them all, giving it only to the *Infinitive*, as we have shewn already. See page 164. See also *Ammon. in Lib. de Interpret.* p. 37. *Apollon. de Syntaxi.* L. I. c. 8. L. III. c. 31. p. 279. c. 32. p. 295. *Theod. Gaz. Gram.* L. IV.

From the above Doctrine it appears, that all *Verbs Neuter* are *Συμβάματα*; *Verbs Active*, *ἴτιον* *ἢ σύμβαμα*.

Ch. IX, than *icos esti*, is equal. So *Albus* in *Latin* is no more than *albus sum*.

— *Campique ingentes offibus albent.* Virg.

THE same may be said of *Tumea*. *Mons tumet*, i. e. *tumidus est*, is *tumid*. To express the Energy in these instances, we must have recourse to the Inceptives.

*Fluctus uti primo cœpit cum ALBESCERE
Vento.* Virg.

— — — *Fretæ ponti;
Incipiunt agitata TUMESCERE.* Virg.

THERE are Verbs also to be found, which are formed out of Nouns. So that as in *Abstract Nouns* (such as *Whiteness* from *White*, *Goodness* from *Good*) as also in the *Infinitive Modes* of Verbs, the *Attributive* is converted into a *Substantive*; here the *Substantive* on the contrary is converted into an *Attributive*. Such are *Kovigen* from *κούγην*, to act the part of a *Dog*, or be a *Cynic*;

πίει; Φιλιππίζειν from Φιλιππός, to Philip. — Ch. IX.
 pize, or favour Philip; Syllaturire from Sylla, to meditate acting the same part as Sylla did. Thus too the wise and virtuous Emperour, by way of counsel to himself — ἐπει μὴ ἀπολαμβάνῃς, beware thou beest not BECAESAR'D; as though he said, Beware, that by being Emperor, thou doest not dwindle into A MERE CÆSAR (c). In like manner one of our own witty Poets,

STERNHOLD himself be OUT-STERNHOLDED.

And long before him the facetious Fuller, speaking of one Morgan, a sanguinary Bishop in the Reign of Queen Mary, says of him, *that he OUT-BONNER'D even BONNER himself**.

AND so much for that Species of ATTRIBUTES, called VERBS IN THE STRICTEST SENSE.

(c) *Marc. Antonin. L. VI. § 30.*

* *Church Hist. B. VIII. p. 21.*

C H A P. X.

*Concerning those other Attributives,
Participles and Adjectives.*

Ch. X. **T**HE nature of Verbs being understood, that of PARTICIPLES is no way difficult. Every complete Verb is expressive of an *Attribute*; of *Time*; and of an *Assertion*. Now if we take away the *Assertion*, and thus destroy the *Verb*, there will remain the *Attribute* and the *Time*, which make the essence of a PARTICIPLE. Thus take away the Assertion from the Verb, Γράφει, *Writeth*, and there remains the Participle, Γράφων, *Writing*, which (without the *Assertion*) denotes the same *Attribute*, and the same *Time*. After the same manner, by withdrawing the *Assertion*, we discover Γράψει in Ἐγράψει, Γράψων in Γράψει, for we chuse to refer to the *Greek*, as being of all languages

the most complete, as well in this respect, Ch. X.
as in others.

AND so much for PARTICIPLES (a).

THE

(a) The *Latins* are defective in this Article of Participles. Their Active Verbs, ending in *or*, (commonly called Deponents) have Active Participles of all Times (such as *Loquens*, *Locutus*, *Locuturus*) but none of the Passive. Their Actives ending in *O*, have Participles of the Present and Future (such as *Scribens*, and *Scripturus*) but none of the Past. On the contrary, their Passives have Participles of the Past (such as *Scriptus*) but none of the Present or Future, unless we admit such as *Scribendus* and *Docendus* for Futures, which Grammarians controvert. The want of these Participles they supply by a Periphrasis—for *γράψας* they say, *cum scripisset*—for *γραφόμενος*, *dum scribitur*, &c. In *English* we have sometimes recourse to the same Periphrasis; and sometimes we avail ourselves of the same Auxiliars, which form our Modes and Tenses.

The *English* Grammar lays down a good rule with respect to its Participles of the Past, that they all terminate in D, T, or N. This Analogy is perhaps liable to as few Exceptions, as any. Considering therefore how little Analogy of any kind we have in our Lan-

Ch. X. THE nature of *Verbs* and *Participles*
being understood, that of **ADJECTIVES**
becomes easy. A *Verb* implies (as we
have said) both an *Attribute*, and *Time*,
and an *Assertion*; a *Participle* only implies
an *Attribute*, and *Time*; and an **ADJECTIVE**
only implies an *Attribute*; that is to
say, in other Words, an **ADJECTIVE** has
no *Assertion*, and only denotes such an *At-*
tribute, as has not its *essence* either in
Motion or its *Privation*. Thus in general
the *Attributes* of *quantity*, *quality*, and
relation (such as *many* and *few*, *great* and
little,

Language, it seems wrong to annihilate the few *Traces*,
that may be found. It would be well therefore, if all
writers, who endeavour to be accurate, would be care-
ful to avoid a corruption, at present so prevalent, of say-
ing, *it was wrote*, for, *it was written*; *he was drove*, for,
he was driven; *I have went*, for, *I have gone*, &c. in all
which instances a *Verb* is absurdly used to supply the
proper *Participle*, without any necessity from the want
of such Word.

*Noble, black and white, good and bad, double, double,
treble, quadruple, &c. &c.) are all denoted by
ADJECTIVES.*

IT must indeed be confessed, that sometimes even those Attributes, which are wholly foreign to the idea of Motion, assume an assertion, and appear as Verbs. Of such we gave instances before, in *albeo, tumeo, latwo*, and others. These however, compared to the rest of Verbs, are but few in number, and may be called, if thought proper, *Verbal Adjectives*. It is in like manner, that Participles insensibly pass too into Adjectives. Thus *doctus* in *Latin*, and *learned* in *English*, lose their power, as *Participles*, and mean a Person possessed of an habitual Quality. Thus *Vir eloquens* means not *a man now speaking*, but a man, *who possesses the habit of speaking*, whether he speak or no. So when we say in *English*, he is a *thinking Man*, an *understanding Man*, we mean not a person, whose mind is *in actual Energy*,

Ch. X. *Energy, but whose mind is enriched with a larger portion of those powers.* It is indeed no wonder, as all Attributives are homogeneous, that at times the several species should appear to interfere, and the difference between them be scarcely perceptible. Even in *natural* species, which are congenial and of kin, the specific difference is not always to be discerned, and in appearance at least they seem to run into each other.

We have shewn already (*b*) in the Instances of Φιλιππίζειν, *Syllaturire*, Αποκαισαρισθίναι, and others, how *Substantives* may be transformed into *Verbal Attributives*. We shall now shew, how they may be converted into *Adjectives*. When we say the party of *Pompey*, the stile of *Cicero*, the philosophy of *Socrates*, in

in these cases the party, the stile, and the Ch. X. philosophy spoken of, receive a stamp and character from the persons, whom they respect. Those persons therefore perform the part of *Attributes*, that is, stamp and characterize their respective Subjects. Hence then *they actually pass into Attributes*, and assume, as such, the form of *Adjectives*. And thus it is we say, the *Pompeian* party, the *Ciceronian* stile, and the *Socratic* philosophy. It is in like manner for a trumpet of *Brajs*, we say, a *brazen* Trumpet; for a Crown of *Gold*, a *golden* Crown, &c. Even *Pronominal* Substantives admit the like mutation. Thus instead of saying, the Book of *Me*, of *Thee*, and of *Him*, we say, *My* Book, *Thy* Book, and *His* Book; instead of saying the Country of *Us*, of *You*, and of *Them*, we say, *Our* Country, *Your* Country, and *Their* Country, which Words may be called so many *Pronominal Adjectives*.

Ch. X. It has been observed already, and must needs be obvious to all, that Adjectives, as marking Attributes, can have no sex (c). And yet their having terminations conformable to the sex, number, and case of their substantive, seems to have led grammarians into that strange absurdity of ranging them with Nouns, and separating them from Verbs, tho' with respect to these they are perfectly homogeneous; with respect to the others, quite contrary. They are homogeneous with respect to Verbs; as both sorts denote *Attributes*; they are heterogeneous with respect to Nouns, as never properly denoting *substances*. But of this we have spoken before (d).

THE

(c) Sup. p. 171.

(d) Sup. C. VI. Note (a). See also C. III. p. 28, &c.

THE ATTRIBUTIVES hitherto treated, Ch. X.
that is to say, VERBS, PARTICIPLES,
and ADJECTIVES, may be called ATTRI-
BUTIVES OF THE FIRST ORDER. The
reason of this name will be better under-
stood, when we have more fully discussed
ATTRIBUTIVES OF THE SECOND OR-
DER, to which we now proceed in the
following chapter.

C H A P. XI.

Concerning Attributives of the second Order.

Ch.XI. AS the Attributives hitherto mentioned denote *the Attributes of Substances*, so there is an inferior class of them, which denote *the Attributes only of Attributes*.

To explain by examples in either kind —when we say, *Cicero and Pliny were both of them eloquent*; *Statius and Virgil both of them wrote*; in these instances the Attributives, *eloquent*, and *wrote*, are immediately referable to the substantives, *Cicero*, *Virgil*, &c. As therefore denoting THE ATTRIBUTES OF SUBSTANCES, we call them ATTRIBUTIVES OF THE FIRST ORDER. But when we say, *Pliny was moderately eloquent*, but *Cicero exceedingly eloquent*; *Statius wrote indifferently*, but *Virgil wrote admirably*; in

in these instances, the *Attributives*, *Moderately*, *Exceedingly*, *Indifferently*, *Admirably*, are not referable to *Substantives*, but to other *Attributives*, that is, to the words, *Eloquent*, and *Wrote*. As therefore denoting *Attributes of Attributes*, we call them **ATTRIBUTIVES OF THE SECOND ORDER.**

GRAMMARIANS have given them the Name of *Ἐπιφῆματα*, **ADVERBIA**, **ADVERBS**. And indeed if we take the word *Φῆμα*, or, *Verb*, in its most comprehensive *Signification*, as including not only *Verbs* properly so called, but also *Participles* and *Adjectives* [an usage, which may be justified by the best authorities (a)] we shall find

(a) Thus Aristotle in his *Treatise de Interpretatione*, instances *Ἄνθρωπος* as a *Noun*, and *Λένκος* as a *Verb*. So Ammonius—κατὰ τέτο τὸ σημανόμενον, τὸ μὲν ΚΑΛΟΣ καὶ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣ καὶ δσα τοιαῦτα—ΡΗΜΑΤΑ λέγεσθαι καὶ ὥν ΟΝΟΜΑΤΑ. According to this Signification (that is of denoting the Attributes of Substance and

Ch.XI. find the name, *Ἐπίπημα*, or **ADVERB**, to be a very just appellation, as denoting a **PART OF SPEECH, THE NATURAL APPENDAGE OF VERBS.** So great is this dependence in Grammatical Syntax, that an *Adverb* can no more subsist without its *Verb*, than a *Verb* can subsist without its *Substantive*. It is the same here, as in certain natural Subjects. Every Colour for its existence as much requires a *Superficies*, as the *Superficies* for its existence requires a solid Body (b).

AMONG

and the Predicate in Propositions) *the words, FAIR, JUST, and the like, are called VERBS, and not NOUNS.*
Am. in libr. de Interp. p. 37. b. Arist. de Interp. L. I. c. 1. See also of this Treatise, c. 6. Note (a) p. 87.

In the same manner the *Stoics* talked of the *Participle.* *Nam PARTICIPIUM connumerantes Verbis, PARTICIPIALE VERBUM vocabant vel CASUALE.* *Priscian, L. I. p. 574.*

(b) This notion of *ranging the Adverb under the same Genus with the Verb* (by calling them both *Attributives*) and of *explaining it to be the Verb's Epithet or Adjective*
 (by

AMONG the Attributes of Substance are Ch.XI.
reckoned Quantities, and Qualities. Thus
we say, *a white Garment, a high Mountain.*
Now some of these Quantities and Quali-
ties are capable of Intension, and Remis-
sion. Thus we say, *a Garment EXCEED-
INGLY white; a Mountain TOLERABLY
high,*

O 2

(by calling it the Attributive of an Attributive) is con-
formable to the best authorities. *Theodore Gaza* defines
an ADVERB, as follows—μέρος λόγων ἀπίστων, κατὰ
ρήματος λεγόμενον, ἢ ἐπιλεγόμενον ρήματι, καὶ οὗ
ἐπίθετον ρήματος. *A Part of Speech devoid of Cases,*
predicated of a Verb, or subjoined to it, and being as it were
the Verb's Adjective. L. IV. (where by the way we
may observe, how properly the Adverb is made an *Ap-*
tote, since its principal sometimes *has cases*, as in *Valdē*
Sapiens; sometimes *has none*, as in *Valdē amat*.) *Pris-*
cian's definition of an Adverb is as follows—ADVER-
BIUM est pars orationis indeclinabilis, cuius significatio Ver-
bis ad̄icitur. Hoc enim perficit Adverbium Verbis additum,
quod adjectiva nomina appellativo nominibus adjuncta; ut
prudens homo; prudenter agit; felix Vir; feliciter vi-
vit. L. XV. p. 1003. And before, speaking of the
Stoics, he says—*Etiam ADVERBIA Nominibus vel VER-*
BIS CONNUMERABANT, & quasi ADJECTIVA VERBO-
RUM nominabant. L. I. p. 574. See also *Apoll. de Synt.*
L. I. c. 3. *sub fin.*

Ch.XI. *high*, or MODERATELY *high*. It is plain therefore that Intension and Remission are among the Attributes of such Attributes. Hence then one copious Source of secondary Attributives, or Adverbs, to denote these two, that is, *Intension*, and *Remission*. The Greeks have their θαυμασώς, μάλιστα, πάντα, ἥκιστα; the Latins their *valde*, *vehementer*, *maximè*, *satis*, *mediocriter*; the English their *greatly*, *vastly*, *extremely*, *sufficiently*, *moderately*, *tolerably*, *indifferently*, &c.

FARTHER than this, where there are different Intentions of the same Attribute, they may be *compared* together. Thus if the Garment A be EXCEEDINGLY *White*, and the Garment B be MODERATELY *White*, we may say, *the Garment A is MORE white than the Garment B.*

IN these instances the Adverb **MORE** not only denotes Intension, but *relative Intension*. Nay we stop not here. We not

not only denote Intension merely relative Ch.XI.
but relative Intension, than which there is
none greater. Thus we not only say *the*
Mountain A is MORE high than the Moun-
tain B, but that *it is the MOST high of all*
Mountains. Even *Verbs*, properly so called,
as they admit *simple* Intentions, so they
admit also these *comparative* ones. Thus
in the following Example—*Fame be*
LOVETH MORE than Riches, but Virtue of
all things be LOVETH MOST—the Words
MORE and **MOST** denote the different
comparative Intentions of the Verbal At-
tributive, *Loveth*.

AND hence the rise of **COMPARISON**,
and of its different *Degrees*; which can-
not well be more, than the two Species
above mentioned, one to denote *Simple*
Excess, and one to denote *Superlative*.
Were we indeed to introduce *more* degrees
than these, we ought perhaps to introduce
infinite, which is absurd. For why stop
at a limited Number, when in all subjects,

Ch.XI. susceptible of Intension, the intermediate
 Excesses are in a manner infinite? There are infinite Degrees of *more* White, between the *first Simple White*, and the *Superlative, Whitest*; the same may be said of *more Great, more Strong, more Minute, &c.* The Doctrine of Grammarians about *three* such Degrees, which they call the Positive, the Comparative, and the Superlative, must needs be absurd; both because in their Positive there is \dagger no Comparison at all, and because their *Superlative* is a Comparative, as much as their *Comparative* itself. Examples to evince this may be found every where. *Socrates was the MOST WISE of all the Athenians— Homer was the MOST SUBLIME of all Poets.*—

—*Cadit et Ripheus, JUSTISSIMUS UNUS
 Qui fuit in Teucris—* Virg.

IT

\dagger *Qui* (scil. *Gradus Positivis*) *quoniam perfectus est,*
a quibusdam in numero Graduum non computatur. *Con-*
sentii Ars apud Putsch. p. 2022.

IT must be confessed these Comparative Adverbs, as well the *simple*, as the *superlative*, seem sometimes to part with their *relative* Nature, and only retain their *intensive*. Thus in the Degree, denoting *simple* Excess,

Tristior, et lacrymis oculos suffusa nitentes. Virg.

Rusticior paulo est— Hor.

IN the *Superlative* this is more usual. *Vir doctissimus, Vir fortissimus, a most learned Man, a most brave Man*,—that is to say, not the *bravest* and *most learned* Man, that ever existed, but a Man possessing those Qualities in an eminent Degree.

THE Authors of Language have contrived a method to retrench these Comparative Adverbs, by expressing their force in the Primary *Attributive*. Thus instead of *More fair*, they say FAIRER; instead of *Most fair*, FAIREST, and the same

Ch.XI. holds true both in the *Greek* and *Latin*.

— This Practice however has reached no farther than to *Adjectives*, or at least to *Participles*, *sharing the nature of Adjectives*. Verbs perhaps were thought too much diversified already, to admit more Variations without perplexity.

As there are some *Attributives*, which admit of Comparison, so there are others, which admit of none. Such for example are those, which denote *that Quality of Bodies arising from their Figure*; as when we say, a *Circular Table*, a *Quadrangular Court*, a *Conical Piece of Metal*, &c. The reason is, that a million of things, participating the same Figure, participate it *equally*, if they participate it at all. To say therefore that while A and B are both quadrangular, A is *more* or *less* quadrangular than B, is absurd. The same holds true in all *Attributives*, denoting *definite Quantities*, whether *continuous* or *discrete*, whether *absolute* or *relative*. Thus the *two-foot Rule*

A

A cannot be *more a two-foot Rule*, than any **Ch. XI.**
other of the same length. *Twenty Lions* —
cannot be more twenty than *twenty Flies*.

If A and B be both triple, or quadruple to C, they cannot be *more triple, or more quadruple*, one than the other. The reason of all this is, there can be *no Comparison* without *Intension and Remission*; there can be no Intension and Remission in things *always definite*; and such are the **Attributives**, which we have last mentioned.

In the same reasoning we see the cause, why *no Substantive is susceptible of these Comparative Degrees*. *A Mountain* cannot be said **MORE TO BE, or TO EXIST**, than *a Mole-hill*, but the *More* and *Less* must be sought for in their *Quantities*. In like manner when we refer many Individuals to one Species, the *Lion A* cannot be called *more a Lion*, than the *Lion B*, but if more any thing, he is *more fierce, more speedy, or exceeding in some such Attribute*: So again, in referring many Species

Ch.XI. Species to one Genus, a Crocodile is not more an Animal, than a Lizard; nor a Tiger, more than a Cat, but if any thing, they are *more bulky, more strong, &c.* the Excess, as before, being derived from their Attributes. So true is that saying of the acute *Stagirite*—that *SUBSTANCE* is *not susceptible of MORE and LESS* (c). But this by way of digression; to return to the subject of Adverbs.

Of the Adverbs, or secondary Attributives already mentioned, these denoting Intension or Remission may be called Adverbs of *Quantity continuous*; *Once, Twice, Thrice*, are Adverbs of *Quantity discrete*; *More and Most, Less and Least*, to which may be added *Equally, Proportionally, &c.* are

(c) ἐκ αὐτοῦ ἐπιδέχοιτο οὐ μείζω τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἔπειρον,
Categor. c. 5. See also *Sanctius*, L. I. c. II. L. II.
 c. 10, 11. where the subject of Comparatives is treated in a very masterly and philosophical manner. See also *Priscian*, p. 598. *Derivantur igitur Comparativa a Non-minibus Adjectivis, &c.* 5

are Adverbs of *Relation*. There are Ch.XI, others of *Quality*, as when we say, *Honest*LY *industrious*, *Prudent*LY *brave*, *they fought* *Bravely*, *be painted* *Finely*, *a Portico formed* *Circularly*, *a Plain cut* *Triangularly*, &c.

AND here it is worth while to observe, how the same thing, participating the same Essence, assumes different grammatical Forms from its different relations. For example, suppose it should be asked, how differ *Honest*, *Honestly*, and *Honesty*. The Answer is, they are *in Essence* the same, but they differ, in as much as *Honest* is the *Attributive of a Substantive*; *Honestly*, of a *Verb*; and *Honesty*, being divested of these its attributive Relations, assumes the *Power of a Substantive*, so as to stand by itself.

THE Adverbs, hitherto mentioned, are common to *Verbs of every Species*; but there

Ch.XI. there are some which are peculiar to *Verbs*
properly so called, that is to say, to such as denote *Motion* or *Energy*, with their *Privations*. All *Motion* and *Rest* imply *TIME* and *PLACE*, as a kind of necessary *Coincidents*. Hence then, if we would express the *Place* or *Time* of either, we must needs have recourse to the proper *Adverbs*; of *Place*, as when we say, *he stood THERE*; *he went HENCE*; *he travelled FAR*, &c.: of *Time*, as when we say, *he stood THEN*; *he went AFTERWARD*; *he travelled FORMERLY*, &c. Should it be asked—why *Adverbs of Time*, when *Verbs* have *Tenses*? The Answer is, tho' *Tenses* may be sufficient to denote the greater Distinctions of *Time*, yet to denote them all by *Tenses* would be a perplexity without end. What a variety of *Forms*, to denote *Yesterday*, *To-day*, *To-morrow*, *Formerly*, *Lately*, *Just now*, *Now*, *Immediately*, *Presently*, *Soon*, *Hereafter*, &c.? It was this then that made the

the *Temporal* Adverbs necessary, over and Ch.XI.
above the *Tenses*.

To the Adverbs just mentioned may be added those, which denote the *Intensions* and *Remissions* peculiar to *Motion*, such as *speedily*, *hastily*, *swiftly*, *slowly*, &c. as also *Adverbs of Place*, made out of *Prepositions*, such as *āvō* and *uātō* from *āvā* and *uātā*, in *English upward* and *downward*, from *up* and *down*. In some instances the *Preposition* suffers no change, but becomes an Adverb by nothing more than its Application, as when we say, *CIRCA equitat, he rides ABOUT*; *PROPE cecidit, he was NEAR falling*; *Verum ne POST conferas culpam in me, But do not AFTER lay the blame on me (d)*.

THERE

(d) *Sofsp. Charissū Inst. Gram.* p. 170. *Terent. Eun.*
Act. II. Sc. 3.

Ch.XI. THERE are likewise *Adverbs of Interrogation*, such as *Where*, *Whence*, *Whither*, *How*; of which there is this remarkable, that when they lose their *Interrogative* power, they assume that of a *Relative*, so as even to represent the *Relative or Subjunctive Pronoun*. Thus *Ovid*,

Et Seges est, ubi Troja fuit—

translated in our old *English Ballad*,

And Corn doth grow, WHERE Troy town stood.

That is to say, *Seges est in eo loco, in quo, &c. Corn growtheth in that place, in which, &c.* the power of the *Relative*, being implied in the *Adverb*. Thus *Terence*,

*Hujusmodi mibi res semper comminiscere,
UBI me excarnufices— Heaut. IV. 6.*

where *UBI* relates to *res*, and stands for *quibus rebus*.

IT

IT is in like manner that the *Relative* Ch. XI. Pronoun upon occasion becomes an *Interrogative*, at least in *Latin* and *English*. Thus *Horace*,

QUEM *Virum aut Heroa lyrâ, vel acri*
Tibiâ sumes celebrare, Clio?

So *Milton*,

Who first seduc'd them to that foul revolt?

THE reason of all this is as follows. The Pronoun and Adverbs here mentioned are all alike, in their original character, RELATIVES. Even when they become Interrogatives, they lose not this character, but are still Relatives, as much as ever. The difference is, that without an Interrogation, they have reference to a Subject, which is *antecedent, definite, and known*; with an Interrogation, to a Subject which is *subsequent, indefinite, and unknown*,

Ch.XI. *known*, and which it is expected that *the Answer* should express and ascertain,

Who first seduc'd them?—

The very Question itself supposes a *Seducer*, to which, tho' *unknown*, the Pronoun, *Who*, has a *reference*.

The infernal Serpent—

Here in the *Answer* we have the *Subject*, *which was indefinite, ascertained*; so that the *Who* in the *Interrogation* is (we see) as much a *Relative*, as if it had been said originally, without any *Interrogation* at all, *It was the Infernal SERPENT, who first seduced them.*

AND thus is it that *Interrogatives* and *Relatives* mutually pass into each other.

AND so much for *ADVERBS*, peculiar to Verbs properly so called. We have already spoken of those, which are common to all *Attributives*. We have likewise at-

tempted to explain their general Nature, Ch.XI. which we have found to consist in being the Attributes of Attributes. There remains only to add, that ADVERBS may be derived from almost every Part of Speech: from PREPOSITIONS, as when from *After* we derive *Afterwards*—from PARTICIPLES, and through these from *Verbs*, as when from *Know* we derive *Knowing*, and thence *Knowingly*; from *Scio, Sciens*, and thence *Scienter*—from ADJECTIVES, as when from *Virtuous* and *Vicious*, we derive *Virtuously* and *Viciously*—from SUBSTANTIVES, as when from Πίθηκος, *an Ape*, we derive Πίθηκειον βλέπειν, *to look APISHLY*; from Λέων, *a Lion*, Λεοντωδῶς, *Leoninely*—nay even from PROPER NAMES, as when from *Socrates* and *Demosthenes*, we derive *Socratically* and *Demosthenically*. *It was Socratically reasoned, we say; it was Demosthenically spoken* *.

P

Of

* Aristotle has Κυκλωπικῶς *Cyclopically*, from Κύκλωψ *a Cyclops*, Eth. Nic. X. 9.

Ch.XI. Of the same sort are many others, cited by the old Grammarians, such as *Catiliniter* from *Catilina*, *Sisenniter* from *Sisenna*, *Tullianè* from *Tullius*, &c. (e).

NOR are they thus extensive only in *Derivation*, but in *Signification* also. *Theodore Gaza* in his Grammar informs us (f), that **ADVERBS** may be found in every one of the Predicaments, and that the readiest way to reduce their Infinitude, was to refer them by classes to those ten universal Genera. The *Stoicks* too called the **ADVERB** by the name of Πανδέκτης, and that from a view to the same *multiform Nature*. *Omnia in se capit quasi collata per satiram, concessa sibi rerum variâ potestate*. It is thus that *Sofipater* explains the


(e) See *Prisc.* L. XV. p. 1022. *Sof. Charis.* 161. *Edit. Puschii.*

(f) — διὸ δὴ καὶ ἀμείνοντιστις δέκα καὶ τῶν ἐπιρρημάτων γένη θεοθεαὶ ἐκεῖνα, ἀσίαν, τοιὸν, τοσὸν, τρεός τι, κ. τ. λ. *Gram. Introd.* L. II.

the Word (g), from whose authority Ch.XI. we know it to be *Stoical*. But of this enough.

AND now having finished these PRINCIPAL PARTS of Speech, the SUBSTANTIVE and the ATTRIBUTIVE, which are SIGNIFICANT WHEN ALONE, we proceed to those AUXILIARY PARTS, which are ONLY SIGNIFICANT, WHEN ASSOCIATED. But as these make the Subject of a Book by themselves, we here conclude the first Book of this Treatise.

(g) *Soph. Char.* p. 175. Edit. *Putschii.*



HERMES

OR A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY
CONCERNING UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR.

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

Concerning Definitions.

WHAT remains of our Work, Ch. I. is a matter of less difficulty, it being the same here, as in some Historical Picture; when the principal Figures are once formed, it is an easy labour to design the rest.

Ch. I. DEFINITIVES, the Subject of the present Chapter, are commonly called by Grammarians, ARTICLES, ARTICULI, Ἀρθρα. They are of two kinds, either those *properly and strictly so called*, or else the *Pronominal Articles*, such as *This, That, Any, &c.*

WE shall first treat of those *Articles more strictly so denominated*, the reason and use of which may be explained, as follows.

THE visible and individual Substances of Nature are infinitely more numerous, than for each to admit of a particular Name. To supply this defect, when any Individual occurs, which either wants a proper Name, or whose proper Name is not known, we ascertain it, as well as we can, by referring it to its Species; or, if the Species be unknown, then at least.

least to some Genus. For example—a certain Object occurs, with a head and limbs, and appearing to possess the powers of Self-motion and Sensation. If we know it not as an Individual, we refer it to its proper Species, and call it *Dog*, or *Horse*, or *Lion*, or the like. If none of these Names fit, we go to the Genus, and call it, *Animal*.

BUT this is not enough. The Thing, at which we are looking, is neither a Species, nor a Genus. What is it then? An Individual.—Of what kind? *Known*, or *unknown*? Seen now *for the first time*, or *seen before*, and now remembered?—It is here we shall discover the use of the two Articles (A) and (THE). (A) respects our *primary* Perception, and denotes Individuals as *unknown*; (THE) respects our *secondary* Perception, and denotes Individuals as *known*. To explain by an example—I see an object pass

Ch. I. by, which I never saw till now. What do I say?—*There goes A Beggar with a long Beard.* The Man departs, and returns a Week after. What do I say then?—*There goes THE Beggar with THE long Beard.* The Article only is changed, the rest remains unaltered.

YET mark the force of this apparently minute Change. The Individual, *once vague*, is now recognized as *something known*, and that merely by the efficacy of this latter Article, which tacitly insinuates a kind of *previous* acquaintance, by referring the present Perception to a like Perception already past (a).

THE Truth is, the Articles (A) and (THE) are both of them *definitives*, as they circumscribe the latitude of Genera and Species, by reducing them for the most

(a) See B. I. &c. 5. p. 63, 64.

most part to denote Individuals. The Ch. I. difference however between them is this; the Article (A) leaves the Individual itself *unascertained*, whereas the Article (THE) *ascertains the Individual also*, and is for that reason the more accurate Definitive of the two.

IT is perhaps owing to the imperfect manner, in which the Article (A) defines, that the *Greeks* have no Article correspondent to it, but supply its place, by a negation of their Article, 'O. 'O ἀνθρωπῷ ἐπεσεν, THE man fell — ἀνθρωπῷ ἐπεσεν, A Man fell, without any thing prefixed, but only the Article withdrawn (b). Even in *English*, where the Article

(b) Τὰ γὰρ ἀορισθῶς πότε νοέντα, οὐ τὰ ἀρθεῖ παράθετις ὑπὸ ὀρισμὸν τὰ προσώπα ἀγει. Those things, which are at times understood indefinitely, the addition of the Article makes to be definite as to their Person. Apoll. L. IV. c. 1. See of the same author, L. I. c. 6, 36.

would

Ch. I. Article (A) cannot be used, as in plurals, its force is express by the same Negation. *Those are the Men*, means those are Individuals, of which we possess some *previous Knowledge*. *Those are Men*, the Article apart, means no more than that they are so many *vague* and *uncertain* Individuals, just as the Phrase, *A Man*, in the singular, implies one of the same number.

BUT

ποιεῖ (τὸ Ἀρθρὸν sc.) δὸν αὐτοπόλησιν προεγνωσμένων τῆς ἐν τῇ συντάξει οἷον εἰς μὲν λέγοις τις, ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΙΣ ΉΚΕ, ἀδηλον τίνα ἀνθρώπουν λέγει. εἰ δὲ ο ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ, δῆλον, προεγνωσμένον γάρ τινα ἀνθρώπουν λέγει. Τέτο δὲ ἀντὸ βέλονται καὶ οἱ φάσκοντες τὸ Ἀρθρὸν σημαντικὸν τερώτης γνώσεως καὶ δευτέρας. The Article causes a Review within the Mind of something known before the texture of the Discourse. Thus if any one says "Ανθρωπῷ ήκε, MAN CAME (which is the same, as when we say in English A man came) it is not evident, of whom he speaks. But if he says οἱ ἀνθρωπῷ ήκε, 'THE MAN CAME, then it is evident; for he speaks of some Person known before. And this is what those mean, who say that the Article is expressive of the First and Second Knowledge together. Theod. Gazæ, L. IV.

BUT tho' the *Greeks* have no Article Ch. I. correspondent to the Article (A,) yet nothing can be more nearly related, than their 'O, to the Article, THE. 'Ο βασιλεῦς, THE King; ΤΟ δῶρον, THE Gift, &c. Nor is this only to be proved by parallel examples, but by the Attributes of the Greek Article, as they are described by *Apollonius*, one of the earliest and most acute of the old Grammarians, now remaining.

"Εσιν δὲ καθὸ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ἀπεφυγάμεθα, οἷδιον ἀρθρων ἡ ἀναφορά, ἡ ἐσι προπατείλευμένα προσώπα παρασατική.—Now the peculiar Attribute of the Article, as we have shewn elsewhere, is that Reference, which implies some certain Person already mentioned. Again—Ου γὰρ δίηγε τὰ ὄνοματα ἐξ ἀυτῶν ἀναφορὰν παρίσησιν, εἰ μὴ συμπαραλόειεν τὸ ἀρθρον, διὸ εἰδαιρετός ἐσιν ἡ ἀναφορά. For Nouns of themselves imply not

Re-

Ch.I. *Reference, unless they take to them the Article, whose peculiar Character is Reference.*
 Again—Τὸ ἀρθρὸν προϊστεῖσαν γνῶσιν δῆλον—*The Article indicates a pre-established acquaintance (c).*

His reasoning upon *Proper Names* is worth remarking. Proper Names (he tells us) often fall into *Homonymie*, that is, different Persons often go by the same Name. To solve this ambiguity, we have recourse to *Adjectives* or *Epithets*. For example—there were two Grecian chiefs, who bore the name of *Ajax*. It was not therefore without reason, that *Menestheus* uses Epithets, when this intent was to distinguish the one of them from the other.

Ἄλλα

(c) *Apoll. de Synt. L. I. c. 6, 7.* His account of *REFERENCE* is as follows—*Ιδίωμα ἀναφορᾶς προκατειλεγμένης προσώπες δευτέρα γνῶσις.* *The peculiar character of Reference is the second or repeated Knowledge of some Person already mentioned.* *L. II. c. 3.*

Αλλὰ τερ οἵτοι τελαμώνιοι ἀλλίους. Ch. I.
Alas. Hom,

*If both Ajaxes (says he) cannot be spared,
—at least alone
Let mighty Telamonian Ajax come.*

Apollonius proceeds——Even Epithets themselves are diffused thro' various Subjects, in as much as the same Adjective may be referred to many Substantives.

In order therefore to render both Parts of Speech equally definite, that is to say the Adjective as well as the Substantive, the Adjective itself assumes an Article before it, that it may indicate a Reference to some single Person only, μονάδικην ἀναφορὰν, according to the Author's own Phrase. And thus it is we say, Τρύφων ὁ Γραμματίκος, Trypho THE Grammariān; Απολόδωρος ὁ Κυρηναῖος, Apollodorus THE Cyrenean, &c. The Author's Conclusion of this

Ch.I. this Section is worth remarking. Δεῖν-
 τως ἀρα καὶ πατὰ τὸ τοιῶτον ἡ πρόσθεσίς ἐσι-
 τεῖ ἀρθρός, συνιδιάλυσα τὸ ἐπιθετικὸν τῷ πυρίῳ
 ὀνόματι—It is with reason therefore that
 the Article is here also added, as it brings
 the Adjective to an Individuality, as precise,
 as the proper Name (d).

We may carry this reasoning farther,
 and shew, how by help of the Article
 even common Appellatives come to have
 the force of proper Names, and that un-
 assisted by epithets of any kinds. Among
 the Atbenians Πλοῖον meant Ship; "Ενδεκα,
 Eleven; and Ἀνθρωπός, Man. Yet add
 but the Article, and Τὸ Πλοῖον, THE SHIP,
 meant that particular Ship, which they sent
 annually to Delos; Οἱ Ενδεκα, THE ELEVEN,
 meant certain Officers of Justice; and Οἱ
 Ἀνθρωποί, THE MAN, meant their public
 Executioner. So in English, City, is a
 Name

(d) See *Apoll. L. I. c. 12.* where by mistake *Mene-*
laus is put for *Menestheus*.

Name common to many places; and **Ch. I.**
Speaker, a Name common to many Men,
Yet if we prefix the Article, **THE CITY**
means our Metropolis; and **THE SPEAKER**,
a high Officer in the British Parliament.

AND thus it is by an easy transition,
that the Article, from denoting *Reference*,
comes to denote *Eminence* also; that is to
say, from implying an *ordinary* pre-ac-
quaintance, to presume a kind of *general*
and universal Notoriety. Thus among
the Greeks 'Ο Ποιητής, **THE POET**, meant
Homer (e); and 'Ο Σταγειρίτης, **THE STA-**
GIRITE, meant *Aristotle*; not that there
were

(e) There are so few exceptions to this Observation,
that we may fairly admit it to be generally true. Yet
Aristotle twice denotes *Euripides* by the Phrase ὁ τρωιλὸς,
once at the end of the seventh Book of his *Nicomachian Ethics*, and again in his *Physics*, L. II. 2. *Plato* also
in his tenth Book of Laws (p. 901. *Edit. Serr.*) denotes
Hesiod after the same manner.

Ch. I. were not many Poets, beside *Homer*; and
 many Stagirites, beside *Aristotle*; but none
 equally illustrious for their Poetry and
 Philosophy.

IT is on a like principle that *Aristotle* tells us, it is by no means the same thing to assert—*εἴδει τὸν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν*, or, TO *ἀγαθὸν*—that, *Pleasure is A Good*, or, *THE Good*. The first only makes it a *common Object of Desire*, upon a level with many others, which daily raise our wishes; the last supposes it *that supreme and sovereign Good*, the ultimate Scope of all our Actions and Endeavours (f).

BUT to pursue our Subject. It has been said already that the Article has no meaning, but when associated to some other word.—To what words then may it be associated?—To such as require *defining*, for

for it is by nature a *Definitive*.—And what Words are these?—Not those which already are as *definite*, as may be. Nor yet those, which, being *indefinite*, cannot properly be made otherwise. It remains then they must be those, which though *indefinite*, are yet capable, through the Article, of becoming *definite*.

Ch.I.

UPON these Principles we see the reason, why it is absurd to say, Ο ΕΓΩ, THE I, or Ο ΣΥ, THE THOU, because nothing can make those Pronouns more *definite*, than they are (g). The same may be asserted

of

(g) *Apollonius* makes it part of the Pronoun's Definition, to refuse co-alescence with the Article. Ἐκεῖνο
ζεῖ Ἀντωνυμία, τὸ μετὰ δεῖξεως ἡ ἀναφορᾶς ἀντονομα-
ζόμενον, ὃς σύνεστι τὸ ἀρθρον. That therefore is a Pro-
noun, which with Indication or Reference is put for a
Noun, and WITH WHICH THE ARTICLE DOOTH
NOT ASSOCIATE. L. II. c. 5. So *Gaza*, speaking of
Pronouns—Πάντη δὲ—οὐκ ἐπιστέχονται ἀρθρον. L. IV.
Priscian says the same. *Jure igitur apud Græcos prima*

Q

et

Ch. I. of Proper Names, and though the *Greeks* say ὁ Σωκράτης, ἡ Σενεκη, and the like, yet the Article is a mere Pleonasm, unless perhaps it serve to distinguish Sexes. By the same rule we cannot say in *Greek* οἱ ἀμφοτεροί, or in *English*, **THE BOTH**, because these Words *in their own nature* are each of them perfectly *defined*, so that to define them farther would be quite superfluous. Thus, if it be said, *I have read both Poets*, this plainly indicates *a definite pair*, of whom some mention has been made already; *Δυὰς ἐγγνωσμένη*, a *known Duad*, as *Apollonius* expresses himself, (b) when he speaks of this Subject. On the contrary, if it be said, *I have read Two Poets*, this may mean *any Pair out of*

et secunda persona pronominum, quæ fine dubio demonstrativa sunt, articulis adjungi non possunt; nec tertia, quando demonstrativa est. L. XII. p. 938.—In the beginning of the same Book, he gives the true reason of this. *Supra omnes alias partes orationis FINIT PERSONAS PRONOMEN.*

(b) *Apollon.* L. I. c. 16.

of all that ever existed. And hence this Numeral, being in this Sense *indefinite* (as indeed are all others, as well as itself) is forced to *assume the Article*, whenever it would become *definite* *. And thus it is, **THE** Two in *English*, and **ΩΣ ΔΤΟ** in *Greek*, mean nearly the same thing, as **ΒΟΤΗ** or **ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΙ**. Hence also it is, that as Two, when taken alone, has reference to some *primary* and *indefinite* Perception, while the Article, **THE**, has reference to some *secondary* and *definite* †; hence I say the Reason, why it is bad *Greek* to say **ΔΤΟ ΟΙ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΙ**, and bad *English*, to say **Two THE MEN**. Such Syntax is in fact a *Blending of Incompatibles*,

Q 2

incompatibles,

* This explains Servius on the XIIth *Aeneid.* v. 511, where he tells us that *Duorum* is put for *Amborum*. In *English* or *Greek* the Article would have done the business, for *the Two*, or *τοῖς δυοῖς* are equivalent to *Both* or *αἱμφολίγων*, but not so *Duorum*, because the *Latins* have no Articles to prefix.

† Sup. p. 215, 216.

Ch. I. *patibles*, that is to say of a *defined Substantive* with an *undefined Attributive*. On the contrary to say in *Greek ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΙ ΟΙ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΙ*, or in *English*, *Both THE MEN*, is good and allowable, because the Substantive cannot possibly be less apt, by being defined, to coalesce with an Attributive, which is defined as well as itself. So likewise, it is correct to say, *ΟΙ ΔΥΟ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΙ*, *THE two MEN*, because here the Article, being placed in the beginning, *extends its Power* as well through Substantive as Attributive, and equally contributes to *define* them both.

As some of the words above admit of no Article, *because they are by Nature as definite as may be*, so there are others, which admit it not, *because they are not to be defined at all*. Of this sort are all **INTERROGATIVES**, If we question about *Substances*, we cannot say *Ο ΤΙΣ ΟΤΟΣ*, *THE WHO IS THIS*; but *ΤΙΣ ΟΤΤΟΣ*,

ΟΤΤΟΣ, WHO IS THIS? (i). The same as to *Qualities* and both kinds of *Quantity*. We say without an Article ΠΟΙΟΣ, ΠΟΣΟΙ, ΠΗΛΙΚΟΣ, in *English*, WHAT SORT OF, HOW MANY, HOW GREAT. The Reason is, that the Articles 'O, and THE, respect Beings, *already known*; Interrogatives respect Beings, *about which we are ignorant*; for as to what we know, Interrogation is superfluous.

Ch. I.

IN a word *the natural Associators with Articles* are all those *common Appellatives*, which denote the several Genera and Species of Beings. It is these, which, by assuming a different Article, serve either to explain an Individual upon its first being perceived, or else to indicate, upon its return, a Recognition, or repeated Knowledge (k).

Q. 3

WE

(i) Apollonius calls ΤΙΣ, ἐναντίωτατον τῶν ἀρθρῶν, a Part of Speech, most contrary, most averse to Articles, L. IV. c. I.

(k) What is here said respects *the two Articles* which we have in *English*. In *Greek*, the Article does no more, than imply a *Recognition*. See before p. 216, 217, 218.

Ch. I. We shall here subjoin a few Instances
of the Peculiar Power of ARTICLES.

EVERY Proposition consists of a *Subject*, and a *Predicate*. In *English* these are distinguished by their Position, the Subject standing *first*, the Predicate *last*. *Happiness is Pleasure*—Here, *Happiness* is the Subject; *Pleasure*, the *Predicate*. If we change their order, and say, *Pleasure is Happiness*; then *Pleasure* becomes the *Subject*, and *Happiness* the *Predicate*. In *Greek* these are distinguished not by any Order or Position, but by help of the *Article*, which the Subject always assumes, and the Predicate in most instances (some few excepted) rejects. *Happiness is Pleasure*—ἡδονὴ ἡ ἐυδαιμονία—*Pleasure is Happiness*—ἡ ἡδονὴ ἐυδαιμονία—*Fine things are difficult*—χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά—*Difficult things are fine*—τὰ χαλεπά καλά.

IN Greek it is worth attending, how in Ch. I. the same Sentence, the same *Article*, by being prefixed to a different Word, quite changes the whole meaning. For example—Ο Πτολεμᾶς γυμνασιαρχήσας ἐτιμήθη —*Ptolemy, having presided over the Games, was publickly honoured.* The Participle γυμνασιαρχήσας has here no other force, than to denote to us the *Time*, when Ptolemy was honoured, *viz.* after having presided over the Games. But if, instead of the Substantive, we join the Participle to the *Article*, and say, 'Ο γυμνασιαρχήσας Πτολεμᾶς ἐτιμήθη, our meaning is then—*The Ptolemy, who presided over the Games, was honoured.* The Participle in this case, being joined to the *Article*, tends tacitly to indicate not one *Ptolemy* but many, of which number a particular one participated of honour (1).

Q 4

IN

(1) *Apollon.* L. I. c. 33, 34.

Ch. I. IN *English* likewise it deserves remarking, how the Sense is changed by changing of the *Articles*, tho' we leave every other Word of the Sentence untouched.—
And Natban said unto David, THOU ART THE MAN *. In that single THE, that diminutive Particle, all the force and efficacy of the Reason is contained. By that alone are the Premises applied, and so firmly fixed, as never to be shaken. It is possible this Assertion may appear at first somewhat strange; but let him, who doubts it, only change the *Article*, and then see what will become of the Prophet and his reasoning.—*And Natban said unto David, THOU ART A MAN.* Might not the King well have demanded upon so impertinent a position,

Non dices bodie, quorsum hæc tam putida tendant?

BUT

* ΣΤ ΕΙ 'Ο ΑΝΗΠ. Βασιλ. Β'. κεφ, 16.

But enough of such Speculations. The Ch. I. only remark, which we shall make on them, is this; that " minute Change in " PRINCIPLES leads to mighty Change in " EFFECTS; so that well are PRINCIPLES " intitled to our regard, however *in appearance* they may be trivial and low."

THE ARTICLES already mentioned are those *strictly* so called; but besides these there are the PRONOMINAL ARTICLES, such as, *This, That, Any, Other, Some, All, No, or None*, &c. Of these we have spoken already in our Chapter of Pronouns (*m*), where

(*m*) See B. I. c. 5. p. 72, 73. It seems to have been some view of words, like that here given, which induced Quintilian to say of the Latin Tongue—*Noster sermo Articulos non desiderat; ideoque in alias partes orationis sparguntur.* Inst. Orat. L. I. c. 4. So Scaliger. *His declaratis, satis constat Græcorum Articulos non negligatos a nobis, sed eorum usum superfluum.* Nam ubi aliiquid præscribendum est, quod Græci per articulum efficiunt (*εἰλέξει οὐ δύλος*) expletur a Latinis per *IS* aut *ILLE*; *IS*, aut,

Ch. I. where we have shewn, when they may be taken as Pronouns, and when as Articles. Yet in truth it must be confessed, if the Essence of an Article be *to define* and *ascertain*, they are much more properly Articles, than any thing else, and as such should be considered in Universal Grammar. Thus when we say, *THIS Picture I approve, but THAT I dislike*, what do we perform by the help of these Definitives, but bring down the common Appellative to denote two Individuals, the one as *the more near*, the other as *the more distant*? So when we say, *SOME men are virtuous, but ALL men are mortal*, what is the natural Effect of this *ALL* and *SOME*, but to define that *Universality*, and *Particularity*, which would remain indefinite, were we to take them

aut, Ille servus dixit, de quo servo antea facta mentio fit,
 aut qui alio quo pacto notus fit. Additur enim Articulus
 ad rei memoriam renovandam, cuius antea non nescii sumus,
 aut ad praescribendam intellectionem, quae latius potere
 queat; veluti cum dicimus, C. Cæsar, Is qui postea dic-
 tator fuit. Nam alii fuere C. Cæsares. Sic Græcè
 Καῖσαρ ὁ ἀυτοκράτωρ. De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 131.

them away? The same is evident in such Sentences, as — *Some substances have sensation; OTHERS want it—Observe ANY way of acting, and SOME men will find fault, &c.* For here *SOME*, *OTHER*, and *ANY*, serve all of them to *define* different Parts of a given Whole; *SOME*, to denote a *definite Part*; *ANY*, to denote an *indefinite*; and *OTHER*, to denote the *remaining Part*, when a Part has been assumed already. Sometimes this last Word denotes *a large indefinite Portion*, set in opposition to some *single, definite, and remaining Part*, which receives from such Opposition no small degree of heightening. Thus *Virgil*,

Excedent ALII spirantia mollius æra;
(Credo equidem) vivos ducent de marmore
vultus;

Orabunt causas melius, cælique meatus
Describent radio, et surgentia fidera
dicent:

Tu regere imperio populos, ROMANE,
memento, &c. Æn. VI.

NOTHING

Ch. I. **N**OTHING can be stronger or more sublime, than this Antithesis ; *one Act* set as equal to *many other Acts taken together*, and the Roman *singly* (for it is *Tu Romane*, not *Vos Romani*) to *all other Men* ; and yet this performed by so trivial a cause, as the just opposition of *Alii* to *Tu*.

BUT here we conclude; and proceed to treat of CONNECTIVES.

C H A P. II.

*Concerning Connectives; and first those
called Conjunctions.*

CONNECTIVES are the subject of what Ch. II. follows; which, according as they connect either *Sentences* or *Words*, are called by the different Names of CONJUNCTIONS, or PREPOSITIONS. Of these Names, that of the *Preposition* is taken from a *mere accident*, as it commonly stands in connection before the Part, which it connects. The name of the *Conjunction*, as is evident, has reference to its *essential character*.

Of these two we shall consider the CONJUNCTION first, because it connects, not Words, but *Sentences*. This is conformable to the Analysis, with which we began this inquiry *, and which led us, by parity

* Sup. p. 11, 12.

Ch. II. parity of reason, to consider *Sentences* themselves before *Words*. Now the Definition of a CONJUNCTION is as follows — *a Part of Speech, void of Signification itself, but so formed as to help Signification, by making two or more significant Sentences to be ONE significant Sentence (a).*

THIS

(a) Grammarians have usually considered the Conjunction as connecting rather *single Parts of Speech*, than *whole Sentences*, and that too with the addition of like with like, Tense with Tense, Number with Number, Case with Case, &c. This Sanctius justly explodes. *Coniunctio neque casus, neque alias partes orationis (ut imperiti docent) conjungit, ipsæ enim partes inter se conjunguntur—sed coniunctio Orationes inter se conjungit.* Miner. L. III. c. 14. He then establishes his doctrine by a variety of examples. He had already said as much, L. I. c. 18. and in this he appears to have followed Scaliger, who had asserted the same before him. *Coniunctionis autem notionem veteres paullo inconsutius prodidere; neque enim, quod aiunt, partes alias conjungit (ipsæ enim partes per se inter se conjunguntur)—sed Coniunctio est, quæ conjungit Orationes plures.* De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 165.

This

THIS therefore being the general Idea of Ch. II.
CONJUNCTIONS, we deduce their Species
in

This Doctrine of theirs is confirmed by *Apollonius*, who in the several places, where he mentions the Conjunction, always considers it in Syntax as connecting *Sentences*, and not *Words*, though in his works now extant he has not given us its Definition. See L. I. c. 2. p. 14. L. II. c. 12. p. 124. L. III. c. 15. p. 234.

But we have stronger authority than this to support *Scaliger* and *Santius*, and that is *Aristotle's* Definition, as the Passage has been corrected by the best Critics and Manuscripts. A Conjunction, according to him, is φωνὴ ἀσημος, ἐκ τλειόνων μὲν φωνῶν μιᾶς, σημαντικῶν οἱ, τοιεῖν τεφυεῖα μιᾶν φωνὴν σημαντικήν. An articulate Sound, devoid of Signification, which is so formed as to make ONE significant articulate Sound out of several articulate Sounds, which are each of them significant. Poet. c. 20. In this view of things, the one significant articulate Sound, formed by the Conjunction, is not the Union of two or more Syllables in one simple Word, nor even of two or more Words in one simple Sentence, but of two or more simple Sentences in one complex Sentence, which is considered as ONE, from that Concatenation of Meaning effected by the Conjunctions. For example, let us take the Sentence, which follows. *If Men are by nature social, it is their Interest to be just, though it were*

Ch. II. in the following manner. CONJUNCTIONS,
 while they *connect sentences*, either *connect*
 also

were not so ordained by the Laws of their Country. Here are three Sentences. (1.) *Men are by nature social.* (2.) *It is Man's Interest to be just.* (3.) *It is not ordained by the Laws of every Country that Man should be just.* The first two of these Sentences are made *One* by the Conjunction, *If*; these, *One* with the third Sentence, by the Conjunction, *THO'*; and the three, thus united, make that φωνὴ μία σημαντικὴ, that *one significant articulate Sound*, of which *Aristotle* speaks, and which is the result of the conjunctive Power.

This explains a passage in his Rhetoric, where he mentions the same Subject. Ο γὰρ σύνδεσμος ἐν τοις τὸ τολλά· ὥστε ἐὰν ἐξαιρεθῇ, δῆλον ὅτι τεναυτίον ἔσται ἐν τολλά. *The Conjunction makes many, ONE; so that if it be taken away, it is then evident on the contrary that one will be MANY.* Rhet. III. c. 12. His instance of a Sentence, divested of its Conjunctions, and thus made *many* out of *one*, is, ἥλθον, ἀπίνιησα, ἐδέομνη, *veni, occurri, rogavi*, where by the way the three Sentences, resulting from this Dissolution, (for ἥλθον, ἀπίνιησα, and ἐδέομνη, are each of them, when unconnected, so many perfect Sentences) prove that these are the proper Subjects of the *Conjunction's* connective faculty.

Ammonius's

also their meanings, or not. For example: let us take these two Sentences—
Rome was enslaved—Cæsar was ambitious—and connect them together by the Conjunction, BECAUSE. *Rome was enslaved, BECAUSE Cæsar was ambitious.* Here the Meanings, as well as the Sentences, appear to be connected. But if I say,—*Manners must be reformed, OR Liberty will be lost—here the Conjunction, OR, though it join the*

Ammonius's account of the use of this Part of Speech is elegant. Διὸ καὶ τὸν λόγων ὁ μὲν ὑπαρξίν μίαν σημαίνων, ὁ κυρίως εῖς, ἀνάλογος ἀν εἰπεῖν τῷ μηδέπω τετμημένῳ ξύλῳ, καὶ διὰ τότο εἰνὶ λεγομένῳ. ὁ δὲ πλειόνας ὑπάρχεις οὐλῶν, ἔνα (lege διὰ) τινὰ δὲ σύνθεσμον ηνόσθιαι τως δοκῶν, ἀναλογεῖ τῇ τοι τῇ ἐκ τολλῶν συγχειμένῃ ξύλων, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν γόμφων φαινομένην ἐχάσῃ τὴν ἔνωσιν. *Of Sentences that, which denotes one Existence simply, and which is strictly ONE, may be considered as analogous to a piece of Timber not yet severed, and called on this account One. That, which denotes several Existences, and which appears to be made ONE by some Conjunctive Particle, is analogous to a Ship made up of many pieces of Timber, and which by means of the nails has an apparent Unity.* Am. in Lib. de Interpret. p. 54, 6.

Ch. II. *the Sentences, yet as to their respective Meanings, is a perfect Disjunctive.* And thus it appears, that though all *Conjunctions conjoin Sentences, yet with respect to the Sense, some are CONJUNCTIVE, and some DISJUNCTIVE; and hence (b) it is that we derive their different Species.*

THE *Conjunctions, which conjoin both Sentences and their Meanings, are either COPULATIVES, or CONTINUATIVES.* The principal *Copulative in English* is, **AND.** The *Continuatives* are, **IF, BECAUSE, THEREFORE, THAT, &c.** The Difference between these is this — *The Copulative does no more than barely couple Sentences, and is therefore applicable to all Subjects, whose Natures are not incompatible.* *Continuatives, on the contrary, by a more intimate connection, consolidate*

Sen-

(b) Thus *Scaliger.* *Aut ergo Sensum conjungunt, ac Verba; aut Verba tantum conjungunt, Sensum vero disjungunt.* *De C. L. Lat. c. 167.*

Sentences into *one continuous Whole*, and Ch. II. are therefore applicable only to Subjects, which have an *essential Co-incidence*.

To explain by examples—It is no way improper to say, *Lyfippus was a Statuary, AND Priscian was a Grammarian — The Sun shineth, AND the Sky is clear*—because these are things that may co-exist, and yet imply no absurdity. But it would be absurd to say, *Lyfippus was a Statuary, BECAUSE Priscian was a Grammarian*; tho' not to say, *the Sun shineth, BECAUSE the Sky is clear*. The Reason is, with respect to the first, the *Co-incidence* is merely *accidental*; with respect to the last, it is *essential*, and founded in nature. And so much for the Distinction between *Copulatives* and *Continuatives* (c).

As

(c) *Copulativa est, quæ copulat tam Verba, quam Sensum.* Thus *Priscian*, p. 1026. But *Scaliger* is more explicit—*si Sensum conjungunt (conjunctiones sc.) aut necessariæ,*

Ch. II. BECAUSE the Moon intervenes—*The Collectives* subjoin *Effects to Causes*—*The Moon intervenes, THEREFORE the Sun is in Eclipse.* Now we use *Causals* in those instances, where, the Effect being conspicuous, we seek its Cause ; and *Collectives*, in *Demonstrations*, and *Science properly so called*, where the Cause being known

It may seem at first somewhat strange, why the *Positive* Conjunctions should have been considered as Subordinate to the *Suppositive*, which by their antient Names appears to have been the fact. Is it, that the Positive are confined to what *actually is* ; the Suppositive extend to *Possibles*, nay even as far as to *Impossibles*? Thus it is false to affirm, *As it is Day, it is Light*, unless it actually be Day. But we may at midnight affirm, *If it be Day, it is Light*, because the, *If*, extends to Possibles also. Nay we may affirm, by its help (if we please) even Impossibles. We may say, *If the Sun be cubical, then is the Sun angular* ; *If the Sky fall, then shall we catch Larks*. Thus too Scaliger upon the same occasion—*amplitudinem Continuativa percipi ex eo, quod etiam impossibile abiquando presupponit.* De C. L. Lat. C. 168. In this sense then the *Continuative*, *Suppositive* or *Conditional* Conjunction is (as it were) superior to the *Positive*, as being of greater latitude in its application.

known first, by its help we discern consequences (e). Ch. II.

ALL these *Continuatives* are resolvable into *Copulatives*. Instead of, BECAUSE it is *Day*, it is *light*, we may say, *It is Day*, AND it is *Light*. Instead of, IF it be *Day*, it is *Light*, we may say, *It is at the same time necessary to be Day*, AND to be *Light*; and so in other Instances. The Reason is, that the Power of the *Copulative* extends to all Connections, as well to the *essential*, as to the *casual* or *fortuitous*. Hence therefore the *Continuative* may be resolved into a *Copulative and something more*, that is to say, into a *Copulative* implying an *essential Co-incidence* (f) in the Subjects conjoined.

R 4

As

(e) The Latins called the Causals, *Causales* or *Causatrices*; the Collectives, *Collectivæ* or *Illativæ*: The Greeks called the former Ἀιτιολογικοί, and the latter Συλλογισμοί.

(f) *Resolvuntur autem in Copulativas omnes haec, propterea quod Causa cum Effectu Suâpte naturâ conjuncta est.* Scal, de C. L. Lat. c. 169.

Ch. II. As to *Causal* Conjunctions (of which we have spoken already) there is no one of the four Species of Causes, which they are not capable of denoting: for example, THE MATERIAL CAUSE—*The Trumpet sounds, BECAUSE it is made of Metal*—THE FORMAL—*The Trumpet sounds, BECAUSE it is long and hollow*—THE EFFICIENT—*The Trumpet sounds, BECAUSE an Artist blows it*—THE FINAL—*The Trumpet sounds, THAT it may raise our courage*. Where it is worth observing, that the three first Causes are express by the strong affirmation of the *Indicative Mode*, because if the Effect actually be, these must of necessity be also. But the last Cause has a different Mode, namely, the *Contingent* or *Potential*. The Reason is, that the Final Cause, tho' it may be *first in Speculation*, is always *last in Event*. That is to say, however it may be the End, which set the Artist first to work, it may still be an End beyond his Power to obtain, and which,

which, like other Contingents, may either happen, or not (g). Hence also it is connected by Conjunctions of a peculiar kind, such as, THAT, *ινα*, UT, &c.

THE Sum is, that ALL CONJUNCTIONS, which connect both Sentences and their Meanings, are either COPULATIVE, or CONTINUATIVE; the Continuatives are either Conditional, or Positive; and the Positives are either Causal or Collective.

AND now we come to the DISJUNCTIVE CONJUNCTIONS, a Species of Words which bear this contradictory Name, because, while they *disjoin the Sense*, they *conjoin the Sentences* (b).

WITH

(g) See B. I. c. 8. p. 142. See also Vol. I. Note VIII. p. 271. For the four Causes, see Vol. I. Note XVII. p. 280.

(b) 'Οι δὲ διαζευκτικοὶ τὰ διαζευγμένα σύντιθεσι, οὐδὲ τραγμα απὸ τραγματοῦ, οὐδὲ τρόσωπον απὸ τρόπου διαζευγνῦντες, τὴν φράσιν ἐπιτύνδεσσιν. *Gazæ Gram.*

Ch. II. — WITH respect to these we may observe, that as there is a Principle of UNION diffused throughout all things, by which THIS WHOLE is kept together, and preserved from Dissipation; so there is a Principle of DIVERSITY diffused in like manner, the Source of Distinction, of Number, and of Order (i).

Now

Gram. L. IV. *Disjunctivæ sunt, quæ, quamvis dicti-ones conjugant, seorsum tamen disjunctum habent.* Prisc. L. XVI. p. 1029. And hence it is, that a Sentence, connected by Disjunctives, has a near resemblance to a *simple negative Truth*. For though this as to its Intellection be *disjunctive* (its end being to disjoin the Subject from the Predicate) yet as it combines Terms together into one Proposition, it is as truly *synthetical*, as any Truth, that is *affirmative*. See Chap. I. Note (b). p. 3.

(i) The DIVERSITY, which adorns Nature, may be said to heighten by degrees, and as it passes to different Subjects, to become more and more intense. Some things only differ, when considered as *Individuals*, but if we recur to their *Species*, immediately lose all Distinction: such for instance are *Socrates* and *Plato*. Others differ as to *Species*, but as to *Genus* are the same: such

Now it is to express in some degree the Ch. II.
Modifications of this Diversity, that DIS-
JUNCTIVE CONJUNCTIONS seem first to
have been invented.

Of these DISJUNCTIVES, some are SIMPLE, some ADVERSATIVE—Simple, as when we say, EITHER it is Day, OR it
is

are *Man* and *Lion*. There are others again, which differ as to Genus, and co-incide only in those *transcendental Comprehensions* of Ens, Being, Existence, and the like: such are *Quantities* and *Qualities*, as for example an *Ounce*, and the Colour, *White*. Lastly ALL BEING whatever differs, as *Being*, from *Non-being*.

Farther, in all things different, however moderate their Diversity, there is an appearance of OPPOSITION with respect to each other, in as much as each thing is *itself*, and *not any* of the rest. But yet in all Subjects this Opposition is not the same. In RELATIVES, such as Greater and Less, Double and Half, Father and Son, Cause and Effect, in these it is *more striking*, than in ordinary Subjects, because these always shew it, by necessarily inferring each other. In CONTRARIES, such as Black and White, Even and Odd, Good and Bad, Virtuous

Ch. II. is *Night*—*Adversative*, as when we say, *It is not Day, BUT it is Night.* The Difference between these is, that the simple do no more, than merely *disjoin*; the *Adversative* *disjoin*, with an *Opposition concomitant*. Add to this, that the *Adversative* are *definite*; the *Simple, indefinite*. Thus when we say, *The Number of Three is not*

an

Virtuous and Vitious, in these the *Opposition* goes still farther, because there not only *differ*, but are even *destructive of each other*. But the *most potent Opposition* is that of *Arithparis*, or *CONTRADICTION*, when we oppose *Proposition* to *Proposition*, *Truth* to *Falhood*, asserting of any Subject, either *it is*, or *it is not*. This indeed is an *Opposition*, which extends itself to all things, for every thing conceivable must needs have its *Negative*, though multitudes by nature have neither *Relatives*, nor *Contraries*.

Besides these Modes of *DIVERSITY*, there are others that deserve notice: such for instance, as the Diversity between the *Name* of a thing, and its *Definition*; between the *various Names*, which belong to the *same thing*, and the *various things*, which are denoted by the *same Name*; all which *Diversities* upon occasion become a Part of our Discourse. An so much, in short, for the Subject of *DIVERSITY*.

an even Number, but an odd, we not only Ch. II. disjoin two opposite Attributes, but we ~~do~~ definitely affirm one, and deny the other. But when we say, *The Number of the Stars is EITHER even OR odd*, though we assert one Attribute *to be*, and the other *not to be*, yet the Alternative notwithstanding is left indefinite. And so much for *simple Disjunctives* (*k*).

As

(*k*) The simple Disjunctive *ἢ*, or *Vel*, is mostly used *indefinitely*, so as to leave an Alternative. But when it is used *definitely*, so as to leave no Alternative, it is then a perfect Disjunctive of the Subsequent from the Previous, and has the same force with *ἢ* *ἢ*, or, *Et non*. It is thus *Gaza* explains that Verse of *Homer*.

Βέλοις ἐγὼ λαὸν σόον ἐμμεναι, η ἀπολέσθαι.

I. A.

That is to say, *I desire the people should be saved, AND NOT be destroyed*, the Conjunction *ἢ* being *ἀντετίκος*, or *sublative*. It must however be confess, that this Verse is otherwise explained by an Ellipsis, either of *μᾶλλον*, or *εὐτίς*, concerning which see the Commentators.

Ch. II. As to *Adversative Disjunctives*, it has been said already that they imply OPPOSITION. Now there can be no Opposition of the *same Attribute*, in the *same Subject*, as when we say, *Nireus was beautiful*; but the Opposition must be either of the *same Attribute* in *different Subjects*, as when we say, *Brutus was a Patriot, BUT Cæsar was not*—or of *different Attributes* in the *same Subject*, as when we say, *Gorgias was a Sophist, BUT not a Philosopher*—or of *different Attributes* in *different Subjects*, as when we say, *Plato was a Philosopher, BUT Hippias was a Sophist*.

THE *Conjunctions* used for all these purposes may be called ABSOLUTE ADVERSATIVES.

BUT there are *other Adversatives*, besides these; as when we say, *Nireus was more beautiful, THAN Achilles—Virgil was*

As great a Poet, as Cicero was an Orator. Ch. II.
The Character of these latter is, that they go farther than the former, by marking not only *Opposition*, but that *Equality* or *Excess*, which arises among Subjects from their being *compared*. And hence it is they may be called **ADVERSATIVES OR COMPARISON.**

BESIDES the Adversatives here mentioned, there are two other Species, of which the most eminent are **UNLESS** and **ALTHO'**. For example—*Troy will be taken, UNLESS the Palladium be preserved—Troy will be taken, ALTHO' Hector defend it.* The Nature of these *Adversatives* may be thus explained. As every *Event* is naturally allied to its *Cause*, so by parity of reason it is *opposed* to its *Preventive*. And as every *Cause* is either *adequate* (*l*) or *in-adequate* (in-

(*l*) This Distinction has reference to *common Opinion*, and the *form of Language*, consonant thereto. In strict metaphysical truth, *No Cause, that is not adequate, is any Cause at all.*

Ch. II. (in-adequate, when it endeavours, without being effectual) so in like manner is every *Preventive*. Now *adequate Preventives* are express by such *Adversatives*, as UNLESS—*Troy will be taken, UNLESS the Palladium be preserved*; that is, *This alone is sufficient to prevent it*. The *In-adequate* are express by such *Adversatives*, as ALTHO'—*Troy will be taken, ALTHO' Hector defend it*; that is, *Hector's Defence will prove in-effectual*.

THE Names given by the old Grammarians to denote these last *Adversatives*, appear not sufficiently to express their Natures (m). They may be better perhaps called **ADVERSATIVES ADEQUATE**, and **IN-ADEQUATE**.

AND thus it is that all **DISJUNCTIVES**, that is **CONJUNCTIONS**, which conjoin *Sentences*,

(m) They called them for the most part, without sufficient Distinction of their Species, *Adversative*, or 'Εναντιωματικοί.

ences, but not their Meanings, are either SIMPLE or ADVERSATIVE; and that all ADVERSATIVES are either Absolute or Comparative; or else Adequate or In-adequate.

We shall finish this Chapter with a few miscellany Observations.

IN the first place it may be observed, through all the Species of Disjunctives, that the *same* Disjunctive appears to have *greater* or *less* force, according as the Subjects, which it disjoins, are *more* or *less* disjoined by Nature. For example, if we say, *Every Number is even, or odd—Every Proposition is true, or false*—nothing seems to disjoin *more strongly* than the *Disjunctive*, because no things are in Nature *more incompatible* than the Subjects. But if we say, *That Object is a Triangle, or Figure contained under three right lines*—the (or) in this case hardly seems to disjoin, or indeed to do more, than *distinctly to express the Thing, first by its*

S Name,

Ch. II. Name, and then by its *Definition*. So if we say, *That Figure is a Sphere, or a Globe, or a Ball*—the Disjunctive in this case, tends no farther to disjoin, than as it distinguishes the several *Names*, which belong to the *same Thing* (n).

AGAIN—the Words, *When* and *Where*, and all others of the same nature, such as, *Whence, Whither, Whenever, Wherever, &c.* may be properly called ADVERBIAL CONJUNCTIONS, because they participate the nature both of Adverbs and Conjunctions—of *Conjunctions*, as they *conjoin Sentences*;

(n) The Latins had a peculiar Particle for this occasion, which they called *Subdisjunctivo*, a *Subdisjunctive*; and that was *SIVE*. *Alexander sive Paris*; *Mars sive Mars*. The Greek "Ειτ' οὐ" seems to answer the same end. Of these Particles, Scaliger thus speaks—*Et sive nomen Subdisjunctivarum reōle acceptum est, neque enim tam planē disjungit, quam Disjunctivæ. Nam Disjunctivæ sunt in Contrariis—Subdisjunctivæ autem etiam in non Contrariis, sed Diversis tantum; ut, Alexander sive Paris.* De C. L. Lat. c. 170.

ces ; of *Adverbs*, as they denote the Attributes either of *Time*, or of *Place*. Ch. II.

AGAIN—these *Adverbial Conjunctions*, and perhaps *most of the Prepositions* (contrary to the Character of *accessory Words*, which have strictly no Signification, but when associated with other words) have a kind of *obscure Signification*, when taken alone, by denoting those Attributes of Time and Place. And hence it is, that they appear in Grammar, like *Zoophytes* in Nature ; a *kind of (o) middle Beings*, of amphibious character, which, by sharing the Attributes of the higher and the lower, conduce to link the Whole together (p).

AND

(o) Πολλαχοῦ γὰρ οἱ φύσις δῆλη γίνεται κατὰ μηχόν μεταβαίνεται, ὡς ἀμφιεπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τίναν, πότερον ζῶν ή φυτόν. *Themist.* p. 74. Ed. Ald. See also *Arist. de Animal.* Part. p. 93. l. 10. Ed. Syll.

(p) It is somewhat surprizing that the politest and most elegant of the *Attic Writers*, and *Plato* above all

Ch. II. AND so much for CONJUNCTIONS,
their Genus, and their Species.

the rest, should have their works filled with Particles of all kinds, and with Conjunctions in particular; while in the modern polite works, as well of ourselves as of our neighbours, scarce such a Word as a Particle, or Conjunction is to be found. Is it, that where there is *Connection in the Meaning*, there must be *Words had to connect*; but that where the Connection is little or none, such Connectives are of little use? That Houses of Cards, without cement, may well answser their end, but not those Houses, where one woud chuse to dwell? Is this the Cause? or have we attained an Elegance, to the Antients unknown?

Venimus ad summam fortunæ, &c.

C H A P. III.

*Concerning those Connectives, called
Prepositions.*

PREPOSITIONS by their name express Ch. III.
their *Place*, but not their *Character*.
Their Definition will distinguish them
from the former Connectives. A PRE-
POSITION is a *Part of Speech, devoid itself*
of Signification, but so formed as to unite
*two Words that are significant, and that re-
fuse to coalesce or unite of themselves (a).*
This

(a) The Stoic Name for a Preposition was Προθε-
τικὸς Σύνδεσμος, *Præpositiva Conjunctio*, a *Prepositiva
Conjunction*. 'Ως μὲν ἐν ᾧ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ταραθέ-
σσις ἡ προθετικὴς συνδεσμικῆς συνίαξες γίνονται τα-
ρεμφατικά, λέλεκται ἡμῖν ἐξ ᾧ καὶ ἀφορμὴ ἔργηται
ταρὰ τοῖς Στιχοῖς τῇ καλεῖσθαι ἀντας Προθετικὴς
Συνδέσμος. Now in what manner even in other applica-
tions (besides the present) Prepositions give proof of their
Conjunctive Syntax, we have mentioned already; whence too

Ch. III. This connective Power, (which relates to *Words* only, and not *Sentences*) will be better understood from the following Speculations.

SOME things co-alesce and unite *of themselves*; others refuse to do so *without help*, and as it were compulsion. Thus in Works of Art, the Morter and the Stone co-alesce of themselves; but the Wainscot and the Wall not without Nails and Pins. In nature this is more conspicuous. For example; all Quantities, and Qualities co-alesce immediately with their Substances. Thus it is we say, *a fierce Lion, a vast Mountain*; and from *this Natural Concord of Subject and Accident*, arises *the Grammatical Concord of Substantive and Adjective*. In like

the Stoies took occasion to call them PREPOSITIVE CONJUNCTIONS. *Apollon.* L. IV. c. 5. p. 313. Yet is this in fact rather a descriptive *Sketch*, than a complete *Definition*, since there are other Conjunctions, which are Prepositive as well as these. See *Gaz.* L. IV, de *Præposit.* *Prisc.* L. XIV. p. 983.

like manner Actions co-alesce with their Agents, and Passions with their Patients. Thus it is we say, *Alexander conquers*; *Darius is conquered*. Nay, as every Energy is a kind of Medium between its Agent and Patient, the whole three, *Agent*, *Energy*, and *Patient*, co-alesce with the same facility; as when we say, *Alexander conquers Darius*. And hence, that is from these Modes of natural Co-alescence, arises the Grammatical Regimen of the Verb by its Nominative, and of the Accusative by its Verb. Farther than this, Attributives themselves may be most of them characterized; as when we say of such Attributives as *ran*, *beautiful*, *learned*, *he ran swiftly*, *she was very beautiful*, *he was moderately learned*, &c. And hence the Co-alescence of the Adverb with Verbs, Participles, and Adjectives.

THE general Conclusion appears to be
this. "THOSE PARTS OF SPEECH UNITE
"OF THEMSELVES IN GRAMMAR, WHOSE
"ORIGINAL ARCHETYPES UNITE OF
S 4 " THEM-

Ch.III. "THEMSELVES IN NATURE." To which we may add, as following from what has been said, that the great Objects of Natural Union are SUBSTANCE and ATTRIBUTE. Now tho' Substances naturally coincide with their Attributes, yet they absolutely refuse doing so, one with another (b). And hence those known Maxims in Physics, that *Body is impenetrable*; that *two Bodies cannot possess the same place*; that *the same Attribute cannot belong to different Substances*, &c.

FROM these Principles it follows, that when we form a Sentence, the Substantive without difficulty co-incides with the Verb, from the natural Co-incidence of Substance and Energy—THE SUN WARMETH. So likewise the Energy with the Subject, on which

(b) *Causa, propter quam duo Substantiva non ponuntur sine copulâ, e Philosophia potesta est: neque enim duo substantialiter unum esse potest, sicut Substantia et Accidens; itaque non dicas, CÆSAR, CATO PUGNAT.* Scal. de Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 177.

which it operates—WARMETH THE Ch.III.
EARTH. So likewise both *Substance* and ~~Energy~~
Energy with their proper *Attributes*.—

THE SPLENDID SUN,—GENIALLY WARM-
ETH—THE FERTILE EARTH. But sup-
pose we were desirous to add other Sub-
stantives, as for instance, AIR, or BEAMS.
How would these co-incide, or under what
Character could they be introduced? Not
as *Nominatives* or *Accusatives*, for both
those places are already filled; the Nomi-
native by the Substance, SUN; the Accu-
sative by the Substance, EARTH. Not as
Attributes to these last, or to any other
thing; for *Attributes by nature they nei-*
ther are, nor can be made. Here then we
perceive the Rise and Use of PREPOSI-
TIONS. By these we connect those Sub-
stantives to Sentences, which at the time
are unable to coalesce *of themselves*. Let
us assume for instance a pair of these Con-
nectives, THRO', and WITH, and mark
their Effect upon the Substances here men-
tioned. *The splendid Sun with his Beams*
genially

Ch. III. *genially warmthh THRO' the Air the fertile Earth.* The Sentence, as before, remains *intire and one*; the *Substantives required* are both *introduced*; and not a *Word*, which was there before, is detrued from its proper place.

IT must here be observed that most, if not all Prepositions seem originally formed to denote the *Relations of Place* (c). The reason is, this is that grand *Relation*, which *Bodies* or *natural Substances* maintain at all times one to another, whether they are *contiguous* or *remote*, whether in motion or at rest.

IT may be said indeed that *in the Continuity of Place* they form this **UNIVERSE**
or

(c) *Omne corpus aut movetur aut quiescit: quare opus*
sunt aliquâ notâ, qua TO ΠΟΥ significaret, sive effet
inter duo extrema, inter qua motus fit, sive effet in altero
extremorum, in quibus fit quies. *Hinc elicemus Praeposi-*
tionis effientiam definitionem. Scal. de Caus: Ling. L. 2
 c. 152.

or VISIBLE WHOLE, and are made as Ch. III. much ONE by that general Comprehension, as is consistent with their several Natures, and specific Distinctions. Thus it is we have Prepositions to denote the *contiguous Relation* of Body, as when we say, *Caius walketh WITH a Staff*; *the Statue stood UPON a Pedestal*; *the River ran OVER a Sand*; others for the *detached Relation*, as when we say, *He is going TO Italy*; *the Sun is risen ABOVE the Hills*; *these Figs came FROM Turkey*. So as to *Motion* and *Rest*, only with this difference, that here the Preposition varies its character with the Verb. Thus if we say, *that Lamp hangs FROM the Ceiling*, the Preposition, *FROM*, assumes a Character of *Quiescence*. But if we say, *that Lamp is falling FROM the Ceiling*, the Preposition in such case assumes a Character of *Motion*. So in *Milton*,

—*To support uneasy Steps*
OVER the burning Marle—Par. L. I.

Here *OVER* denotes *Motion*.

Again

Ch. III. Again—

—*He—with looks of cordial Love
Hung over her enamour'd*—Par. L. IV.

Here *over* denotes *Rest*.

BUT though the original use of Prepositions was to denote *the Relations of Place*, they could not be confined to this Office only. They by degrees extended themselves to Subjects *incorporeal*, and came to denote Relations, as well *intellectual* as *local*. Thus, because in Place he, who is *above*, has commonly the advantage over him, who is *below*, hence we transfer *over* and *under* to *Dominion* and *Obedience*; of a King we say, *he ruled over his People*; of a common Soldier, *he served under such a General*. So too we say, *with Thought*; *without Attention*; *thinking over a Subject*; *under Anxiety*; *from Fear*; *out of Love*; *through Jealousy*, &c. All which instances, with many others of like kind,

kind, shew that the *first Words* of Men, Ch.III. like their *first Ideas*, had an immediate reference to *sensible Objects*, and that in afterdays, when they began to discern with their *Intellect*, they took those Words, which they found *already* made, and transferred them by metaphor to *intellectual Conceptions*. There is indeed no Method to express new Ideas, but either this of *Metaphor*, or that of *Coining new Words*, both which have been practised by Philosophers and wise Men, according to the nature, and exigence of the occasion (d).

IN

(d) Among the Words new coined we may ascribe to *Anaxagoras*, 'Ομοιομέρεια; to *Plato*, Ποιότης; to *Cicero*, *Qualitas*; to *Aristotle*, 'Εὐλείχεια; to the *Stoics*, 'Ουτις, *χεράτις*, and many others.—Among the Words transferred by Metaphor from *common* to *special Meanings*, to the *Platonics* we may ascribe 'Ιδία; to the *Pythagoreans* and *Peripatetics*, *Κατηγορία*, and *Κατηγορεῖν*; to the *Stoics*, *Κατάληψις*, *ὑπόληψις*, *καθίκον*; to the *Pyrrhonists*, 'Εξειγι, *ἰνδέχεται*, *ἰπίχω*, *διε*.

And

Ch. III. In the foregoing use of Prepositions, we have seen how they are applied *xata* *xaπάθεσιν*, by way of *Juxta-position*, that is to say, where they are prefixt to a Word, with-

And here I cannot but observe, that he who pretends to discuss the Sentiments of any one of these Philosophers, or even to cite and translate him (except in trite and obvious Sentences) without accurately knowing the Greek Tongue in general; the nice differences of many Words apparently synonymous; the peculiar Stile of the Author whom he presumes to handle; the new coined Words, and new Significations given to old Words, used by such Author, and his Sect; the whole Philosophy of such Sect, together with the Connections and Dependencies of its several Parts, whether Logical, Ethical, or Physical;—He I say, that, without this previous preparation, attempts what I have said, will shoot in the dark; will be liable to perpetual blunders; will explain, and praise, and censure merely by chance; and though he may possibly to Fools appear as a wise Man, will certainly among the wise ever pass for a Fool. Such a Man's Intellect comprehends antient Philosophy, as his Eye comprehends a distant Prospect. He may see perhaps enough, to know Mountains from Plains, and Seas from Woods; but for an accurate discernment of particulars, and their character, this without farther helps, it is impossible he should attain.

without becoming a Part of it. But they Ch. III. may be used also *κατὰ σύνθετον*, by way of Composition, that is, they may be prefixt to a Word, so as to become a real Part of it (e). Thus in *Greek* we have *Ἐπισταθαι*, in *Latin*, *Intelligere*, in *English*, to *Understand*. So also, to *foretel*, to *overact*, to *undervalue*, to *outgo*, &c. and in *Greek* and *Latin*, other Instances innumerable. In this case the Prepositions commonly transfuse something of their own Meaning into the Word, with which they are compounded; and this imparted Meaning in most instances will be found ultimately resolvable into some of the Relations of **PLACE**, (f) as used either in its *proper* or *metaphorical* acceptation.

LASTLY,

(e) See *Gaz. Gram.* L. IV. Cap. de *Præpositione*.

(f) For example, let us suppose some given Space. **E** & **Ex.** signify *out of* that Space; **Per**, *through it*, from beginning to end; **In**, *within it*; **Sub**, *under it*.

Ch.III. LASTLY, there are times, when Prepositions totally lose their connective Nature, being

Hence then E and PER in composition *augment*; *Exer-*
mis, something not simply big, but big in excess; some-
 thing got *out of the rule*, and *beyond the measure*; *Dico*,
 to *speak*; *Edico*, to *speak out*; whence *Edictum*, an
Edict, something so effectually spoken, as all are supposed
 to hear, and all to obey. So *Terence*,

Dico, Edico vobis—Eun. V. 5. 20.

which (as *Donatus* tells us in his Comment) is an
 “*Αὐξησις*. *Fari*, to *speak*; *Effari*, to *speak out*—hence
Effatum, an *Axiom*, or self-evident Proposition, some-
 thing addressed as it were to all men, and calling for
 universal Assent. *Cic. Acad. II. 29. Permagnum, Per-*
utilis, great throughout, useful through every part.

On the contrary, IN and SUB diminish and lessen.
Injustus, *Iniquus*, *unjust*, *inequitable*, that lies *within*
 Justice and Equity, that reaches not so far, that falls
short of them; *Subniger*, *blackish*; *Subrubicundus*, *reddish*;
 tending to black, and tending to red, but yet *under the*
standard, and *below perfection*.

Emo originally signified *to take away*; hence it came
 to signify *to buy*, because he, who buys, *takes away*
 his purchase. *INTER*, *Between*, implies *Discontinu-*
ance.

being converted into Adverbs, and used Ch.III. in Syntax accordingly. Thus *Homer*,

—Γέλασσε δὲ ωᾶσα ωερὶ χθών.

—*And Earth smil'd all around.*

I. T. 362.

But of this we have spoken in a preceding Chapter. (g). One thing we must however observe, before we finish this Chapter, which is, that whatever we may be told of CASES in modern Languages, there are in fact no such things; but their force and power is express by two Methods,

ance, for in things continuous there can nothing lie between. From these two comes, *Interimo*, to kill, that is to say, to take a Man away in the midst of Life, by making a Discontinuance of his vital Energy. So also *Perimo*, to kill a Man, that is to say, to take him away thoroughly; for indeed what more thorough taking away can well be supposed? The Greek Verb, 'Αναιγεῖν, and the English Verb, To take off, seem both to carry the same allusion. And thus it is that Prepositions become Parts of other Words.

(g) See before, p. 205.

Ch. III. thods, either by *Situation*, or by *Prepositions*;
the *Nominative and Accusative Cases* by *Situation*; the *rest*, by *Prepositions*.
But this we shall make the *Subject* of a Chapter by itself, concluding here our Inquiry concerning *Prepositions*.

C H A P IV.

Concerning Cases.

AS CASES, or at least their various Ch.IV. Powers, depend on the knowledge partly of *Nouns*, partly of *Verbs*, and partly of *Prepositions*; they have been reserved, till those Parts of Speech had been examined and discussed, and are for that reason made the Subject of so late a Chapter, as the present.

THERE are no CASES in the modern Languages, except a few among the *primitive Pronouns*, such as I, and ME; JE, and MOY; and the *English Genitive*, formed by the addition of s, as when from *Lion*, we form *Lion's*; from *Ship*, *Ship's*. From this defect however we may be enabled to discover in some instances *what a Case is*, the *Periphrasis*, which sup-

T 2 plies

Ch.IV. plies its place, being *the Case* (as it were)
unfolded. Thus *Equi* is analized into *Du Cheval*, *Of the Horse*, *Equo* into *Au Cheval*, *To the Horse*. And hence we see that the GENITIVE and DATIVE CASES imply the joint Power of a *Noun* and a *Preposition*, the Genitive's Preposition being *A*, *De*, or *Ex*, the Dative's Preposition being *Ad*, or *Versus*.


WE have not this assistance as to the ACCUSATIVE, which in modern Languages (a few instances excepted) is only known from its position, that is to say, by being subsequent to its Verb, in the collocation of the words.

THE VOCATIVE we pass over from its little use, being not only unknown to the modern Languages, but often in the ancient being supplied by the *Nominative*.

THE ABLATIVE likewise was used by the *Romans* only; a Case they seem to have adopted

adopted to associate with their *Prepositions*, Ch. IV. as they had deprived their *Genitive* and *Dative* of that privilege; a Case certainly not necessary, because the *Greeks* do as well without it, and because with the *Romans* themselves it is frequently undistinguished.

THERE remains the **NOMINATIVE**, which whether it were a Case or no, was much disputed by the Antients. The *Peripatetics* held it to be no *Case*, and likened the Noun, in this its *primary* and *original Form*, to a perpendicular Line, such for example, as the line AB.



The Variations from the Nominative, they considered as if A B were to fall from its perpendicular, as for example, to A C, or A D. Hence then they only called these

Ch. IV. Variations, ΠΤΩΣΕΙΣ, CASES, or
 ↙ FALLINGS. The Stoicks on the contrary,
 and the Grammarians with them, made the
Nominative a CASE also. Words they con-
 sidered (as it were) *to fall from the Mind*,
 or *discursive Faculty*. Now when a Noun
 fell thence *in its primary Form*, they then
 called it ΠΤΩΣΙΣ ΟΡΘΗ, CASES REC-
 TUS, AN ERECT, OR UPRIGHT CASE or
 FALLING, such as AB, and by this name
 they distinguished the *Nominative*. When
*it fell from the Mind under any of its varia-
 tions*, as for example in the form of a Ge-
 nitive, a *Dative*, or the like, such varia-
 tions they called ΠΤΩΣΕΙΣ ΠΛΑΓΙΑΙ, CASES
 OBLIQUE CASES, or SIDE-
 LONG FALLINGS (such as AC, or AD) in
 opposition to the other (that is AB) which
 was erect and perpendicular (a). Hence
 too Grammarians called the Method of
 enumerating the various Cases of a Noun,
 ΚΛΙΣΙΣ, DECLINATIO, a DECLENSION,
 it

(a) See Ammon. in Libr. de Interpr. p. 35.

it being a sort of *progressive Descent* from Ch. IV. the Noun's upright Form thro' its various —
— declining Forms, that is, a Descent from A B, to A C, AD, &c.

Of these CASES we shall treat but of four, that is to say, the NOMINATIVE, the ACCUSATIVE, the GENITIVE, and the DATIVE.

IT has been said already in the preceding Chapter, that the great Objects of natural Union are SUBSTANCE and ATTRIBUTE. Now from this *Natural Concord* arises the *Logical Concord* of SUBJECT and PREDICATE, and the *Grammatical Concord* of SUBSTANTIVE and ATTRIBUTIVE (b). These CONCORDS in SPEECH produce PROPOSITIONS and SENTENCES, as that previous CONCORD in NATURE produces NATURAL BEINGS. This being

T 4 admitted,

(b) See before, p. 264.

Ch. IV. admitted, we proceed by observing, that when a Sentence is regular and orderly, *Nature's Substance*, the *Logician's Subject*, and the *Grammarians Substantive* are all denoted by that Case, which we call the **NOMINATIVE**. For example, *CÆSAR pugnat*, *Æs fingitur*, *DOMUS ædificatur*. We may remark too by the way, that the *Character of this Nominative* may be learnt from its *Attributive*. The Action implied in *pugnat*, shews its Nominative *CÆSAR* to be an Active efficient Cause; the Passion implied in *fingitur*, shews its Nominative *Æs* to be a Passive Subject, as does the Passion in *ædificatur* prove *DOMUS* to be an Effect.

As therefore every *Attributive* would as far as possible conform itself to its Substantive, so for this reason, when it has Cases, it imitates its Substantive, and appears as a *Nominative* also. So we find it in such instances as—*CICERO est ELOQUENS*; *VITIUM est TURPE*; *HOMO est ANIMAL*,

~~ANIMAL~~, &c. When it has no Cases, Ch. IV. (as happens with Verbs) it is forced to content itself with such assimilations as it has, those of Number and Person *; as when we say, **CICERO LOQUITUR**; **NOS LOQUIMUR**; **HOMINES LOQUUNTUR**.

FROM what has been said, we may make the following observations—that as there can be *no Sentence without a Substantive*, so that Substantive, if the Sentence be *regular*, is always denoted by a *Nominative*—that on this occasion *all the Attributives, that have Cases, appear as Nominatives also*—that there may be a regular and perfect Sentence *without any of the other Cases*, but that *without one Nominative at least*, this is utterly impossible. Hence therefore we form its Character and Description—**THE NOMINATIVE is that Case, without which there can be no regular**

* What sort of Number and Person Verbs have, see before, p. 170, 171.

Ch. IV. *Imperfect* and *perfect Sentence.* We are now
 to search after another Case.

WHEN the *Attributive* in any Sentence is some *Verb* denoting *Action*, we may be assured the *principal Substantive* is some *active efficient Cause*. So we may call *Achilles* and *Lyippus* in such Sentences as *Achilles vulneravit*, *Lyippus fecit*. But though this be evident and clearly understood, the Mind is still *in suspense*, and finds its conception *incomplete*. *ACTION*, it well knows, not only requires some *Agent*, but it must have a *Subject* also to work on, and it must produce some *Effect*. It is then to denote one of these (that is, the *Subject* or the *Effect*) that the Authors of Language

(c) We have added *regular* as well as *perfect*, because there may be *irregular* Sentences, which may be *perfect* without a *Nominative*. Of this kind are all Sentences, made out of those Verbs, called by the *Stoicks* Παρα-
 συμβάμετα or Παρακατηγορήματα, such as Σωκράτει
 μετάμελει, *Socratem pœnitet*, &c. See before, p. 180.

guage have destined THE ACCUSATIVE. Ch. IV.
Acbilles vulneravit HECTOREM—here the Subject Accusative denotes the Subject. *Lyfppus fecit STATUAS*—here the Accusative denotes the Effect. By these additional Explanations the Mind becomes satisfied, and the Sentences acquire a Perfection, which before they wanted. In whatever other manner, whether figuratively, or with Prepositions, this Case may have been used, its first destination seems to have been that here mentioned, and hence therefore we shall form its Character and Description—THE ACCUSATIVE is that Case, which to an efficient Nominative and a Verb of Action subjoins either the Effect or the passive Subject. We have still left the Genitive and the Dative, which we investigate, as follows.

IT has been said in the preceding Chapter (d), that when the Places of the *Nominative*

(d) See before, p. 265.

Ch.IV. *minative* and the *Accusative* are filled by proper Substantives, other Substantives are annexed by the help of *Prepositions*. Now, though this be so far true in the modern Languages, that (a very few instances excepted) they know no other method; yet is not the rule of equal latitude with respect to the *Latin* or *Greek*, and that from reasons which we are about to offer.

AMONG the various Relations of Substantives denoted by Prepositions, there appear to be two principal ones; and these are, the *Term* or *Point*, which something commences *FROM*, and the *Term* or *Point*, which something tends *TO*. These Relations the *Greeks* and *Latins* thought of so great importance, as to distinguish them, when they occurred, *by peculiar Terminations of their own*, which express their force, *without the help of a Preposition*. Now it is here we behold the Rise of the ancient Genitive, and Dative, the **GENITIVE** being formed to express all Relations

com-

commencing from *itself*; THE DATIVE, Ch.IV.
all Relations tending to itself. Of this
 there can be no stronger proof, than the
 Analysis of these Cases in the modern
 Languages, which we have mentioned
 already (e).

It is on these Principles that they say in
 Greek — Δεομαι ΣΟΥ, δίδωμι ΣΟΙ, Of
thee I ask, To thee I give. The reason
 is, in requests the person requested is one
 whom something is expected *from*; in
 donations, the person presented, is one
 whom something passes *to.* So again —
 (f) Πεποίηται λίθε, *it is made of Stone.*
 Stone was the passive Subject, and thus
 it appears in the *Genitive*, as being the
Term from, or out of which. Even in
Latin, where the Syntax is more formal
 and strict, we read —

Implentur

(e) See before, p. 275, 276.

(f) Χρυσοῦς τεποιημένος, καὶ ἐλέφαντος, *made of Gold*
and Ivory. So says *Pausanias* of the *Olympian Jupiter*,
L. V. p. 400. See also *Hom. Iliad. Σ. 574.*

Ch.IV. *Implentur veteris Baccbi, pinguisque ferinae.* Virg.

The old Wine and Venison were the funds or stores, *of* or *from* which they were filled. Upon the same principles, Πίνω τε ὑδατος, is a Phrase in *Greek*; and *Je bois de l'eau*, a Phrase in *French*, as much as to say, *I take some or a certain part, FROM or OUT OF a certain whole.*

WHEN we meet in Language such Genitives as *the Son of a Father*; *the Father of a Son*; *the Picture of a Painter*; *the Painter of a Picture*, &c. these are all RELATIVES, and therefore each of them reciprocally a *Term or Point* to the other, FROM or OUT OF which it derives its *Essence*, or at least its *Intellection* (g).

THE

(g) All Relatives are said to reciprocate, or mutually infer each other, and therefore they are often express by this Case, that is to say, the Genitive. Thus *Aristotle*, Πάντα δὲ τὰ πρός τι πρός αὐτούς ποντα λέγεται,

THE *Dative*, as it implies *Tendency to*, Ch. IV. is employed among its other uses to denote the FINAL CAUSE, that being the Cause to which all Events, not fortuitous, may be said to tend. It is thus used in the following instances, among innumerable others.

— *TIBI suaveis dædala tellus*
Submittit flores — Lucret.

— *TIBI bracia contrabit ardens*
Scorpios — Virg. G. I.

— *TIBI serviat ultima Thule.*
Ibid.

AND so much for CASES, their Origin and Use; a Sort of Forms, or Terminations,

οῖον ὁ δεῖλος δεσπότης δεῖλος, καὶ ὁ δεσπότης δεῖλος δεσπότης λέγεται εἶναι, καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον ἡμίσεος διπλάσιον, καὶ τὸ ἡμίσυ διπλασίας ἡμίσυ. *Omnia vero, quæ sunt ad aliquid, referuntur ad ea, quæ reciprocantur.* *Ut servus dicitur domini servus; et dominus, servi dominus; necnon duplum, dimidii duplum; et dimidium, dupli dimidium.* *Categor. C. VII.*

Ch. IV. tions, which we could not well pass over, from their great importance (b) both in the Greek and Latin Tongues; but which however, not being among the Essentials of Language, and therefore not to be found in many particular Languages, can be hardly said to fall within the limits of our Inquiry.

(b) *Annan et illud observatione dignum (licet nobis modernis spiritus nonnihil redundat) antiquas Linguas plenius declinationum, casuum, conjugationum, et similium fuisse; modernas, his fere desitutas, plurima per praefinitiones et verba auxiliaria segniter expedit? Sane facile quis conficiat (utcunque nobis ipsi placeamus) ingenia priorum seculorum nostris fuisse multo acutiora et subtiliora.* Bacon. de Augm. Scient. VI. 1.

C H A P. V.

*Concerning Interjections—Recapitulation—
Conclusion.*

BESIDES the Parts of Speech before Ch. V. mentioned, there remains THE INTERJECTION. Of this Kind among the Greeks are *Ω*, *Φεῦ*, *Αι*, &c. among the Latins, *Ab!* *Heu!* *Hei!* &c. among the English, *Ab!* *Alas!* *Fie!* &c. These the Greeks have ranged among their Adverbs; improperly, if we consider the Adverbial Nature, which always co-incides with some Verb, as its Principal, and to which it always serves in the character of an Attributive. Now INTERJECTIONS co-incide with no Part of Speech; but are either uttered alone, or else thrown into a Sentence, without altering its Form, either in Syntax or Signification. The Latins seem therefore to have done better in † separating

† *Vid. Servium in Aeneid XII. v. 486.*

Ch. V. parating them by themselves, and giving them a name by way of distinction from the rest.

SHOULD it be ask'd, if not Adverbs, what then are they ? It may be answered, not so properly Parts of Speech, as adventitious Sounds ; certain VOICES OF NATURE, rather than Voices of *Art*, expressing those Passions and natural Emotions, which spontaneously arise in the human Soul, upon the View or Narrative of interesting Events (a).

“ AND

(a) INTERJECTIONES a Gracis ad Adverbia referuntur, atque eos sequitur etiam Boethius. Et recte quidem de iis, quando casum regunt. Sed quando orationi solum inserviunt, ut nota affectus, velut suspiri aut metus, vix videntur ad classem aliquam pertinere, ut que NATURALES sint NOTÆ; non, aliarum vocum instar, ex instituto significant. Voss. de Anal. L. I. c. I. INTERJECTIO est Vox affectum mentis significans, ac circa verbi opem sententiam complens. Ibid. c. 3. Restat classum extrema, INTERJECTIO. Hujus appellatio non solum

“ AND thus we have found that ALL Ch. V.
 “ WORDS ARE EITHER SIGNIFICANT BY
 “ THEMSELVES, OR ONLY SIGNIFICANT,
 U 2 “ WHEN

similiter se habet ac *Conjunctionis*. Nam cum hæc dicatur *Conjunctionio*, quia conjugat; *Interjectio* tamen, non quia interjacet, sed quia interjicitur, nomen accepit. Nec tamen de ipsis ejus est, ut interjiciatur; cum per se compleat sententiam, nec raro ab eâ incipiat oratio. Ibid. L. IV. c. 28. *INTERJECTIONEM* non esse partem *Orationis* sic ostendo: *Quod naturale est, idem est apud omnes*: *Sed genus et signa letitiae idem sunt apud omnes*: *Sunt igitur naturales*. *Si vero naturales, non sunt partes Orationis*. Nam eae partes, secundum Aristotèlem, ex instituto, non naturâ, debent constare. *Interjectionem* Græci *Adverbis* adnumerant; sed falso. *Nam neque, &c.* Sanct. Miner. L. I. c. 2. *INTERJECTIONEM* Græci inter *Adverbia* ponunt, quoniam hæc quoque vel adjungitur verbis, vel verba ei subaudiuntur. *Ut si dicam—Papa!* quid video?—vel per se—*Papa!*—etiam si non addatur, *Miror*; habet in se ipsis verbi significationem. *Quæ res maxime fecit Romanarum artium Scriptores* separatim hanc partem ab *Adverbis* accipere; quia videtur affectum habere in se ipso Verbi, et plenari motus animi significationem, etiam si non addatur *Verbum*, demonstrare. *Interjectio* tamen non solum illa, quæ dicunt Græci σχετλιασμὸν, significat; sed etiam voces, quæ cujuscunque passionis animi pulsu per exclamacionem interjiciuntur. Prisc. L. XV.

Ch. V. "WHEN ASSOCIATED—that those significant by themselves, denote either SUBSTANCES or ATTRIBUTES, and are called for that reason SUBSTANTIVES and ATTRIBUTIVES—that the Substantives are either NOUNS or PRONOUNS—that the ATTRIBUTIVES are either PRIMARY or SECONDARY—that the Primary ATTRIBUTIVES are either VERBS, PARTICIPLES, or ADJECTIVES; the Secondary, ADVERBS—Again, that the Parts of Speech, only significant when associated, are either DEFINITIVES or CONNECTIVES—that the Definitives are either ARTICULAR or PRONOMINAL—and that the Connectives are either PREPOSITIONS or CONJUNCTIONS."

AND thus have we resolved LANGUAGE, AS A WHOLE INTO ITS CONSTITUENT PARTS, which was the first thing, that we proposed, in the course of this Inquiry (b).

BUT

(b) See before, p. 7.

BUT now as we conclude, methinks I Ch. V.
hear some Objector, demanding with an air of pleasantry, and ridicule—“ *Is there*
“ *no speaking then without all this trouble?*
“ *Do we not talk every one of us, as well*
“ *unlearned, as learned; as well poor Pea-*
“ *sants, as profound Philosophers?*” We
may answer by interrogating on our part
—Do not those same poor Peasants use
the Lever and the Wedge, and many
other Instruments, with much habitual
readiness? And yet have they any con-
ception of those Geometrical Principles,
from which those Machines derive their
Efficacy and Force? And is the Ignorance
of these Peasants, a reason for others to
remain ignorant; or to render the Subject
a less becoming Inquiry? Think of Ani-
mals, and Vegetables, that occur every
day—of Time, of Place, and of Motion
—of Light, of Colours, and of Gravita-
tion—of our very Senses and Intellect,
by which we perceive every thing else—

Ch. V. THAT they are, we all know, and are perfectly satisfied—WHAT they are, is a Subject of much obscurity and doubt. Were we to reject this last Question, because we are certain of the first, we should banish all Philosophy at once out of the world (c).

BUT a graver Objector now accosts us.
 “What (says he) is the UTILITY?
 “Whence the Profit, where the Gain?”
 Every Science whatever (we may answer) has its Use. Arithmetic is excellent

(c) Ἀλλ' οἱ πολλὰ τῶν θίσιν, ἀ τὴν μὲν ὑπερέν
 ἔχει γνωριμωτάτην, ἀγρωποτάτην δὲ τὴν οὐσίαν· μόνη
 γάτε κίνησις, καὶ ὁ τόπος, οἷς δὲ μᾶλλον ὁ χρόνος.
 Ἐκάρι γαρ τάτων τὸ μὲν εἶναι γνωρίμον καὶ αἰνατί-
 λεκτον τίς δὲ ποτέ ἐσιν αὐτῶν η οὐσία, τῶν χαλεπω-
 τάτων ὄραθήναι. Εἰσὶ δὲ δὴ τί τῶν τοιεστῶν καὶ η φύχη
 τὸ μὲν γαρ εἶναι τι τὴν ψυχὴν, γνωριμότατην καὶ φα-
 νερώτατον τι δὲ ποτέ ἐσιν, καὶ ράδιον καταμαθεῖν
 Ἀλέξανδρος. Αφροδίτης Β. p. 142.

Ient for the gauging of Liquors; Geome- Ch. V.
try, for the measuring of Estates; Astro-
nomy, for the making of Almanacks;
and Grammar perhaps, for the drawing of
Bonds and Conveyances.

Thus much to the *Sordid* — If the *Liberal* ask for something better than this, we may answer and assure them from the best authorities, that every Exercise of the Mind upon Theorems of Science, like generous and manly Exercise of the Body, tends to call forth and strengthen Nature's original Vigour. Be the Subject itself immediately lucrative or not, the Nerves of Reason are braced by the mere Employ, and we become abler Actors in the Drama of Life, whether our Part be of the busier, or of the sedater kind.

Ch. V. *PERHAPS* too there is a *Pleasure even in Science itself*, distinct from any End, to which it may be farther conducive. Are not Health and Strength of *Body* desirable for their own sakes, tho' we happen not to be fated either for Porters or Draymen; And have not Health and Strength of *Mind* their intrinsic Worth also, tho' not condemned to the low drudgery of sordid Emolument? Why should there not be a *Good* (could we have the Grace to recognize it) in the mere *Energy of our Intellect*, as much as in Energies of lower degree? The Sportsman believes there is Good in his Chace; the Man of Gaiety, in his Intrigue; even the Glutton, in his Meal. We may justly ask of these, *why they pursue such things*; but if they answer, *they pursue them, because they are Good*, it would be folly to ask them farther, *WHY they PURSUE what is Good*. It might well in such case be replied on *their*

their behalf (how strange soever it may Ch. V.
at first appear) that if there was not something GOOD, which was in no respect USEFUL, even things useful themselves would not possibly have existence. For this is in fact no more than to assert, that some things are ENDS, some things are MEANS, and that if there were no ENDS, there could be of course no MEANS.

Upon this point, it is to be observed, that it should seem then the Grand Question was, WHAT is GOOD—that is to say, what is that which is desirable, not for something else, but for itself; for whether it be the Chance, or the Intrigue, or the Meal, may be fairly questioned, since Men in each instance are far from being agreed.

IN the mean time it is plain from daily experience, there are infinite Pleasures, Amusements, and Diversions, some for Summer, others for Winter; some for Country,

Ch. V. Country, others for Town; some, easy, indolent, and soft; others, boisterous, active, and rough; a multitude diversified to every taste, and which for the time are enjoyed as **PERFECT GOOD**, without a thought of any End, that may be farther obtained. Some Objects of this kind are at times sought by all men, excepting alone that contemptible Tribe, who, from a love to the Means of life wholly forgetting its End, are truly, for that reason called *Miser*, or *Miserable*.

If there be supposed then a Pleasure, a Satisfaction, a Good, a Something valuable for its self without view to anything farther, in so many Objects of the *sub-ordinate* kind; shall we not allow the same praise to the *sublime*st of all Objects? Shall **THE INTELLECT** alone feel no pleasures in its Energy, when we allow them to the grossest Energies of Appetite, and Sense? Or if the Reality of all Pleasures and Goods

were

were to be controverted, may not the *Intellectual* Good be defended, as rationally as any of them? Whatever may be urged in behalf of the rest (for we are not now arraigning them) we may safely affirm of INTELLECTUAL GOOD, that it is “the “Good of that Part, which is most ex-“cellent within us; that it is a Good ac-“commodated to all Places and Times; “which neither depends on the will of “others, nor on the affluence of external “Fortune; that it is a Good, which de-“cays not with decaying Appetites, but “often rises in vigour, when those are no “more (d).”

THERE is a Difference, we must own, between this *Intellectual* Virtue, and *Moral* Virtue. MORAL VIRTUE, from its Employment, may be called more Hu-

MAN.

(d) See Vol. I. p. 119, 120, &c.

Ch. V. **MAN**, as it tempers our Appetites to the purposes of human Life. But INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE may be surely called more DIVINE, if we consider the Nature and Sublimity of its End.

INDEED for *Moral Virtue*, as it is almost wholly conversant about Appetites, and Affections, either to reduce the natural ones to a proper Mean, or totally to expel the unnatural and vicious, it would be impious to suppose THE DEITY to have occasion for such an Habit, or that any work of this kind should call for his attention. Yet GOD IS, and LIVES. So we are assured from Scripture it self. What then may we suppose the DIVINE LIFE to be? Not a Life of Sleep, as Fables tell us of *Endymion*. If we may be allowed then to conjecture with a becoming reverence, what more likely, than A PERPETUAL ENERGY OF THE PUREST INTELLECT ABOUT THE FIRST, ALL-COMPREHENSIVE

COMPREHENSIVE OBJECTS OF INTEL- Ch. V.
LECTION, WHICH OBJECTS ARE NO
OTHER THAN THAT INTELLECT IT-
SELF? For in pure INTELLECTION it
holds the reverse of all Sensation, that
THE PERCEIVER AND THING PER-
CEIVED are ALWAYS ONE AND THE
SAME (e).

IT

(e) Εἰ δὲ ἔτις εὐ ἔχει, ὡς πάμεις ποτὲ, ὁ Θεὸς αἰ,
Θαυμασόν· εἰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἔτι Θαυμασιώτερον· ἔχει δὲ
ἄδε, καὶ ζωὴ δὲ γε ὑπάρχει· οὐ γὰρ Νῦ οὐέργεια, ζωὴ·
Ἐκεῖνος δε, οὐ οὐέργεια· οὐέργεια δὲ οὐ καθ' αὐτὴν, οὐεῖνε
ζωὴ αἵρετη καὶ αἰδίος. Φαμὲν δὲ τὸν Θεὸν εἶναι ζῶον
αἰδίον, αἵρετον· οὐεὶς ζωὴ καὶ αἰών συνεχῆς καὶ αἰδίος
ὑπάρχει τῷ Θεῷ ΤΟΥΤΟ γὰρ ο ΘΕΟΣ. Τῶν
μετὰ τὰ φυτά Λ'. Ζ. It is remarkable in Scripture
that GOD is peculiarly characterized as A LIVING
God, in opposition to all false and imaginary Deities,
of whom some had no pretensions to Life at all; others
to none higher than that of Vegetables or Brutes; and
the best were nothing better than illustrious Men, whose
existence was circumscribed by the short period of Hu-
manity.

To

Ch. V. IT was Speculation of this kind concerning THE DIVINE NATURE, which induced one of the wisest among the Antients to believe—“ That the Man, “ who could live in the pure enjoyment “ of his *Mind*, and who properly culti- “ vated that divine Principle, was *happiest* “ *in himself*, and *most beloved by the Gods*. “ For if the Gods had any regard to “ what past among Men (as it appeared “ they had) it was probable they should “ rejoice in *that which was most excellent*, “ and by nature *the most nearly allied to* “ *themselves*; and, as this was *MIND*, “ that they should requite the Man, who “ most loved and honoured *This*, both “ from his regard to *that which was* “ *dear*

To the passage above quoted, may be added another, which immediately precedes it. Αὐτὸν δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νῆσος κατὰ μετάληψιν τῆς νοντᾶς νοντὸς γὰρ γίνεται, Θιγλά-
νων τὸ νοῦν ὡς ΤΑΤΤΩΝ ΝΟΤΣ ΚΑΙ ΝΟΗΤΟΝ.


“ dear to themselves, and from his act- Ch. V.
“ ing a Part, which was laudable and right
“ right (f).”

AND thus in all SCIENCE there is something *valuable for itself*, because it contains within it something which is *divine*.

(f) Ἡδίκη Νικομάχη τὸ Κ'. κεφ. 5.

End of the SECOND Book.

H E R-



H E R M E S

OR A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY
CONCERNING UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR.

B O O K III.

C H A P. I.

Introduction—Division of the Subject into its principal Parts.

SOME things the MIND performs Ch. I. thro' the BODY; as for example, the various Works and Energies of Art. Others it performs *without such Medium*; as for example, when it thinks, and reasons, and concludes. Now tho' the Mind, in either case, may be called the Principle or Source, yet are these last

Ch. I. more properly *its own* peculiar *Acts*, as being immediately referable to its own innate Powers. And thus is MIND ultimately *the Cause of all*; of every thing at least that is *Fair and Good*.

Among those Acts of Mind more immediately its own, that of *mental Separation* may be well reckoned one. *Corporeal Separations*, however accurate otherwise, are in one respect incomplete, as they may be repeated without end. The smallest Limb, severed from the smallest Animalcule (if we could suppose any instrument equal to such dissection) has still a triple Extension of length, breadth, and thickness; has a figure, a colour, with perhaps many other qualities; and so will continue to have, tho' thus divided to infinity. But (a) the *Mind* surmounts all power of *Concretion*,

(a) *Itaque Naturæ facienda est prorsus Solutio & Separatio; non per Ignorari certe, sed per Mentem, tanquam ignem divinum.* Bacon. Organ. Lib. II. 16.

cretion, and can place in the simplest manner every Attribute by itself; convex without concave; colour without superficies; superficies without Body; and Body without its Accidents; as distinctly each one, as tho' they had never been united.

Ch. I.

AND thus it is that it penetrates into the recesses of all things, not only dividing them, as *Wholes*, into their *more conspicuous Parts*, but persisting, till it even separate those *Elementary Principles*, which, being blended together after a more mysterious manner, are united in the *minutest Part*, as much as in the *mightiest Whole* (b).

Now if MATTER and FORM are among these Elements, and deserve perhaps to be esteemed as *the principal* among them, it may not be foreign to the Design of this Treatise, to seek whether *these*, or *any thing analogous to them*, may be found in

Ch. I. SPEECH or LANGUAGE (c). This therefore we shall attempt after the following method.

EVERY

(c) See before, p. 2. 7. MATTER and FORM (in Greek ΤΛΗ and ΕΙΔΟΣ) were Terms of great import in the days of antient Philosophy, when things were scrutinized rather at their beginning than at their End. They have been but little regarded by modern Philosophy, which almost wholly employs itself about the last order of Substance, that is to say, the *tangible*, *corporeal* or *concrete*, and which acknowledges no separations even in this, but those made by mathematical Instruments or Chemical Process.

The original meaning of the Word ΤΛΗ, was SYLVA, a WOOD. Thus Homer,

—Τρέμει δὲ χρεα μαντίκη ΤΛΗ,
Ποστὶν ἐν' αἰθανάτοις Πασιδάνως ἴόντος.

*As Neptune past, the Mountains and the Wood
Trembled beneath the God's immortal Feet.*

Hence as Wood was perhaps the first and most useful kind of Materials, the Word "Τλη", which denoted it, came to be by degrees extended, and at length to denote MATTER or MATERIALS in general. In this sense Brass was called the "Τλη or Matter of a Statue; Stone, the "Τλη or Matter of a Pillar; and so in other instances. The *Platonic Chalcidius*, and other

Authors

EVERY thing in a manner, whether natural or artificial, is in its constitution com-

Ch. I.
—

Authors of the latter Latinity use SYLVA under the same extended and comprehensive Signification.

Now as the Species of *Matter*, here mentioned, (Stone, Metal, Wood, &c.) occur most frequently in common life, and are all nothing more than natural Substances or Bodies, hence by the Vulgar, MATTER and BODY have been taken to denote the same thing; *Material* to mean *Corporeal*; *Immaterial*, *Incorporeal*, &c. But this was not the Sentiment of Philosophers of old, by whom the Term *Matter* was seldom used under so narrow an acceptation. By these, every thing was called ΤΑΗ, or MATTER, whether corporeal or incorporeal, which was *capable of becoming something else*, or *of being moulded into something else*, whether from the operation of Art, of Nature, or a higher Cause.

In this sense they not only called *Brafs* the "Τλη of a Statue, and Timber of a Boat, but Letters and Syllables they called the "Τλαι of Words; Words or simple Terms, the "Τλαι of Propositions; and Propositions themselves the "Τλαι of Syllogisms. The Stoicks held all things out of our own power ($\tau\alpha\ \varepsilon\kappa\ \iota\phi\ \eta\mu\iota\pi\iota\pi$) such as Wealth and Poverty, Honour and Dishonour,

Ch. I. compounded of something COMMON, and something PECULIAR; of something Common,

Health and Sickness, Life and Death, to be the "Τλικός, or *Materials of Virtue or Moral Goodness*, which had its essence in a proper conduct with respect to all these, (Vid. *Arr. Epict.* L. I. c. 29. Also Vol. the first of these miscellaneous Treatises, p. 187, 309. M. Ant. XII. 29. VII. 29. X. 18, 19. where the Τλικός and Αἰτιώδεις are opposed to each other). The *Peripatetics*, tho' they expressly held the Soul to be ατόματος, or *Incorporeal*, yet still talked of a Νῆσ Τλικός, a *material Mind or Intellect*. This to modern Ears may possibly sound somewhat harshly. Yet if we translate the Words, *Natural Capacity*, and consider them as only denoting that *original* and *native Power* of *Intellection*, which being previous to all *human Knowledge*, is yet necessary to its *reception*; there seems nothing then to remain, that can give us offence. And so much for the Idea of ΤΛΗ, or *MATTER*. See *Alex. Aphrod. de Anim.* p. 144, b. 145. *Arist. Metaph.* p. 121, 122, 141. *Edit. Sylb. Procl. in Euclid.* p. 22, 23.

As to ΕΙΔΟΣ, its original meaning was that of **FORM** or **FIGURE**, considered as denoting *visible Symmetry*, and *Proportion*; and hence it had its name from Εἶδω to see, *Beauty of person* being one of the noblest, and most excellent Objects of *Sight*. Thus *Euripides*,

Πρῶτον μὲν Εἶδος ἀξίου τυραννίδος.

Fair FORM to Empire gave the first pretence.

Now

mon, and belonging to many other things; Ch. I.
and of something *Peculiar*, by which it
is

Now as the *Form* or *Figure* of visible Beings tended principally to *distinguish* them, and to give to each its Name and Essence; hence in a more general sense, *whatever of any kind* (*whether corporeal or incorporeal*) was peculiar, essential, and distinctive, so as by its accession to any Beings, as to its *Τλη* or *Matter*, to mark them with a Character, which they had not before, was called by the Antients ΕΙΔΟΣ or *FORM*. Thus not only the *Shape* given to the Brats was called the *Eidōs* or *Form* of the Statue; but the *Proportion* assigned to the Drugs was the *Eidōs* or *Form* of the Medicine; the *orderly Motion* of the human Body was the *Eidōs* or *Form* of the Dance; the *just Arrangement* of the Propositions, the *Eidōs* or *Form* of the Syllogism. In like manner the *rational and accurate Conduct* of a *wise and good man*, in all the various Relations and Occurrences of life, made that *Eidōs* or *Form*, described by Cicero to his Son,—*FORMAM quidam ipjam, Marce fili, et tanquam faciem HONESTI vides: quæ, si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores (ut ait Plato) excitaret sapientia, &c.* De Offic. I.

We may go farther still—THE SUPREME INTELLIGENCE, which passes thro' all things, and which is the same to our Capacities, as Light is to our Eyes,

Ch. I. is distinguished, and made to be its true and proper self.

HENCE

this supreme Intelligence has been called ΕΙΔΟΣ ΕΙΔΩΝ, THE FORM OF FORMS, as being the Fountain of all Symmetry, of all Good, and of all Truth; and as imparting to every Being those *essential* and *distinctive* Attributes, which make it to be *itself*, and *not any thing else*.

And so much concerning FORM, as before concerning MATTER. We shall only add, that it is in the *uniting* of these, that every thing generable begins to exist; in their *separating*, to perish, and be at an end—that while the two co-exist, they co-exist not by *juxta-position*, like the stones in a wall, but by a more *intimate Co-incidence*, complete in the minutest part—that hence, if we were to persist in dividing any substance (for example Marble) to infinity, there would still remain after every section both *Matter* and *Form*, and these as perfectly united, as before the Division began—lastly, that they are both *pre-existent* to the Beings, which they constitute; the *Matter* being to be found in the world at large; the *Form*, if *artificial*, *pre-existing* within the *Artificer*, or if *natural*, within the *supreme Cause*, the Sovereign Artist of the Universe,

—*Pulchrum pulcherrimus ipse*

Mundum mente gerens, similique in imagine formans.

Even

HENCE LANGUAGE, if compared according to this notion to the murmurs of a Foun-

Even without speculating so high as this, we may see among all animal and vegetable Substances, the Form pre-existing in their *immediate generating Cause*; Oak being the parent of Oak, Lion of Lion, Man of Man, &c.

Cicero's account of these Principles is as follows.

MATTER.

Sed subiectam putant omnibus sine ulla specie, atque carentem omni illa qualitate (faciamus enim tractando usitatis hoc verbum et tritius) MATERIAM quandam, ex qua omnia expressa atque efficta sint: (quae tota omnia accipere possit, omnibusque modis mutari atque ex omni parte) eoque etiam interire, non in nihilum, &c. Acad. I. 8.

FORM.

Sed ego sic statuo, nihil esse in ulla genere tam pulchrum, quo non pulchrius id sit, unde illud, ut ex ore aliquo, quasi imago, exprimatur, quod neque oculis, neque auribus, neque ulla sensu percipi potest: cogitatione tantum et mente complectimur. — HAS RERUM FORMAS appellat Ideas ille non intelligendi solum, sed etiam dicendi gravissimus auctor et magister, Plato: easque gigni negat, et ait semper esse, ac ratione et intelligentia contineri: cætera nasci, occidere, fluere, labi; nec diutius esse uno et eodem statu. Quidquid

est

Ch. I. a Fountain, or the dashings of a Cataract, has in common this, that like them, *it is a Sound*. But then on the contrary it has *in peculiar* this, that whereas those Sounds have *no Meaning or Signification*, to Language *a MEANING or SIGNIFICATION is essential*. Again, *Language*, if compared to the Voice of irrational Animals, has *in common* this, that like them, *it has a Meaning*. But then it has this *in peculiar* to distinguish it from them, that whereas the *Meaning* of those Animal Sounds is derived *from NATURE*, that of Language is derived, not from Nature, but *from COMPACT (d)*.

FROM

est igitur, de quo ratione et viâ disputetur, id est ad ultimam sui generis Formam speciemque redigendum. Cic. ad M. Brut. Orat.

(d) The *Peripatetics* (and with just reason) in all their definitions as well of Words as of Sentences, made it a part of their character to be significant κατὰ συνθήσειν, by *Compact*. See *Aristot. de Interp.* c. 2. 4. *Boethius* translates the Words κατὰ συνθήσειν, *ad placitum,*

FROM hence it becomes evident, that **Ch.I.**
LANGUAGE, taken in the most comprehensive view, implies certain Sounds, having certain Meanings; and that of these two Principles, the SOUND is as the **MATTER**, common (like other Matter) to many different things; the MEANING as that peculiar and characteristic FORM, by which the Nature or Essence of Language becomes complete.

tum, or secundum placitum, and thus explains them in his comment—SECUNDUM PLACITUM vero est, quod secundum quandam positionem, placitumque ponentis aptatur; nullum enim nomen naturaliter constitutum est, neque unquam, sicut subjecta res à naturâ est, ita quoque a naturâ veniente vocabulo nuncupatur. Sed hominum genus, quod et ratione; et oratione vigeret, nomina posuit, eaque quibus libuit literis syllabisque conjungens, singulis subjectarum rerum substantiis dedit. Boeth. in Lib. de Interpret. p. 308.

C H A P. II.

Upon the Matter, or common Subject of Language.

Ch. II. **T**HE ΥΛΗ or MATTER OF LANGUAGE comes first to be considered, a Subject, which Order will not suffer us to omit, but in which we shall endeavour to be as concise as we can. Now this ΥΛΗ or Matter is SOUND, and SOUND is that *Sensation peculiar to the Sense of Hearing, when the Air hath felt a Percussion, adequate to the producing such Effect* (a).

As

(a) This appears to be *Priscian's* Meaning when he says of a VOICE, what is more properly true of SOUND in general, that it is—*suum sensibile aurium, id est, quod propriè auribus accidit.* Lib. I. p. 537.

The following account of the *Stoics*, which refers the cause of SOUND to an *Undulation in the Air propagated circularly*, as when we drop a stone into a Cistern of water, seems to accord with the modern Hypothesis, and

As the Causes of this Percussion are Ch. II.
various, so from hence Sound derives the
Variety of its Species.

FARTHER, as all these Causes are either
Animal or Inanimate, so the two grand
Species of Sounds are likewise *Animal* or
Inanimate.

THERE is no peculiar Name for *Sound*
Inanimate; nor even for that of Animals,
when made by the trampling of their Feet,
the fluttering of their Wings, or any other
Cause, which is merely *accidental*. But
that,

and to be as plausible as any—'Ακούειν δὲ, τὰ μεταξὺ τῶν τε φωνοῦντος καὶ τῶν ἀκόντος ἀέρος ὡλητομένων σφαιροειδῶς, ἔιτα κυματουμένων, καὶ ταῖς ἀκοαῖς προσπίπλοντος, ὡς κυματίζεται τὸ ἐν τῇ δεξαμενῇ ὕδωρ κατὰς κύκλους ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμβληθέντος λίθων—Porro audire, cum ē, qui medius inter loquentem, et audientem est, aer verberatur orbiculariter, deinde agitatus auribus influit, quemadmodum et cisternæ aqua per orbes injecto agitatur lapide.
Diog. Laert. VII.

Ch. II. that, *which they make by proper Organs, in consequence of some Sensation or inward Impulse, such Animal Sound is called a VOICE.*

As Language therefore implies that Sound called HUMAN VOICE ; we may perceive that to know the *Nature and Powers of the Human Voice*, is in fact to know THE MATTER or common Subject of Language.

Now the Voice of Man, and it should seem of all other Animals, is formed by certain Organs between the Mouth and the Lungs, and which Organs maintain the intercourse between these two. The Lungs furnish Air, out of which the Voice is formed ; and the Mouth, when the Voice is formed, serves to publish it abroad.

WHAT these Vocal Organs precisely are, is not in all respects agreed by Philosophers

sophers and Anatomists. Be this as it will, it is certain that the *mere primary and simple Voice is completely formed, before ever it reach the Mouth*, and can therefore (as well as Breathing) find a Passage thro' the Nose, when the Mouth is so far stopt, as to prevent the least utterance.

Now *pure and simple Voice*, being thus produced, is (as before was observed) *transmitted to the Mouth*. HERE then, by means of certain *different Organs*, which do not change its primary Qualities, but only superadd others, it receives the *Form or Character of ARTICULATION*. For ARTICULATION is in fact nothing else, than *that Form or Character, acquired to simple Voice, by means of the Mouth and its several Organs, the Teeth, the Tongue, the Lips, &c.* The Voice is not by Articulation made more grave or acute, more loud or soft (which are its *primary Qualities*) but it acquires to these Characters
certain

Ch. II. certain *others additional*, which are perfectly adapted to exist along with them (b).

THE

(b) The several Organs above mentioned not only serve the purposes of *Speech*, but those very different ones likewise of *Mastication* and *Respiration*; so frugal is Nature in thus assigning them double duty, and so careful to maintain her character of *doing nothing in vain*.

He, that would be informed, how much better the Parts here mentioned are framed for *Discourse* in *Man*, who is a *Discursive Animal*, than they are in other Animals, who are not so, may consult *Aristotle* in his *Treatise de Animal. Part. Lib. II. c. 17. Lib. III. c. 1. 3. De Animâ. L. II. c. 8. § 23, &c.*

And here by the way, if such Inquirer be of a Genius truly modern, he may possibly wonder how the Philosopher, considering (as it is modestly phrased) the Age in which he lived, should know so much, and reason so well. But if he have any taste or value for antient literature, he may with much juster cause wonder at the Vanity of his Contemporaries, who dream all Philosophy to be the Invention of their own Age, knowing nothing of those Antients still remaining for their perusal, tho' they are so ready on every occasion to give the preference to *themselves*.

The following account from *Ammonius* will shew whence the Notions in this chapter are taken, and what

THE *simplest* of these new Characters Ch. II.
are those acquired thro' the *mere Openings*
of

what authority we have to distinguish VOICE from
mere SOUND; and ARTICULATE VOICE from SIM-
PLE VOICE.

Kai ΨΟΦΟΣ μὲν ἐστιν ἀληγή ἀέρος αἰσθητὴ ἀκοή.
ΦΩΝΗ δὲ, ψόφος ἐξ ἐμψυχει γινόμενος, διαν διὰ τῆς
συγολῆς τῆς θώρακος ἐκθλιβόμενος ἀπὸ τῆς πνεύμονος ὁ
εἰσπνευθεὶς ἀπὸ τροσπίκη ἀθρόως τῇ καλεμένῃ τρα-
χείᾳ ἀρτηρίᾳ, καὶ τῇ υπερώῃ, πότι τῷ γαργαρεῶνι, καὶ
διὰ τῆς ἀληγῆς ἀποτελῇ τινα ἥχον αἰσθητὸν, κατὰ
τινα ὀρμὴν τῆς ψυχῆς· ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμπνευσῶν ταρα-
τοῖς μυστικοῖς καλεμένων ὀργάνων συμβαίνει, διον αὐλῶν
καὶ συρίγγων· τῆς γλώττης, καὶ τῶν ὁδόντων, καὶ χει-
λίων ἀρὸς μὲν ΤΗΝ ΔΙΑΛΕΚΤΟΝ ἀναγκαίων ὄντων,
πρὸς δὲ ΤΗΝ ΑΙΓΑΙΩΣ ΦΩΝΗΝ καὶ πάντως συμ-
βαλλομένων.—*Estque SONUS, ictus aeris qui auditu sentitur: Vox autem est sonus, quem animans edit, cum per thoracis compressionem aer attractus a pulmonib; elitus sonul totus in arteriam, quam aperam vocant, et palatum, aut gurgulionem impingit, et ex ictu sonum quendam sensibilem pro animi quodam impetu perficit. Id quod in instrumentis quæ quia instant, ideo ēμπνευσα a musicis dicuntur, usu venit, ut in tibiis, ac fistulis contingit, cum lingua, dentes, labiaque ad loquaciam necessaria sint, ad vocem vero simplicem non omnino conserant. Ammon. in Lib. de Interpr. p. 25. b. Vid. etiam Boerhaave Institut. Medic. Sect. 626. 630.*

Ch. II. *of the Mouth*, as these Openings differ in giving the Voice a Passage. It is the Variety of Configurations in these Openings only, which gives birth and origin to the several VOWELS; and hence it is they derive their Name, by being thus *eminently Vocal* (c), and *easy to be founded of themselves alone*.

THERE are other articulate Forms, which the Mouth makes not by mere Openings, but by *different Contacts of its different parts*; such for instance, as it makes by the Junction of the two Lips, of the Tongue with

It appears that the Stoics (contrary to the notion of the Peripatetics) used the word ΦΩΝΗ to denote SOUND in general. They defined it therefore to be—Τὸ ιδεῖον αἰσθητὸν ἀκοῆς, which justifies the definition given by Priscian, in the Note preceding. ANIMAL SOUND they defined to be—Ἄηρ, ὃντὸς ὁρμῆς πεπληγμένος, Air struck (and so made audible) by some animal impulse; and HUMAN or RATIONAL SOUND they defined—Ἐραθεῖος καὶ απὸ διανοίας ἐκπεμπομένην, Sound articulate and derived from the discursive faculty. Diog. Laert. VII. 55.

(c) ΦΩΝΗNTA.

with the Teeth, of the Tongue with the Ch. II.
Palate, and the like.

Now as all these several Contacts, unless some Opening of the Mouth either immediately precede, or immediately follow, would rather occasion Silence, than to produce a Voice; hence it is, that with some such Opening, either previous or subsequent, they are always connected. Hence also it is, that the *Articulations* so produced are called CONSONANT, because they sound not of themselves, and from their own powers, but *at all times in company with some auxiliary Vowel* (d).

THERE are other subordinate Distinctions of these primary Articulations, which to enumerate would be foreign to the design of this Treatise.

IT is enough to observe, that they are all denoted by the common Name of ELE-

Ch.II. MENT (*e*), in as much as every Articulation of every other kind is from them derived, and into them resolved. Under their *smallest* Combination they produce a *Syllable*; Syllables properly combined produce a *Word*; Words properly combined produce a *Sentence*; and Sentences properly combined produce an *Oration* or *Discourse*.

AND thus it is that to Principles apparently so trivial (*f*), as about twenty plain

ele-

(*e*) The Stoic Definition of an ELEMENT is as follows—Ἐσὶ δὲ σοιχεῖον, οὐκ οὐ τρόπῳ γίνεται τὰ γνίμενα, καὶ εἰς ὁ ἔσχατον, ἀναλύεται. An ELEMENT is that, out of which, as their first Principle, things generated are made, and into which, as their last remains, they are resolved. Diog. Laert. VII. 176. What Aristotle says upon ELEMENTS with respect to the Subject here treated, is worth attending to—Φωνῆς σοιχεῖα, οὐκ οὐ σύγχειται οὐ φωνὴ, καὶ εἰς ἀ διαιρεῖται ἔσχατα· ἐκεῖνα δὲ μηκέτ' εἰς ἄλλας φωνὰς ἐτέρας τῷ ὑδει σύντονος. The ELEMENTS OF ARTICULATE VOICE are those things, out of which the VOICE is compounded; and into which, as its last remains, it is divided: the Elements themselves being no farther divisible into other articulate Voices, differing in Species from them. Metaph. V. c. 3.

(*f*) The Egyptians paid divine Honours to the Inventor of Letters, and Regulator of Language, whom they

elementary Sounds, we owe that variety of articulate Voices, which have been sufficient to explain the Sentiments of so innumerable a Multitude, as all the present and past Generations of Men.

IT

they called **THEUTH**. By the **GREEKS** he was worshipped under the Name of **HERMES**, and represented commonly by a *Head alone without other Limbs*, standing upon a *quadrilateral Basis*. The Head itself was that of a beautiful Youth, having on it a *Petasus*, or *Bonnet*, adorned with two Wings.

There was a peculiar reference in this Figure to the **ΕΡΜΗΣ ΛΟΓΙΟΣ**, THE HERMES OF LANGUAGE OR DISCOURSE. He possessed no other part of the human figure but the HEAD, because no other was deemed *requisite to rational Communication*. Words at the same time, the medium of this Communication, being (as Homer well describes them) *Επιτα πλεόντα*, *Winged Words*, were represented in their *Velocity* by the WINGS of his Bonnet.

Let us suppose such a **HERMES**, having the *Front of his Basis* (the usual place for Inscriptions) adorned with some old Alphabet, and having a *Veil* flung across, by which that Alphabet is partly covered. Let A **YOUTH** be seen drawing off this *Veil*; and A **NYMPH**, near the Youth, transcribing what She there discovers.

Such a Design would easily indicate its Meaning. THE YOUTH we might imagine to be THE GENIUS

Ch. II. It appears from what has been said, that THE MATTER OR COMMON SUBJECT OF LANGUAGE IS *that Species of Sounds called Voices ARTICULATE,*

WHAT

OF MAN (*Naturæ Deus humanae*, as *Horace* styles him;) THE NYMPH to be MNHMOΣTNH, or MEMORY; as much as to insinuate that "MAN, for the Preservation of his *Deeds* and *Inventions*, was necessarily obliged to have recourse to LETTERS; and that MEMORY, being conscious of her own Insufficiency, was glad to avail herself of so valuable an Acquisition."

MR. STUART, well known for his accurate and elegant Edition of the *Antiquities of Athens*, has adorned this Work with a Frontispiece agreeable to the above Ideas, and that in a taste truly *Attic* and *Simple*, which no one possesses more eminently than himself.

As to HERMES, his History, Genealogy, Mythology, Figure, &c. Vid. *Platon. Phileb.* T. II. p. 18. *Edit. Serran.* *Diod. Sic.* L. I. *Horat. Od. X. L. I.* *Hesiod. Theog.* V. 937. *cum Comment.* *Joan. Diaconi.* *Thycid.* VI. 27. *et Scholiast. in loc.* *Pigium apud Gr. nov. Thesaur.* T. IX. p. 1164.

For the value and importance of *Principles*, and the difficulty in attaining them, see *Aristot. de Sephiſt. Elench.* & 34.

WHAT remains to be examined in the Ch. II. following Chapter, is Language under its characteristic and peculiar FORM, that is to say, Language considered, not with respect to *Sound*, but to *Meaning*.

The following Passage, taken from that able Mathematician *Tacquet*, will be found peculiarly pertinent to what has been said in this chapter concerning *Elementary Sounds*, p. 324, 325.

Mille millions scriptorum mille annorum millionibus non scribebant omnes 24 litterarum alphabeti permutationes, licet singuli quotidiè absolvarent 40 paginas, quarum unaquæque contineret diversos ordines litterarum 24. Tacquet Arithmetice Theor. p. 381. Edit. Antwerp. 1663.

C H A P III.

Upon the Form, or peculiar Character of Language.

Ch.III: **W**HEN to any articulate Voice there accedes *by compact* a Meaning or Signification, such Voice by such accession is then called A WORD; and many Words, possessing their Significations (as it were) *under the same Compact* (a), unite in constituting A PARTICULAR LANGUAGE.

IT

(a). See before Note (c) p. 314. See also Vol. I. Treatise II. c. 1. Notes (a) and (c).

The following Quotation from *Ammonius* is remarkable—Καθάπερ ἐν τῷ μὲν κατὰ τόπον κινεῖσθαι, φύσει, τὸ δὲ ὀρχεῖσθαι, θέσει καὶ κατὰ συνθήκην, καὶ τὸ μὲν ξύλον, φύσει, οὐ δὲ θύρα, θέσει· ὅταν καὶ τὸ μὲν φωνεῖν, φύσει, τὸ δὲ δι' ὄνομάτων ἡρήματων σημαίνειν, θέσει—καὶ ἔσικε τὴν μὲν φωνητικὴν δύναμιν, ἔργαναν ἵσταν τῶν ψυχικῶν ἐν ἡμῖν δυνάμεων γνωσικῶν, η ὀρεκτικῶν, κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν ἐπίθεσιν τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις

IT appears from hence, that A WORD Ch.III. may be defined *a Voice articulate, and significant by Compact* — and that LANGUAGE may be defined *a System of such Voices, so significant.*

IT is from notions like these concerning Language and Words, that one may be

ζώοις τὸ δὲ ὄνομασιν, ἢ ῥήμασιν, ἢ τοῖς ἐκ τέτων συγκειμένοις λόγοις χρῆσθαι τρὸς τὴν σημασίαν (ἐκέτει φύσει δύσιν, ἀλλὰ θέσει) ἐξαίρετον ἔχειν τρὸς τὰ ἄλογα ζῶα, διότι καὶ μόνον τῶν θυητῶν ἀυτοκινήτων μετέχει ψυχῆς, καὶ τέχνικῶς ἐνεργεῖν δύναμέντος, οἷα καὶ ἐν ἀυτῷ τῷ φωνεῖν ἡ τεχνικὴ ἀντῆς διακρίνηται δύναμις δηλῶσι δὲ ταῦτα οἱ εἰς κάλλος συντθέμενοι λόγοι μετὰ μέτρων, ἢ ἀνευ μέτρων. In the same manner therefore, as local Motion is from Nature, but Dancing is something positive; and as Timber exists in Nature, but a Door is something positive; so is the power of producing a vocal Sound founded in Nature, but that of explaining ourselves by Nouns, or Verbs, something positive. And hence it is, that as to the simple power of producing vocal Sound (which is as it were the Organ or Instrument to the Soul's faculties of Knowledge or Volition) as to this vocal power I say, Man seems to possess it from Nature, in like manner as

irra-

Ch.III. be tempted to call LANGUAGE a kind of
 PICTURE OF THE UNIVERSE, where the
 Words are as the Figures or Images of all
 particulars.

AND yet it may be doubted, how far
 this is true. For if *Pictures* and *Images*
 are all of them *Imitations*, it will follow,
 that whoever has natural faculties to know
 the

irrational animals : but as to the employing of *Nouns*, or
Verbs, or *Sentences composed out of them*, in the explanation
 of our *Sentiments* (the thing thus employed being founded not
 in *Nature*, but in *Position*) this he seems to possess by way of
 peculiar eminence, because he alone of all mortal Beings par-
 takes of a *Soul*, which can move itself, and operate arti-
 ficially ; so that even in the Subject of Sound his artificial
 Power shews itself ; as the various elegant Compositions both
 in *Metre*, and without *Metre*, abundantly prove. *Ammonius*,
de Interpr. p. 51. a.

It must be observed, that the operating artificially, (τεργεῖν τεχνικῶς) of which *Ammonius* here speaks, and
 which he considers as a distinctive Mark peculiar to the
Human Soul, means something very different from the
 mere producing works of elegance and design ; else it could
 never be a mark of Distinction between Man, and many
 other Species of Animals, such as the Bee, the Beaver,
 the Swallow, &c. See Vol. I. p. 8, 9, 10. 158, 159,
 &c.

the Original, will by help of the same Ch.III. faculties know also its Imitations. But it by no means follows, that he who knows any Being, should know for that reason its *Greek* or *Latin* Name.

THE Truth is, that every Medium through which we exhibit any thing to another's Contemplation, is either derived from *Natural Attributes*, and then it is an **IMITATION**; or else from *Accidents* quite *arbitrary*, and then it is a **SYMBOL** (b).

Now,

(b) Διαφίρει δὲ τὸ ΟΜΟΙΩΜΑ τῆς ΣΤΥΜΒΟΛΟΤ, καθόσον τὸ μὲν ὁμοίωμα τὴν φύσιν ἀντὶ τῆς πράγματος κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ἀπεικονίζεσθαι βέλεται, καὶ ἐκ ἐσιν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἀντὸν μεταπλάσται· τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῇ εἰκόνι γεγραμμένη τῆς Σωκράτες ὁμοίωμα, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὸ φαλακρὸν, καὶ τὸ σιρμὸν, καὶ τὸ ἐξαφθαλμον ἔχει τῆς Σωκράτες, ἀκέτ' ἀν ἀντὸν λέγοιστο εἶναι ὁμοίωμα· τὸ δέ γε σύμβολον, πτοι σημεῖον, (ἀμφότερα γάρ ὁ φιλόσοφος ἀντὸν ὀνομάζει) τὸ ὅλον ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔχει, ἀπε καὶ μόνης ὑφισάμενον τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐπινοίας· οἷον, τῆς πέτρης δεῖ συμβάλλειν ἀλλήλοις τὰς πολεμοῦτας, δύ-

ναται

Ch.III. Now, if it be allowed that in far the greater part of things, not any of their *natural* Attributes are to be found in articulate Voices, and that yet through such Voices things of every kind are exhibited, it will follow that WORDS *must of necessity be SYMBOLS*, because it appears that they cannot be *Imitations*.

BUT here occurs a Question, which deserves attention—“ Why, in the common intercourse of men with men, have Imitations been neglected, and Symbols “ pre-

νεται σύμβολον έιναι καὶ σάλπιγος ἀπόχρεις, καὶ λαμπάδος ρίψις, καθάπερ φησὶν Εὐριπίδης,

Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀφείθη τιμρός, ὡς τυρσηικῆς

Σάλπιγος ἦχος, σῆμα φοινίου μάχης.

Δύναται δέ τις ὑποθέσθαι καὶ δόρατος ἀνάτασιν, καὶ βέλες ἀφεσιν, καὶ αλλὰ μυρία.—A REPRESENTATION or RESEMBLANCE differs from a SYMBOL, in as much as the Resemblance aims as far as possible to represent the very nature of the thing, nor is it in our power to shift or vary it. Thus a REPRESENTATION intended for Socrates in a Picture, if I have not those circumstances peculiar

“ preferred, although Symbols are only Ch.III.
 “ known by Habit or Institution, while —,
 “ Imitations are recognized by a kind of
 “ natural Intuition?” — To this it may be
 answered, that if the Sentiments of the
 Mind, like the Features of the Face, were
 immediately visible to every beholder, the
 Art of Speech or Discourse would have
 been perfectly superfluous. But now,
 while our Minds lie enveloped and hid,
 and the Body (like a Veil) conceals every
 thing but itself, we are necessarily compell-
 led, when we communicate our Thoughts,

to

*culier to Socrates, the bald, the flat-nosed, and the Eyes
 projecting, cannot properly be called a Representation of
 him. But a SYMBOL or SIGN (for the Philosopher
 Aristotle uses both names) is wholly in our own pow-
 er, as depending singly for its existence on our imagina-
 tion. Thus for example, as to the time when two armies
 should engage, the Symbol or Sign may be the sounding of
 a Trumpet, the throwing of a Torch, (according to what
 Euripides says,*

*But when the flaming Torch was hurl'd, the sign
 Of purple fight, as when the Trumpet sounds, &c.)*

*or else one may suppose the elevating of a Spear, the darting
 of a Weapon, and a thousand ways besides. Ammon. in
 Lib. de Interp. p. 17. b.*

Ch.III. to convey them to each other *through a*
Medium which is corporeal (c). And hence
 it is that all Signs, Marks, Imitations,
 and Symbols must needs be *sensible*, and
 addressed *as such* to the *Senses (d)*. Now
 THE SENSES, we know, never exceed
 their natural Limits; the Eye perceives
 no Sounds; the Ear perceives no Figures
 nor Colours. If therefore we were to
 converse, not by *Symbols* but by *Imitations*,
 as far as things are characterized by Fi-
 gure

(c) Αἱ φυχαὶ αἱ ἡμέτεραι, γυμναὶ μὲν ἔσται τὰ
 σωμάτων, ἡδύναντο δι' αὐτῶν τῶν ὄνομάτων σημαίνειν
 ἀλλήλαις τὰ πράγματα. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ σώμασι συνδέονται,
 δίκην νέφες περικαλύπτειν αὐτῶν τὸ νοερὸν, ἐδεί-
 θησαν τῶν ὄνομάτων, δι' ὧν σημαίνεσιν ἀλλήλαις τὰ
 πράγματα. *Animi nostri a corporis compage secreti res*
viciissim animi conceptionibus significare possent: cum au-
tem corporibus involuti sint, perinde ac nebula, ipsorum
intelligendi vis obtegitur: quocirca opus eis fuit nominibus,
quibus res inter se significarent. Ammon. in Predicam.
 p. 18. 2.

(d) *Quicquid scindi possit in differentias satis numero-*
res, ad notionum varietatem explicandam (modo differ-
entiae illae sensui perceptibiles sint) fieri potest vehiculum
cogitationum de homine in hominem. Bacon, de Augm.
Scient. VI. 1.

gure and Colour, our Imitation would be Ch.III, necessarily thro' Figure and Colour also. Again, as far as they are characterized by Sounds, it would for the same reason be thro' the Medium of Sounds. The like may be said of all the other Senses, the Imitation still shifting along with the Objects imitated. We see then how *complicated* such Imitation would prove.

If we set LANGUAGE therefore, as a *Symbol*, in opposition to *such Imitation*; if we reflect on the Simplicity of the one, and the Multiplicity of the other; if we consider the Ease and Speed, with which Words are formed (an Ease which knows no trouble or fatigue; and a * Speed, which equals the Progress of our very Thoughts) if we oppose to this the difficulty and length of Imitations; if we remember that some Objects are capable of no Imitations at all, but that all Objects universally may be typified by Symbols; we may plainly

* Επια πεποίηται — See before, p. 325.

Ch. III. plainly perceive an Answer to the Question here proposed, “ Why, in the common intercourse of men with men, Imitations have been rejected, and Symbols preferred.”

HENCE too we may perceive a Reason, *why there never was a Language, nor indeed can possibly be framed one, to express the Properties and real Essences of things*, as a Mirrour exhibits their Figures and their Colours. For if Language of itself imply nothing more, than *certain Species of Sounds with certain Motions concomitant*; if to some Beings Sound and Motion are no Attributes at all; if to many others, where Attributes, they are no way essential (such as the Murmurs and Wavings of a Tree during a storm) if this be true—it is impossible the Nature of such Beings should be expressed, or the least essential Property be any way imitated, while between the Medium and themselves there is nothing CONNATURAL (e).

IT

(e) See Vol. I. Treatise II. c. 3. p. 70.

IT is true indeed, when *Primitives* were Ch.III. once established, it was easy to follow the Connection and Subordination of Nature, in the just deduction of *Derivatives* and *Compounds*. Thus the Sounds, *Water*, and, *Fire*, being once annexed to those two Elements, it was certainly more natural to call Beings participating of the first, *Watry*, of the last, *Fiery*, than to commute the Terms, and call them by the reverse. But why, and from what *natural Connections* the Primitives themselves might not be commuted, it will be found, I believe, difficult to assign a Reason, as well in the instances before us, as in most others. We may here also see the Reason, why ALL LANGUAGE IS FOUNDED IN COMPACT, and not in Nature; for so are all Symbols, of which Words are a certain Species.

THE Question remains if WORDS are Symbols, then SYMBOLS OF WHAT?—

Z

If

Ch. III. If it be answered, of things, the Question returns, of what things?—If it be answered, of the several Individuals of Sense, the various particular Beings, which exist around us—to this, it is replied, may be raised certain Doubts. In the first place every Word will be in fact a *proper Name*. Now if all Words are proper Names, how came Lexicographers, whose express business is to explain Words, either wholly to omit proper Names, or at least to explain them, not from their own Art, but from History?

AGAIN, if all Words are *proper Names*, then in strictness no Word can belong to more than one Individual. But if so, then, as *Individuals* are *infinite*, to make a perfect Language, *Words must be infinite also*. But if infinite, then *incomprehensible*, and never to be attained by the wisest Men; whose labours in Language upon this Hypothesis would be as idle as that study of infinite written Symbols, which

Mission-

But Missionaries (if they may be credited) at- Ch.III.
If tribute to the Chinese.

AGAIN, if all Words are proper Names, or (which is the same) the Symbols of Individuals; it will follow, as Individuals are not only infinite, but ever passing, that the Language of those, who lived ages ago, will be as unknown now, as the very Voices of the Speakers. Nay the Language of every Province, of every Town, of every Cottage, must be every where different, and every where changing, since such is the Nature of Individuals, which it follows.

AGAIN, if all Words are proper Names, the Symbols of Individuals, it will follow that in Language there can be no general Proposition, because upon the Hypothesis all Terms are particular; nor any Affirmative Proposition, because no one Individual in nature is another. It remains, there can be no Propositions, but Particular Negatives.

Ch. III. *tives.* But if so, then is Language incapable of communicating *General Affirmative Truths*—If so, then of communicating *Demonstration*—If so, then of communicating *Sciences*, which are so many Systems of Demonstrations—If so, then of communicating *Arts*, which are the Theorems of Science applied practically—If so, we shall be little better for it either in Speculation or in Practice (e). And so much for this Hypothesis ; let us now try another.

IF WORDS are not the Symbols of *external Particulars*, it follows of course, they must be THE SYMBOLS OF OUR IDEAS: For this is evident, if they are not Symbols

(e) The whole of *Euclid* (whose Elements may be called the basis of Mathematical Science) is founded upon *general Terms*, and *general Propositions*, most of which are *affirmative*. So true are those Veres, however barbarous as to their stile,

*Syllogizari non est ex Particulari,
Neve Negativis, recte concludere si vis.*

Symbols of things *without*, they can only Ch.III.
be Symbols of something *within*.

HERE then the Question recurs, if SYMBOLS OF IDEAS, then of WHAT IDEAS?—OF SENSIBLE IDEAS.—Be it so, and what follows?—Every thing in fact, which has followed already from the supposition of their being the Symbols of *external Particulars*; and that from this plain and obvious reason, because the several Ideas, which *Particulars* imprint, must needs be as *infinite* and *mutable*, as they are themselves.

IF then Words are neither the Symbols of *external Particulars*, nor yet of *particular Ideas*, they can be SYMBOLS of nothing else, except of GENERAL IDEAS, because nothing else, except these, remains.—And what do we mean by GENERAL IDEAS?—We mean SUCH AS ARE COMMON TO MANY INDIVIDUALS; not only to Individuals which exist now,

Ch. III. but which existed in ages past, and will
 exist in ages future; such for example, as
 the Ideas belonging to the Words, *Man*,
Lion, *Cedar*.—Admit it, and what fol-
 lows?—It follows, that if *Words are the
 Symbols of such general Ideas*, Lexicogra-
 phers may find employ, though they
 meddle not with *proper Names*.

IT follows that one *Word* may be, not
 homonymously, but truly and essentially com-
 mon to many *Particulars*, past present and
 future; so that however these *Particulars*
 may be infinite, and ever fleeting, yet Lan-
 guage notwithstanding may be definite and
 steady. But if so, then attainable even by
 ordinary Capacities, without danger of
 incurring the Chinese Absurdity *.

AGAIN, it follows that the Language
 of those, who lived ages ago, as far as it
 stands

* See p. 338, 339.

stands for the same general Ideas, may be as Ch.III. intelligible now, as it was then. The like may be said of the same Language being accommodated to distant Regions, and even to distant Nations, amidst all the variety of *ever new and ever changing Objects.*

AGAIN, it follows that Language may be expressive of *general Truths*; and if so, then of Demonstration, and Sciences, and Arts; and if so, become subservient to purposes of every kind (*f*).

Now if it be true “ that none of these “ things could be asserted of Language, “ were not Words the Symbols of *general Ideas*—and it be further true, that these “ things may be all undeniably asserted “ of Language”—it will follow (and that necessarily) that WORDS ARE THE SYMBOLS OF GENERAL IDEAS.

Z 4

AND

(f) See before Note (e).

Ch.III. AND yet perhaps even here may be an Objection. It may be urged, if Words are the Symbols of *general Ideas*, Language may answer well enough the purpose of Philosophers, who reason about *general*, and *abstract* Subjects—but what becomes of the business of ordinary Life? Life we know is merged in a multitude of *Particulars*, where an Explanation by Language is as requisite, as in the highest Theorems. The Vulgar indeed want it to *no other* End. How then can this End in any respect be answered, if Language be expressive of nothing farther than *general Ideas*?

To this it may be answered, that *Arts* surely respect the business of ordinary Life; yet so far are *general Terms* from being an Obstacle here, that without them no Art can be *rationally* explained. How for instance should the measuring Artist ascertain to the Reapers the price of their labours, had not he first through *general Terms*

Terms learnt those general Theorems, that Ch. III. respect the doctrine and practice of Mensuration ?

BUT suppose this not to satisfy a persevering Objector—suppose him to insist, that, admitting this to be true, there were still a multitude of occasions for minute particularizing, of which it was not possible for mere Generals to be susceptible—suppose, I say, such an Objection, what should we answer?—That the Objection was just; that it was necessary to the Perfection and Completion of LANGUAGE, that it should be expressive of PARTICULARS, as well as of GENERALS. We must however add, that its general Terms are by far its most excellent and essential Part, since from these it derives “ that comprehensive Universality, that just proportion of Precision and Permanence, without which it could not possibly be either learnt, or understood, or applied to the purposes of Reasoning and Science;”

Ch.III. “ Science;”—that *particular* Terms have
 their Utility and End, and that therefore
 care too has been taken for a supply of
 these,

ONE Method of expressing Particulars,
 is that of PROPER NAMES. This is the
 least artificial, because *proper Names* be-
 ing in every district arbitrarily applied,
 may be unknown to those, who know the
 Language perfectly well, and can hardly
 therefore with propriety be considered as
 parts of it. The other and more artificial
 Method is that of DEFINITIVES or AR-
 TICLES (g), whether we assume the *pro-
 nominal*, or those *more strictly* so called.
 And here we cannot enough admire the
 exquisite *Art* of Language, which, *with-
 out wandering into infinitude*, contrives *how*
to denote things infinite; that is to say in
 other words, which, by the small Tribe
 of *Definitives* *properly applied to general*
Terms,

(g) See before, p. 72, &c. 233, &c.

Terms, knows how to employ these last, Ch.III. tho' in number *finite*, to the accurate expression of *infinite* Particulars.

To explain what has been said by a single example. Let the general Term be **MAN**. I have occasion to apply this Term to the denoting of some Particular. Let it be required to express this Particular, *as unknown*; I say, **A Man—known**; I say, **THE Man—*indefinite***; **ANY Man—*definite***; **A CERTAIN Man—*present and near***; **THIS Man—*present and distant***; **THAT Man—*like to some other***; **SUCH A Man—*an indefinite Multitude***; **MANY Men—*a definite Multitude***; **A THOUSAND Men—*the ones of a Multitude, taken throughout***; **EVERY Man—*the same ones, taken with distinction***; **EACH Man—*taken in order***; **FIRST Man, SECOND Man, &c.—*the whole Multitude of Particulars taken collectively***; **ALL Men—*the Negation of this Multitude***; **NO Man**. But of this we have spoken already, when we inquired concerning *Definitives*.

Ch. III. **T**HE Sum of all is, that WORDS ARE
THE SYMBOLS OF IDEAS BOTH GENERAL AND PARTICULAR; YET OF THE GENERAL, PRIMARILY, ESSENTIALLY, AND IMMEDIATELY; OF THE PARTICULAR, ONLY SECONDARILY; ACCIDENTALLY, AND MEDIATELY.

SHOULD it be asked, “ why has Language this *double Capacity*? ”—May we not ask, by way of return, Is it not a kind of reciprocal Commerce, or *Intercourse of our Ideas*? Should it not therefore be framed, so as to express *the whole* of our Perception? Now can we call that Perception intire and whole, which implies either INTELLECTION without Sensation, or SENSATION without Intellection? If not, how should Language explain *the whole* of our Perception, had it not Words to express the Objects, proper to each of the two Faculties?

To

To conclude—As in the preceding Ch.III. Chapter we considered Language with a view to its MATTER, so here we have considered it with a view to its FORM. Its MATTER is recognized, when it is considered *as a Voice*; its FORM, as it is *significant of our several Ideas*; so that upon the whole it may be defined—**A SYSTEM OF ARTICULATE VOICES, THE SYMBOLS OF OUR IDEAS, BUT OF THOSE PRINCIPALLY, WHICH ARE GENERAL, OR UNIVERSAL.**

C H A P. IV.

Concerning general or universal Ideas.

Ch.IV. **M**UCH having been said in the preceding Chapter about GENERAL OR UNIVERSAL IDEAS, it may not perhaps be amiss to inquire, *by what process we come to perceive them, and what kind of Beings they are*; since the generality of men think so meanly of their existence, that they are commonly considered, as little better than Shadows. These Sentiments are not unusual even with the Philosopher now a days, and that from causes much the same with those, which influence the Vulgar.

THE VULGAR merged in *Sense* from their earliest Infancy, and never once dreaming any thing to be worthy of pursuit, but what either pampers their Appetite, or fills their Purse, imagine nothing to

to be *real*, but what may be *tasted*, or Ch. IV. *touched*. THE PHILOSOPHER, as to these matters being of much the same Opinion, in Philosophy looks no higher, than to *experimental Amusements*, deeming nothing *Demonstration*, if it be not made *ocular*. Thus instead of ascending from *Sense* to *Intellect* (the natural progress of all true Learning) he hurries on the contrary into the midst of *Sense*, where he wanders at random without any end, and is lost in a Labyrinth of infinite Particulars. Hence then the reason why the sublimer parts of *Science*, the Studies of *MIND*, *INTELLIGENCE*, and *INTELLIGENT PRINCIPLES*, are in a manner neglected; and, as if the Criterion of all Truth were an Alembic or an Air-pump, what cannot be proved by *Experiment*, is deemed no better than mere *Hypothesis*.

AND yet it is somewhat remarkable, amid the prevalence of such Notions, that there should still remain two Sciences in fashion,

Ch. IV. fashion, and these having their Certainty
 of all the least controverted, *which are not*
in the minutest article depending upon Experi-
ment. By these I mean ARITHMETIC,
 and GEOMETRY (a). But to come to our
 Subject concerning GENERAL IDEAS.

MAN's

(a) The many noble Theorems (so useful in life,
 and so admirable in themselves) with which these two
 SCIENCES so eminently abound, arise originally from
 PRINCIPLES, THE MOST OBVIOUS IMAGINABLE;
 Principles, so little wanting the pomp and apparatus of
 EXPERIMENT, that they are *self-evident* to every one,
 possessed of common sense. I would not be understood,
 in what I have here said, or may have said elsewhere, to
 undervalue EXPERIMENT; whose importance and utility
 I freely acknowledge, in the many curious Nostrums
 and choice Receipts, with which it has enriched the
 necessary Arts of life. Nay, I go farther—I hold *all*
justifiable Practice in every kind of Subject to be founded
 in EXPERIENCE, which is no more than *the result of*
many repeated EXPERIMENTS. But I must add withal,
 that the man who acts from *Experience alone*, tho'
 he act ever so well, is but an Empiric or Quack, and
 that not only in Medicine, but in every other Subject.
 It is then only that we recognize ART, and that the
 EMPIRIC quits his name for the more honourable one
 of ARTIST, when to his EXPERIENCE he adds
 SCIENCE,

MAN'S FIRST PERCEPTIONS are those Ch.IV. of the SENSES, in as much as they commence from his earliest Infancy. These Perceptions, if not infinite, are at least *indefinite*, and more *fleeting* and *transient*, than the very Objects, which they exhibit, because

SCIENCE, and is thence enabled to tell us, not only, *WHAT is to be done*, but *WHY it is to be done*; for ART is a composite of Experience and Science, Experience providing it Materials, and Science giving them A FORM.

In the mean time, while EXPERIMENT is thus necessary to all PRACTICAL WISDOM, with respect to PURE and SPECULATIVE SCIENCE, as we have hinted already, it has not the least to do. For who ever heard of *Logic*, or *Geometry*, or *Arithmetic* being proved *experimentally*? It is indeed by the application of *these* that *Experiments* are rendered useful; that they are assumed into Philosophy, and in some degree made a part of it, being otherwise nothing better than puerile amusements. But that these Sciences themselves should depend upon the Subjects, on which they work, is, as if the Marble were to fashion the Chizzle, and not the Chizzle the Marble.

Ch. IV. because they not only depend upon the *existence* of those Objects, but because they cannot subsist, without their *immediate Presence*. Hence therefore it is, that there can be *no Sensation of either Past or Future*, and consequently had the Soul no other Faculties, than the *Senses*, it never could acquire the least Idea of TIME (b).

BUT happily for us we are not deserted here. We have in the first place a Faculty, called **IMAGINATION** or **FANCY**, which however as to its *energies* it may be subsequent to Sense, yet is truly prior to it both in *dignity* and *use*. THIS it is which *retains the fleeting Forms of things*, when Things themselves are gone, and *all Sensation* at an end.

THAT this Faculty, however connected with Sense, is still perfectly different, may be

(b) See before, p. 105. See also, p. 112. Note (f).

be seen from hence. We have an *Imagination* of things, that are gone and extinct; but no such things can be made objects of *Sensation*. We have an easy command over the Objects of our *Imagination*, and can call them forth in almost what manner we please; but our *Sensations* are necessary, when their Objects are present, nor can we controul them, but by removing either the Objects, or ourselves (c).

As

(c) Besides the distinguishing of *SENSATION* from *IMAGINATION*, there are two other Faculties of the Soul, which from their nearer alliance ought carefully to be distinguished from it, and these are *MNHMH*, and *ANAMNHΣΙΣ*, *MEMORY*, and *RECOLLECTION*.

When we view some *relict* of sensation reposed within us, *without thinking of its rise, or referring it to any sensible Object*, this is *PHANSY* or *IMAGINATION*.

When we view some such *relict*, and *refer it withal to that sensible Object, which in time past was its cause and original*, this is *MEMORY*.

A 2

Lastly

Ch.IV. As the Wax would not be adequate to its busines of Signature, had it not a Power to retain, as well as to receive; the same holds of the SOUL, with respect to Sense and *Imagination*. SENSE is its *receptrix*

Lastly the Road, which leads to *Memory* through a series of Ideas, however connected, whether rationally or casually, this is *RECOLLECTION*. I have added *casually*, as well as *rationally*, because a casual connection is often sufficient. Thus from seeing a Garment, I think of its Owner; thence of his Habitation; thence of Woods; thence of Timber; thence of Ships, Sea-fights, Admirals, &c.

If the Distinction between *Memory* and *Phansy* be not sufficiently understood, it may be illustrated by being compared to the view of a Portrait. When we contemplate a Portrait, *without thinking of whom it is the Portrait*, such Contemplation is analogous to *PHANSY*. When we view it *with reference to the Original, whom it represents*, such Contemplation is analogous to *MEMORY*.

We may go farther. *IMAGINATION* or *PHANSY* may exhibit (after a manner) even *things that are to come*. It is here that *Hope* and *Fear* paint all their pleasant, and all their painful Pictures of *Futurity*. But *MEMORY* is confined in the strictest manner to *the past*.

What

*ceptive Power; IMAGINATION, its re- Ch.IV.
tentive.* Had it Sense without Imagi-
nation, it would not be as Wax, but as
Water, where tho' all Impressions may
be instantly made, yet as soon as made
they are as instantly lost.

THUS then, from a view of the two
Powers taken together, we may call
SENSE (if we please) *a kind of transient
Imagination*; and IMAGINATION on the
contrary *a kind of permanent Sense (d)*.

Now

What we have said, may suffice for our present pur-
pose. He that would learn more, may consult *Aristot.
de Anima*, L. III. c. 3, 4. and his *Treatise de Mem. et
Reminisc.*

(d) Τί τοίνυν ἐσὶν ἡ φαντασία ὡδε ἀν γνωρίσαιμεν
δεῖ νοεῖν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀισθη-
τὰς; Σιν τύπου (lege τύπου) τινὰ καὶ ἀναζωγράφημα
ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ ἀισθητηρίῳ, ἐγκατάλειμμά τι τῆς ὑπὸ τῷ
ἀισθητῷ γινομένης κινήσεως, ὃ καὶ μηκέτι τῷ ἀισθητῷ
παρόντος, ὑπομένει τε καὶ σώζεται, οὐ πάστερ ἐικών τις

A a 3

autem;

Ch.IV. Now as our Feet in vain venture to walk upon the River, till the Frost bind the Current, and harden the yielding Surface; so does the SOUL in vain seek to exert its higher Powers, the Powers I mean of REASON and INTELLECT, till IMAGINATION first fix the *fluency* of SENSE, and thus provide a proper Basis for the support of its higher Energies.

AFTER

ἀντεῖ, οὐ καὶ τῆς μυῆμεν πάμιν σωζόμενον ἀίσιον γίνεται τὸ τοιότον ἐγκατάλειμμα, καὶ τὸν τοιότον ὀσπέρ τύπον, ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑΝ καλεῖσιν. Now what PHANSY or IMAGINATION is, we may explain as follows. We may conceive to be formed within us, from the operations of our Senses about sensible Subjects, some Impression (as it were) or Picture in our original Sensorium, being a relict of that motion caused within us by the external object; a relict, which when the external object is no longer present, remains and is still preserved, being as it were its Image, and which, by being thus preserved, becomes the cause of our having Memory. Now such a sort of relict and (as it were) Impression they call PHANSY or IMAGINATION. Alex. Aphrod. de Anima, p. 135. b. Edit. Ald.

AFTER this manner, in the admirable Ch.IV. Oeconomy of the Whole, are Natures subordinate made subservient to the higher. Were there *no Things external*, the *Senses* could not operate; were there *no Sensations*, the *Imagination* could not operate; and were there *no Imagination*, there could be *neither Reasoning nor Intellection*, such at least as they are found in *Man*, where they have their Intentions and Remissions in alternate succession, and are at first nothing better, than *a mere CAPACITY or POWER*. Whether every Intellect begins thus, may be perhaps a question; especially if there be any one of a nature *more divine*, to which “*Intention and Remission and mere Capacity are unknown (e).*” But not to digress.

IT

(e) See p. 162. The *Life, Energy, or Manner of MAN’s Existence* is not a little different from that of the *Deity*. THE LIFE OF MAN has its Essence in Motion.

Ch.IV. It is then on these *permanent Phantasms*
 that THE HUMAN MIND first works, and
 by

MOTION. This is not only true with respect to that lower and subordinate Life, which he shares in common with Vegetables, and which can no longer subsist than while the Fluids circulate, but it is likewise true in that *Life*, which is peculiar to him as *Man*. Objects from without first move our faculties, and thence we move of ourselves either to *Practice* or *Contemplation*. But the LIFE or EXISTENCE of GOD (as far as we can conjecture upon so transcendent a Subject), is not only complete throughout Eternity, but complete in every Instant, and is for that reason IMMUTABLE and SUPERIOR TO ALL MOTION.

It is to this distinction that *Aristotle* alludes, when he tells us—Οὐ γὰρ μόνον κινήσεως ἔσιν ἐνέργεια, ἀλλὰ καὶ ακίνησίας· καὶ οὐδονὴ μᾶλλον ἐν πρεμίᾳ ἔσιν, οὐ ἐν κινήσει· μεταβολὴ δὲ τῶν γλυκὺν, κατὰ τὸν τοιητήρα, διὰ τωνηρίαν τινά· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἀνθρώπος ἐν μετάβολος ὁ τωνηρός, καὶ οὐ φύσις οὐ δομένη μεταβολῆς· καὶ γὰρ ἀτλῆ, οὐδὲν ἐπιεικῆς. For there is not only an Energy of MOTION, but of IMMObILITY; and PLEASURE or FELICITY exists rather in REST than in MOTION; Change of all things being sweet (according to the Poet) from a principle of Pravity in those who believe so. For

by an Energy as spontaneous and familiar Ch. IV.
to its Nature, as the seeing of Colour is
familiar to the Eye, it discerns at once
what

in the same manner as the bad man is one fickle and changeable, so is that Nature bad that requireth Variety, in as much as such Nature is neither simple nor even. Eth. Nicom. VII. 14. & Ethic. Eudem. VI. sub. fin.

It is to this UNALTERABLE NATURE OF THE DEITY that *Boethius* refers, when he says in those elegant verses,

— *Tempus ab Avo*
Ire jubes STABILISQUE MANENS das cuncte
moveri.

From this single principle of IMMOBILITY, may be derived some of the noblest of the *Divine Attributes*; such as that of IMPASSIVE, INCORRUPTIBLE, INCORPOREAL, &c. Vide *Aristot. Physic.* VIII. *Metaphys.* XIV. c. 6, 7, 9. 10. Edit. *Du Val.* See also Vol. I. of these Treatises, p. 262 to 266—also p. 295, where the Verses of *Boethius* are quoted at length.

It must be remembered however, that tho' we are not *Gods*, yet as *rational Beings* we have within us something *Divine*, and that the more we can become superior to our mutable, variable, and irrational part, and place our welfare in that Good, which is immutable, per-

Ch.IV. what in MANY is ONE ; what in things
 DISSIMILAR and DIFFERENT is SIMILAR
 and the SAME (f). By this it comes to
 behold

permanent, and rational, the higher we shall advance in real Happiness and Wisdom. This is (as an antient writer says)—Ομοίωσις τῷ Θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν, the becoming like to GOD, as far as in our power. Τοῖς μὲν γὰρ θεοῖς τὰς ὁ βίοις μακάριοις· τοῖς δὲ ἀνθρώποις,
 οὐδὲν ὁμοίωσά τι τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργίας ὑπάρχει. For to THE GODS (as says another antient) the whole of life is one continued happiness ; but to MEN, it is so far happy, as it rises to the resemblance of so divine an Energy. See Plat. in Theætet. Aрист. Eth. X. 8.

(f) This CONNECTIVE ACT of the Soul, by which it views ONE IN MANY, is perhaps one of the principal Acts of its most excellent Part. It is this removes that impenetrable mist, which renders *Objects of Intelligence* invisible to lower faculties. Were it not for this, even the *sensible* World (with the help of all our Sensations) would appear as unconnected, as the words of an Index. It is certainly not the Figure alone, nor the Touch alone, nor the Odour alone, that makes the Rose, but it is made up of all these, and other attributes UNITED ; not an *unknown* Constitution of *insensible* Parts, but a *known* Constitution of *sensible* Parts, unless we chuse to extirpate the possibility of natural Knowledge.

behold a kind of *superior Objects*; a new Ch.IV.
Race of Perceptions, more comprehensive
than

WHAT then perceives this CONSTITUTION or UNION?—Can it be any of the Senses?—No one of these, we know, can pass the limits of its own province. Were the Smell to perceive the union of the Odour and the Figure, it would not only be Smell, but it would be Sight also. It is the same in other instances. We must necessarily therefore recur to some HIGHER COLLECTIVE POWER, to give us a prospect of Nature, even in these her subordinate Wholes, much more in that comprehensive Whole, whose Sympathy is universal, and of which these smaller Wholes are all no more than Parts.

But no where is this *collecting*, and (if I may be allowed the expression) this *unifying Power* more conspicuous, than in the subjects of PURE TRUTH. By virtue of this power the Mind views *One general Idea*, in *many Individuals*; *One Proposition* in *many general Ideas*; *One Syllogism* in *many Propositions*; till at length, by properly repeating and connecting Syllogism with Syllogism, it ascend into those bright and steady regions of SCIENCE,

*Quas neque concutunt venti, neque nubila nimbis
Adspergunt, &c.*

Lucr.

Even

Ch.IV. than those of Sense ; a Race of Perceptions, *each one of which may be found intire and*

Even *negative* Truths and *negative* Conclusions cannot subsist, but by bringing Terms and Propositions together, so necessary is this UNITING Power to every Species of KNOWLEDGE. See p. 3. 250.

He that would better comprehend the distinction between SENSITIVE PERCEPTION, and INTELLECTIVE, may observe that, when a Truth is spoken, it is *heard* by our Ears, and *understood* by our Minds. That these two Acts are different, is plain, from the example of such, as *hear* the sounds, without *knowing* the language. But to shew their difference still stronger, let us suppose them to concur in the same Man, who shall both *hear* and *understand* the Truth proposed. Let the Truth be for example, *The Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right Angles.* That this is ONE Truth, and not two or many Truths, I believe none will deny. Let me ask then, in what manner does this Truth become perceptible (if at all) to SENSATION ?—The Answer is obvious ; it is by successive Portions of little and little at a time. When the first Word is *present*, all the subsequent are *absent* ; when the last Word is *present*, all the previous are *absent* ; when any of the middle Words are *present*, then are there some *absent*, as well of one sort as the other. No more exists at once than a single Syllable, and the Remainder as much *is not*, (to Sensation at least) as tho'

*and whole in the separate individuals of an Ch. IV.
infinite and fleeting Multitude, without de-
parting*

tho' it never had been, or never was to be. And so much for the perception of SENSE, than which we see nothing can be more *dispersed, fleeting, and detached.* —And is that of the MIND similar?—Admit it, and what follows?—It follows, that *one* Mind would no more recognize *one* Truth, by recognizing its Terms *successively* and *apart*, than *many* distant Minds would recognize it, were it distributed among them, a different part to each. The case is, every TRUTH is ONE, tho' its TERMS are MANY. It is in no respect true *by parts at a time*, but it is true of necessity at once and in an instant.—What Powers therefore recognize this ONENESS or UNITY?—Where even does it reside, or what makes it?—Shall we answer with the Stagirite, Τὸ δὲ ΕΝ ΠΟΙΟΤΝ τὸ τοῦ ΝΟΤΣ ἔχειν?—If this be allowed, it should seem, where SENSATION and INTELLECTION appear to concur, that Sensation was of MANY, Intellection was of ONE; that Sensation was *temporary, divisible* and *successive*; Intellection, *instantaneous, indivisible*, and *at once.*

If we consider the Radii of a Circle, we shall find at the Circumference that they are MANY; at the Center that they are ONE. Let us then suppose SENSE and MIND to view the same Radii, only let Sense view them at the Circumference, Mind at the Center; and

Ch.IV. *parting from the unity and permanence of*
its own nature.

AND

and hence we may conceive, how these Powers differ, even where they jointly appear to operate in perception of the same object.

There is ANOTHER ACT OF THE MIND, the very reverse of that here mentioned ; an A&T, by which it perceives not *one in many*, but *MANY IN ONE*. This is that *mental Separation*, of which we have given some account in the first Chapter of this Book ; that Resolution or Analysis which enables us to investigate the *Causes, and Principles, and Elements of things*. It is by Virtue of this, that we are enabled to abstract any particular Attribute, and make it *by itself* the Subject of philosophical Contemplation. Were it not for this, it would be difficult for *particular Sciences* to exist ; because otherwise they would be as much blended, as the several Attributes of sensible Substances. How, for example, could there be such a Science as *Optics*, were we necessitated to contemplate *Colour concreted with Figure*, two Attributes, which the Eye can never view, but associated ? I mention not a multitude of other sensible qualities, some of which still present themselves, whenever we look on any *coloured Body*.

These

AND thus we see the *Process* by which Ch. IV.
we arrive at GENERAL IDEAS; for the
Per-

Those two noble Sciences, ARITHMETIC and GEOMETRY, would have no Basis to stand on, were it not for this *separative* Power. They are both conversant about QUANTITY; *Geometry* about CONTINUOUS Quantity, *Arithmetick* about DISCRETE. EXTENSION is essential to *continuous* Quantity; MONADS, or UNITS, to *Discrete*. By separating from the infinite Individuals, with which we are surrounded, those infinite Accidents, by which they are all diversified, we leave nothing but those SIMPLE and PERFECTLY SIMILAR UNITS, which being combined make NUMBER, and are the Subject of ARITHMETIC. Again, by separating from *Body* every possible subordinate Accident, and leaving it nothing but its triple Extension of Length, Breadth, and Thickness, (of which were it to be deprived, it would be *Body* no longer) we arrive at that pure and unmixed MAGNITUDE, the contemplation of whose properties makes the Science of *Geometry*.

By the same *analytical* or *separative* Power, we investigate DEFINITIONS of all kinds, each one of which is a developed Word, as the same Word is an *involved* Definition.

To conclude—IN COMPOSITION AND DIVISION CONSISTS THE WHOLE OF SCIENCE, COMPOSITION

Ch.IV. Perceptions here mentioned are in fact no
 other. In these too we perceive the ob-
 jects of SCIENCE and REAL KNOWLEDGE,
 which can by no means be, but *of that*
which is general, and definite, and fixt (g).

Here

TION MAKING AFFIRMATIVE TRUTH, AND
 SHEWING US THINGS UNDER THEIR SIMILAR-
 TIES AND IDENTITIES; DIVISION MAKING NE-
 GATIVE TRUTH, AND PRESENTING THEM TO
 US UNDER THEIR DISSIMILARITIES AND DIVER-
 SITIES.

And here, by the way, there occurs a Question.—
 If all Wisdom be Science, and it be the business of
 Science as well to *compound* as to *separate*, may we not
 say that those Philosophers took *Half* of Wisdom for the
Whole, who distinguished it from Wit, as if *WISDOM*
 only *separated*, and *WIT* only *brought together*?—Yet
 so held the Philosopher of *Malmbury*, and the Author
 of the *Essay on the Human Understanding*.

(g) The very Etymologies of the Words ΕΠΙ-
 ΣΤΗΜΗ, SCIENTIA, and UNDERSTANDING, may
 serve in some degree to shew the nature of these
 Faculties, as well as of those Beings, their true and
 proper Objects. ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ ὠνάμασις, διὸ τὸ
 ΕΠΙ ΣΤΑΣΙΝ καὶ ὄρον τὸν πραγμάτων ἀγενοῦ πρᾶς,
 τῆς

Here too even *Individuals*, however of Ch.IV.
themselves unknowable, become objects of
Knowledge,

τῆς ἀορίσιας καὶ μεταβολῆς τῶν ἐπὶ μέρες ἀπάγεσσα·
ἡ γὰρ ἐπισήμη περὶ τὰ καθόλες καὶ ἀμετάπλωτα κατα-
γίνεται. SCIENCE (ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ) has its name from
bringing us (ΕΠΙ ΣΤΑΣΙΝ) to some STOP and
BOUNDARY of things, taking us away from the unbounded
nature and mutability of Particulars; for it is conversant
about Subjects, that are general, and invariable. Niceph.
Blemi. Epit. Logic. p. 21.

This Etymology given by *Blemmides*, and long before him adopted by the *Peripatetics*, came originally from *Plato*, as may be seen in the following account of it from his *Cratylus*. In this Dialogue *Socrates*, having first (according to the *Heraclitean Philosophy*, which *Cratylus* favoured) etymologized a multitude of Words with a view to that *Flow* and *uncleaving Mutation*, supposed by *Heraclitus* to run thro' all things, at length changes his System, and begins to etymologize from another, which supposed something in nature to be *permanent and fixed*. On this principle he thus proceeds —Σκοπῶμεν δῆ, εἴ τις αὐτῶν ἀναλαβόντες τρῶτον μὲν τῦτο τὸ ὄνομα τὴν ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗΝ, ὡς ἀμφιβόλειν
ἴσι, καὶ μᾶλλον ἔοικε σημαῖνόν τι ὅτι ΙΣΤΗΣΙΝ
ἡμῶν ΕΠΙ τοῖς τρέαγμασι τὴν ψυχὴν, ἢ ὅτι συμπερι-
φέρεται. Let us consider then (says he) some of the very

Ch.IV. Knowledge, as far as their nature will permit. For then only may *any Particular* be

Words already examined; and in the first place, the Word SCIENCE; how disputable is this (as to its former Etymology) how much more naturally does it appear to signify, that IT STOPS THE SOUL AT THINGS, than that it is carried about with them. Plat. Cratyl. p. 437. Edit. Serr.

The disputable Etymology, to which he here alludes, was a strange one of his own making in the former part of the Dialogue, adapted to the flowing System of Heraclitus there mentioned. According to this notion, he had derived ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ from ἐπεσθαι and μίνειν, as if it kept along with things, by perpetually following them in their motions. See *Plato* as before, p. 412.

As to SCIENTIA, we are indebted to Scaliger for the following ingenious Etymology. RATIOCINATIO, motus quidam est: SCIENTIA, quies: unde et nomen, tum apud Græcos, tum etiam nostrum. Παρὰ τὸ ΕΠΙ ΙΣΤΑΣΘΑΙ, ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ. Siftur enim mentis agitatio, et fit species in animo. Sic Latinum SCIENTIA, ὅτι γίγεται ΣΧΕΣΙΣ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ. Nam Latini, quod nomen entis simplex ab usu abjecerunt atque repudiarunt, omnibus actibus participiis idem adjunxerunt. Audiens, ακέψει. Sciens, χῶν ἀν. Scal. in Theophr. de Causis Plant. Lib. I. p. 17.

be said to be known, when by asserting it Ch. IV.
to be *a Man*, or *an Animal*, or the like,

we

The *English* Word, UNDERSTANDING, means not so properly Knowledge, as that *Faculty of the Soul*, where Knowledge resides. Why may we not then imagine, that the framers of this Word intended to represent it as a kind of firm *Basis*, on which the fair Structure of Sciences was to rest, and which was supposed to STAND UNDER them, as their immovable Support?

Whatever may be said of these Etymologies, whether they are true or false, they at least prove their Authors to have considered SCIENCE and UNDERSTANDING, not as *fleeting* powers of Perception, like *Sense*, but rather as *steady, permanent, and durable* COMPREHENSIONS. But if so, we must somewhere or other find for them certain *steady, permanent, and durable Objects*; since if PERCEPTION OF ANY KIND BE DIFFERENT FROM THE THING PERCEIVED, (whether it perceive straight as crooked, or crooked as straight; the moving as fixed, or the fixed as moving) SUCH PERCEPTION MUST OF NECESSITY BE ERRONEOUS AND FALSE. The following passage from a *Greek Platonic* (whom we shall quote again hereafter) seems on the present occasion not without its weight—*Ei ἐστι γνῶσις ἀκριβεστέρα τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ἐν ἀντίθεστα γνωστὰ αἰσθεστέρα τῶν αἰσθητῶν.* If there be

Ch.IV. we refer it to some such *comprehensive*, or
 general Idea.

Now it is of these **COMPREHENSIVE** and **PERMANENT IDEAS**, THE **GENUINE PERCEPTIONS OF PURE MIND**, that **WORDS** of all Languages, however different, are the **SYMBOLS**. And hence it is, that *as the PERCEPTIONS include, so do these their SYMBOLS*

A KNOWLEDGE more accurate than SENSATION; there must be certain OBJECTS of such knowledge MORE TRUE THAN OBJECTS OF SENSE.

The following then are Questions worth considering,—*What these Objects are?—Where they reside?—And how they are to be discovered?*—Not by *experimental Philosophy* it is plain; for that meddles with nothing, but what is tangible, corporeal, and mutable—nor even by the more refined and rational speculation of *Mathematics*; for this, at its very commencement, takes such Objects for granted. We can only add, that *if they reside in our own MINDS*, (and who, that has never looked there, can affirm they do not?) then will the advice of the Satirist be no ways improper,

—NEC TE QUÆSIVERIS EXTRA.

Perf.

SYMBOLS express, not this or that set of Ch.IV. Particulars only, but all indifferently, as they happen to occur. Were therefore the Inhabitants of *Salisbury* to be transferred to *York*, tho' new particular objects would appear on every side, they would still no more want a new Language to explain themselves, than they would want new Minds to comprehend what they beheld. All indeed, that they would want, would be the *local proper Names*; which Names, as we have said already*, are hardly a part of Language, but must equally be learnt both by learned and unlearned, as often as they change the place of their abode.

IT is upon the same principles we may perceive the reason, why the dead Languages (as we call them) are now intelligible; and why the Language of *modern England* is able to describe *antient Rome*;

B b 3

and

* Sup. p. 345, 346.

Ch.IV. and that of *antient Rome* to describe *modern*
~~and~~ *England (b)*. But of these matters we
 have spoken before.

§ 2. AND now having viewed *the Process, by which we acquire general Ideas*, let us begin anew from other Principles, and try to discover (if we can prove so fortunate) *whence it is that these Ideas originally come*. If we can succeed here, we may discern perhaps, *what kind of Beings they are*, for this at present appears somewhat obscure.

LET

(b) As far as *Human Nature*, and *the primary Genera* both of *Substance* and *Accident* are *the same* in all places, and have been so thro' all ages: so far *all Languages* share one common *IDENTITY*. As far as *peculiar species of Substance* occur in different regions; and much more, as far as *the positive Institutions of religious and civil Politics* are *every where different*; so far each *Language* has its peculiar *DIVERSITY*. To the *Causes of Diversity* here mentioned, may be added *the distinguishing Character and Genius of every Nation*, concerning which we shall speak hereafter.

LET us suppose any man to look for Ch.IV. the first time upon *some Work of Art*, as for example upon a Clock, and having sufficiently viewed it, at length to depart. Would he not retain, when absent, an Idea of what he had seen?—And what is it, *to retain such Idea?*—It is to have A FORM INTERNAL correspondent to THE EXTERNAL; only with this difference, that the *Internal Form is devoid of the Matter; the External is united with it*, being seen in the metal, the wood, and the like.

Now if we suppose this Spectator to view *many such Machines*, and not simply to view, but to consider every part of them, so as to comprehend how these parts all operate to one End, he might be then said to possess a kind of INTELLIGIBLE FORM, by which he would not only understand, and know the Clocks, which he had seen *already*, but every Work also of like Sort, which he might see *hereafter*.—

B b 4

Should

Ch.IV. Should it be asked “which of these Forms
 ————— “ is prior, the External and Sensible, or
 “ the Internal and Intelligible ;” the An-
 swer is obvious, that the prior is the Sen-
 sible.

THUS then we see, THERE ARE IN-
 TELLIGIBLE FORMS, WHICH TO THE
 SENSIBLE ARE SUBSEQUENT.

BUT farther still—If these Machines be
 allowed the Work *not of Chance*, but of
 an Artist, they must be the Work of one,
 who knew what he was about. And what
 is it, to work, and know what one is about ?
 —It is to have an Idea of what one is
 doing; to possess a FORM INTERNAL, cor-
 responding to the EXTERNAL, to which ex-
 ternal it serves for an EXEMPLAR or AR-
 CHETYPE.

HERE then we have AN INTELLIGI-
 BLE FORM, WHICH IS PRIOR TO THE
 SENSIBLE FORM; which, being truly prior

*as well in dignity as in time, can no more be- Ch.IV.
come subsequent, than Cause can to Effect.*

THUS then, with respect to Works of ART, we may perceive, if we attend, A TRIPLE ORDER OF FORMS ; one Order, intelligible and previous to these Works ; a second Order, sensible and concomitant ; and a third again, intelligible and subsequent. After the first of these Orders the Maker may be said to work ; thro' the second, the Works themselves exist, and are what they are ; and in the third they become recognized, as mere Objects of Contemplation. To make these Forms by different Names more easy to be understood ; the first may be called THE MAKER'S FORM ; the second, that of THE SUBJECT ; and the third, that of THE CONTEMPLATOR.

LET us pass from hence to Works of NATURE. Let us imagine ourselves viewing some diversified Prospect ; " a Plain, for example, spacious and fer-

Ch.IV. " tile; a river winding thro' it ; by the
" banks of that river, men walking and
" cattle grazing ; the view terminated
" with distant hills, some craggy, and
" some covered with wood." Here it
is plain we have plenty of FORMS NA-
TURAL. And could any one quit so fair
a Sight, and retain no traces of what he
had beheld ?—And what is it, *to retain*
traces of what one has beheld?—It is to
have certain FORMS INTERNAL corre-
spondent to the EXTERNAL, and resem-
bling them in every thing, *except the*
being merged in Matter. And thus, thro'
the same *retentive* and *collective* Powers,
the Mind becomes fraught with *Forms na-*
tural, as before with *Forms artificial*.—
Should it be asked, " *which of these natu-*
" *ral Forms are prior, the External ones*
" *viewed by the Senses, or the Internal ex-*
" *isting in the Mind?*" the Answer is ob-
vious, that *the prior are the External*.

THUS

THUS therefore in NATURE, as well as Ch. IV. in ART, THERE ARE INTELLIGIBLE FORMS, WHICH TO THE SENSIBLE ARE SUBSEQUENT. Hence then we see the meaning of that noted School Axiom, *Nil est in INTELLECTU quod non prius fuit in SENSU*; an Axiom, which we must own to be so far allowable, as it respects the Ideas of a mere *Contemplator*.

BUT to proceed somewhat farther—Are *natural* Productions made BY CHANCE, or BY DESIGN?—Let us admit *by Design*, not to lengthen our inquiry. They are certainly* more exquisite than *any* Works of ART, and yet *these* we cannot bring ourselves to suppose made by *Chance*.—Admit it, and what follows?—*We must of necessity admit a MIND also, because DESIGN implies MIND, wherever it is to be found.*—Allowing therefore this, what do we mean

* *Arist. de Part. Animal. L. I. c. 1.*

Ch. IV. mean by the Term, MIND?—We mean something, which, when it acts, knows what it is going to do; something stored with Ideas of its intended Works, agreeably to which Ideas those Works are fashioned.

THAT such EXEMPLARS, PATTERNS, FORMS, IDEAS (call them as you please) must of necessity be, requires no proving, but follows of course, if we admit the Cause of Nature to be A MIND, as above mentioned. For take away these, and what a Mind do we leave without them? CHANCE surely is as knowing, as MIND WITHOUT IDEAS; or rather MIND WITHOUT IDEAS is no less blind than CHANCE.

THE Nature of these IDEAS is not difficult to explain, if we once come to allow a possibility of their Existence. That they are exquisitely *beautiful*, *various*, and *orderly*, is evident from the exquisite Beauty, Variety, and Order, seen in natural Substances,

stances, which are but their *Copies* or *Pictures*. That they are *mental* is plain, as they are of the *Essence of MIND*, and consequently no Objects to any of the *Senses*, nor therefore circumscribed either by *Time* or *Place*.

HERE then, on this System, we have plenty of FORMS INTELLIGIBLE, WHICH ARE TRULY PREVIOUS TO ALL FORMS SENSIBLE. Here too we see that NATURE is not defective in her TRIPLE ORDER, having (like Art) her FORMS PREVIOUS, HER CONCOMITANT, and HER SUBSEQUENT (i).

THAT

(i) *Simplicius*, in his commentary upon the *Predicaments*, calls the first Order of these intelligible Forms, *τὰ ὡρὸς τῆς μεθίξεως*, those previous to *Participation*, and at other times, *ἱ ἐξηρημένην κοινότην*, the *transcendent Universality* or *Sameness*; the second Order he calls *τὰ ἐν μεθίξει*, those which exist in *Participation*, that is, those merged in *Matter*; and at other times, he calls them *ἱ κατατεταγμένην κοινότην*, the *subordinate Universality* or *Sameness*; lastly, of the third Order he says, that

Ch.IV. *THAT the Previous may be justly so called is plain, because they are essentially prior*

that they have no independent existence of their own, but that—ήμεις ἀφελόντες αὐτὰ ἐν ταῖς ἡμετέραις ἐνοίαις, καθ' εαυτὰ ὑπεσήσαμεν, we ourselves abstracting them in our own Imaginations, have given them by such abstraction an existence as of themselves. *Simp. in Prædic.* p. 17. In another place he says, in a language somewhat mysterious, yet still conformable to the same doctrine—Μήποτε ἐν τριτίλον ληπτέον τὸ κοινὸν, τὸ μὲν ἔχοντας τῶν καθ' ἔκαστα, καὶ ἀιτού τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς κοινότητος, κατὰ τὴν μίαν εἴαυτη φύσιν, ὡσπερ καὶ τῆς διαφορότητος κατὰ τὴν τολμειόν τρόπον—δεύτερον δὲ ἔστι τὸ κοινὸν, τὸ ἀπὸ κοινῆς ἀιτίας τοῖς διαφόροις ἔδεστι ἐνδιδόμενον, καὶ ἐνυπάρχον ἀυτοῖς—τρίτον δέ, τὸ ἐν ταῖς ἡμετέραις διανοίαις ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως ὑφισάμενον, ὑσερογενὲς ὅν—*Perhaps therefore we must admit a TRIPLE ORDER OF WHAT IS UNIVERSAL AND THE SAME; that of the first Order, transcendent and superior to Particulars, which thro' its uniform nature is the cause of that Sameness existing in them, as thro' its multi-form pre-conception it is the cause of their Diversity—that of the second Order, what is infused from the first universal Cause into the various Species of Beings, and which has its existence in those several Species—that of the third Order, what subsists by abstraction in our own Understandings, being of subsequent origin to the other two.* *Ibid. p. 21.*

To

prior to all things else. The WHOLE VISIBLE WORLD exhibits nothing more, than
so

To *Simplicius* we shall add the two following Quotations from *Ammonius* and *Nicephorus Blemmides*, which we have ventured to transcribe, without regard to their uncommon length, as they so fully establish the Doctrine here advanced, and the works of these Authors are not easy to be procured.

Ἐνοείσθω τοίνυν δακτύλιός τις ἐκλύπωμα ἔχων, εἰ τύχοι, Ἀχιλλέως, καὶ χηρία τολλὰ ταραχείμενα· οὐ δὲ δακτύλιον σφραγίζεται τές εηράς τάντας· ὑγερον δέ τις εισελθὼν καὶ θεασάμενος τὰ χηρία, ἐπισήσας ὅτε τάντα εἰς ἐνός εἰσιν ἐκλυπάμενος, ἔχεται ταρφ' αὐτῷ τὸ ἐκλύπωμα τῇ διανοίᾳ. Ἡ τοίνυν σφραγὶς οὐ ἐν τῷ δακτύλιῳ λέγεται ΠΡΟ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ εἴναι, οὐ δὲ ἐν τοῖς χηρίοις, ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ· οὐ δέ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ τῇ ἀπομακραίνειν, ΕΠΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ, καὶ υἱερεγενής. Τέτο γὰρ ἐνοείσθω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν γενῶν καὶ ἐιδῶν· οὐ γαρ Δημιεργός, τοιῶν τάντα, ἔχει ταρφ' ἐαυτῷ τὰ τάντων ταραδείγματα· οἶν, τοιῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἔχει τὸ εῖδος ταρφ' ἐαυτῷ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, τρόπος δὲ ἀφορῶν, τάντας τοιεῖν. Εἰ δέ τις ἐνσαίν λέγων, ως ἐκ εἰσὶ ταρφὰ τῷ Δημιεργῷ τὰ τέλη, ἀκετέω ταῦτα, ως οὐ Δημιεργὸς Δημιεργεῖ, οὐ εἰδὼς τὰ ὑπ' αὐτῷ Δημιεργάμενα, οὐδὲ εἰδὼς. Αλλ' εἰ μὲν μὴ εἰδὼς, ὡς ἀν Δημιεργήσει. Τίς γαρ, μέλλων τοιόστιν τὶ, ἀγνοεῖ δι μέλλεις.

Ch.IV. so many *passing Pictures* of these *immutable Archetypes*. Nay thro' these it attains even
a Sem-

μέλλεις τωις; εἰ γὰρ, ὡς ή φύσις, ἀλόγῳ δυνάμεις τωις· (ὅθεν καὶ τωις ή φύσις, εἰκὸν ἐφισάνεσσε γνωστὸς τῷ γιγνομένῳ) Ἐι δέ τι καθ' ἔξιν λογικὴν τωις, οἶδε τις τάντως τὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπὸ αὐτῷ. Ἐι τοίνυν μὴ χάριον, η κατὰ ἀνθρώπου, ο Θεὸς τωις, οἶδε τὸ ὑπὸ αὐτῷ γιγνόμενον· εἰ δὲ δίδεις δ τωις, αὐτόθι δῆλος, εἰς ἔξιν εἰν τῷ Δημιουργῷ τὰ ἔιδη. Ἐι δέ τὸ ἔιδος εἰν τῷ Δημιουργῷ, ὡς οὐ εἰν τῷ δακτύλῳ τύπος· καὶ λέγεται τότε τὸ ἔιδος ΠΡΟ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ, καὶ χωρισθεὶς ὑλης. Ἐι δέ τὸ ἔιδος τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ εἰν τοῖς καθ' ἔκαστον ἀνθρώποις, ὡς τὰ εἰν τοῖς κηροῖς ἐκτυπώματα· καὶ λέγεται τὰ τοιάυτα ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ ἔιναι, καὶ ἀχώριστης ὑλης. Θεασάμενοι δέ τὰς κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώπους, θτι τάντες τὸ αὐτὸ δίδος τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἔχεσσι, (ὡς ἐπὶ τῷ ὑστερον ἐλθόντος, καὶ θεασαμένων τὰ κηρία) ἀνεμαξάμεθα αὐτὸ εἰν τῇ διανοίᾳ καὶ λέγεται τότε ΕΠΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ, ήγουν μετὰ τὰ τολλά, καὶ ὑερογενές. *Intelligatur annulus, qui alicuius, aucto-pote Achillis, imaginem insculptam habeat: multæ insuper cera sint, et ab annulo imprimantur: veniat deinde quip-piam, videatque ceras omnes unius annuli impressione for-matas, annulique impressionem in mente contineat: sigillum annulo insculptum, ANTE MULTA dicetur: in cerulis impreßum, in MULTIS: quod vero in illius, qui illo ve-nerat intelligentia remanserit, POST MULTA, et posto-rius*

rius genitum dicitur. Idem in generibus et formis intelligendum censeo: etenim ille optimus procreator mundi Deus, omnium rerum formas, atque exempla habet apud se: ut si hominem efficere velit, in hominis formam, quam habet, intueatur, et ad illius exemplum cæteros faciat omnes. At si quis restiterit, dicatque rerum formas apud Creatorem non esse: quæso ut diligenter attendat: Opifex, quæ facit, vel cognoscit, vel ignorat: sed is, qui nesciæ, nuncquam quicquam faciet: quis enim id facere aggreditur, quod facere ignorat? Neque enim facultate quoddam rationis experte aliquid agit, prout agit natura (ex quo confititur, ut natura etiam agat, et si quæ faciat, non advertat:) Si vero ratione quadam aliquid facit, quodcunque ab eo factum est omnino cognovit. Si igitur Deus non pejore ratione, quam homo, facit quid, quæ facit cognovit: si cognovit quæ fecit, in ipso rerum formas esse perspicuum est. Formæ autem in opifice sunt perinde ac in annulo sigillum, bæque forma ANTE MULTA, et avulsa a materiâ dicitur. Atqui hominis species in unoquoque homine est, quemadmodum etiam sigilla in ceris; et IN MULTIIS, nec avulsa a materiâ dicitur. At cum singulos homines animo conficiimus, et eandem in unoquoque formam atque effigiem videimus, illa effigies in mente nostrâ infidens POST MULTA, et posterius genita dicitur: veluti in illo quoque dicebamus, qui multa sigilla in cerâ uno et eodem annulo impressa conficerat. *Annon. in Prophyr. Introd. p. 29. b.*

Ch.IV. tinues throughout ages to be SPECIALLY

Λέγονται δὲ τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἰδη ΠΡΟ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ, ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ, ΕΠΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ· οἷον ἐνυοείσθι τι σφραγιστήριον, ἔχειν καὶ ἐκίνητα μεταλλαγές τοῦ τυχόν, ἐξ ἐκτηρίας τολλὰ μεταλλαγές ταῦτα, μὴ τροχατιδῶν μηδὲ ὅλως τὸ σφραγιστήριον· ἐφακτὸς δὲ τὰ ἐν οἷς τὸ ἐκίνητα μεταλλαγές, καὶ ἐπισήσας ὅτι τάντα, τὰς αὐτὰς μετέχοντιν ἐκίνητα μεταλλαγές, καὶ τὰ δοκεῖτα τολλὰ τῷ λόγῳ συναθροίσας εἰς ἓν, ἔχετω τέτοιο κατὰ διάνοιαν. Τὸ μὲν ἐν σφραγιστήριον τύπωμα λέγεται ΠΡΟ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ· τὸ δὲ ἐν τοῖς κηρύσσεις, ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ· τὸ δὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν καταληφθὲν, καὶ κατὰ διάνοιαν αὐλως ὑποσάν, ΕΠΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ. "Οὐτως δέν καὶ τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἰδη ΠΡΟ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ μέν εἰσιν ἐν τῷ Δημιεργῷ, κατὰ τὰς τοιηπτικὰς λόγυας· ἐν τῷ Θεῷ γαρ οἱ ἐπιοποιοὶ λόγοι τῶν ὅντων ἐνιαίως τροῦφες πάντας, καθ' ἃς λόγυες ὁ ὑπερέστι Τάκας τὰ ὅντα τάντα καὶ τροώριστες καὶ παρήγαγεν· ὑφεστηκέναι δὲ λέγονται τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἰδη ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ, διότι ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος αὐθρώποις τὸ τῷ αὐθρώπῳ εἰδός ἐστι, καὶ τοῖς κατὰ μέρος ἵπποις τὸ τῷ ἵππῳ εἰδότι· ἐν αὐθρώποις δὲ, καὶ ἵπποις, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις τὸ γένος οὐδεὶς πάντας τῶν τοιετῶν εἰδῶν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ ζῶον· καὶ τοῖς ζώοις ὅμοιος καὶ τοῖς ζωοφύτοις τὸ καθολικώτερον γένος, τὸ αἰσθητικὸν, ἔχεται δέ τοις ζωοφύτοις δὲ καὶ τῶν φυτῶν,

Θεωρεῖται τὸ ἔμψυχον εἰ δὲ σὺν τοῖς ἔμψυχοις ἔθέλει τις ἐπισκοπεῖν καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα, τὰ σῶμα σύμπαν κατόψυχαν συνδραμεσῶν δὲ τοῖς ἐρημένοις τῶν αὐτομάτων ἐστῶν, τὸ ἀράτον γένθω φανεῖται καὶ γενικώτατον· καὶ ἔτω μὲν ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ ὑφέσηκε τὰ ἕιδη καὶ τὰ γένη. Καταλαβὼν δέ τις ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώπων τὴν ἀυτῶν φύσιν, τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα, ἐκ δὲ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἵππων ἀυτὴν τὴν ἵπποτητα, καὶ ἔτω τὸν καθόλευ ἀνθρώπον, καὶ τὸν καθόλευ ἵππον ἐπινοήσας· καὶ τὸ καθόλευ ζῶον ἐκ τῶν καθέκαστα τῷ λόγῳ συναγαγών· καὶ τὸ καθόλευ αἰσθητικόν, καὶ τὸ καθόλευ ἔμψυχον, καὶ τὸ καθόλευ σῶμα, καὶ τὸν καθολικωτάτην ἐσίαν ἐξ ἀπάντων συλλογισάμενθω, ὃ τοιεῖται· ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῇ διανοίᾳ τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἴδη ἀύλως ὑπέγησεν ΕΠΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ, τατίσι, μετὰ τὰ τολλὰ καὶ ὑπερογενῶς. *Genera vero et Species dicuntur esse ANTE MULTA, IN MULTIS, POST MULTA.* Ut puta, intelligatur sigillum, quamlibet figuram habens, ex quo multæ ceræ ejusdem figuræ sint participes, et in medium aliquis has proferat, nequaquam praeviso sigillo. Cum autem vidisset eas ceras in quibus figura exprimitur, et animadvertisset omnes eandem figuram participare, et quæ videbantur multæ, ratione in unum coegeret, hoc in mente teneat. Nempe sigillum dicitur esse species ANTE MULTA; illa vero in ceris, IN MULTIS; quæ vero ab iis desumitur, et in mente immaterialiter subsistit, POST MULTA. Sic igitur et *Genera et Species ANTE MULTA in Creatore sunt, secundum rationes efficientes.*

Ch. IV. cular changes, that befal it every moment (k).

M A Y

In Deo enim rerum effectrices rationes una et simpliciter præ-existent; secundum quas rationes ille supra-substantialis omnes res et prædestinavit et produxit. Existere autem dicuntur Genera et Species IN MULTIS, quoniam in singularibus hominibus hominis Species, et in singulari equis equi Species est. In hominibus atque ac in equis et aliis animalibus Genus invenitur harum specierum, quod est animal. In animalibus etiam una cum Zoophytis magis universale Genus, siempe sensitivum exquiritur. Additis vero plantis, spectatur Genus animalium. Si vero una cum animali quisquam velit perscrutari etiam inanimata, totum Corpus perspiciet. Cum autem entia incorporea conjuncta fuerint iis modo tractatis, apparebit primum et generalissimum Genus. Atque ita quidem IN MULTIS subsuntur Genera et Species. Comprehendens vero quisquam ex singularibus hominibus naturam ipsam humanam, et ex singulari equi ipsam equinam, atque ita universalem hominem et universalem equum considerans, et universale animal ex singulari ratione colligens, et universale sensitivum, et universale animatum, et universale corpus, et maximè universale ens ex omnibus colligens, hic, inquam, in suâ mente Genera et Species immaterialiter constituit ΕΠΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΔΑΙΣ, hoc est, POST MULTA, et posterius genita. Nic. ceph. Blem. Log. Epit. p. 62. Vid. etiam Alcin. in Platonic. Philosoph. Introd. C. IX. X.

(k) The following elegant Lines of *Virgil* are worth attending to, tho' applied to no higher a subject than Bees.

MAY we be allowed then to credit those Ch. IV.
speculative Men, who tell us, "it is in
"these

*Ergo ipsas quamvis angusti terminus ævi
Excipiat: (neque enim plus septima ducitur ætas)*

AT GENUS IMMORTALE MANET — G. IV.

The same *Immortality*, that is, the *Immortality of the Kind*, may be seen in all *perishable* substances, whether animal or inanimate; for tho' *Individuals perish*, the *several Kinds still remain*. And hence, if we take *TIME*, as denoting the *system of things temporary*, we may collect the meaning of that passage in the *Timæus*, where the Philosopher describes *TIME* to be — *μίνοντος άιώνος* *ἐν* *ἐνὶ* *χαρ' αριθμὸν* *ισταν* *αιώνιον* *έκχοντα.* *Æternitatis in uno permanentis Imaginem quandam, certis numerorum articulis progredientem.* *Plat. V. III. p. 37.* *Edit. Serran.*

We have subjoined the following extract from *Boethius*, to serve as a commentary on this description of *TIME*. — *ÆTERNITAS* igitur est, interminabilis *vita* *tota simul et perfecta posse*ssio. *Quod ex collatione temporaliūm clarius liquet.* Nam quidquid vivit in *TEMPORE*, id *præsens* à *præteritis* in *futura* procedit: *nihilque* est in *tempore* ita *constitutum*, *quod totum* *vita* *suæ* *spatium* *pariter* *possit* *amplecti*; *sed* *crastinum* *quidem* *hondum* *apprehendit*, *hæsternum* *vero* *jam* *perdidit.* *In* *hodiernâ* *quaque* *vita* *non* *amplius* *vivit*; *quam* *in* *illo* *mobili* *transitorioque*.

Ch.IV. "these permanent and comprehensive FORMS
 "that THE DEITY views at once, without
 "looking abroad, all possible productions
 "both present, past, and future—that this
 "great and stupendous View is but a View
 "of himself, where all things lie enveloped
 "in their Principles and Exemplars, as be-
 "ing

momento. Quod igitur Temporis patitur conditionem, licet illud, sicut de mundo consuit Aristoteles, nec cœperit unquam esse, nec defensat, vitaque ejus cum temporis infinitate tendatur, nondum tamen tale est, ut aeternum esse jure credatur. Non enim totum simul infinitum licet vita spatiū comprehendit, atque complectitur, sed futura nondum transacta jam non habet. Quod igitur interminabilis vita plenitudinem totam pariter comprehendit, ac possidet, cui neque futuri quidquam absit, nec præteriti fluxeret, id AETERNUM esse jure perhibetur: idque necesse est, et sui compos præsens sibi semper affistere, et infinitatem mobilis temporis habere præsentem. Unde quidam non reuelè, qui cum audiunt vixum Platoni, mundum hunc nec habuisse initium, nec habiturum esse defectum, hoc modo conditori conditum mundum fieri co-aeternum putant. Aliud est enim PER INTERMINABILEM DUCI VITAM, (quod Mundo Plato tribuit) aliud INTERMINABILIS VITÆ TOTAM PARITER COMPLEXAM ESSE PRÆSENTIAM, quod Divinæ Mantis proprium esse manifestum est. Neque enim

Deus

“*ing essential to the fulness of his universal* Ch.IV.
 “*Intellection?*”—If so, it will be proper
 that we invert the Axiom before men-
 tioned. We must now say—*Nil est in*
SENSU, quod non prius fuit in INTELLEC-
TU. For tho’ the contrary may be true
 with respect to Knowledge *merely human*,
 yet never can it be true with respect to

Cc 4

Know-

*Deus conditis rebus antiquior videri debet temporis quanti-
 tate, sed simplicis potius proprietate naturæ. HUNC
 ENIM VITÆ IMMOBILIS PRÆSENTARIUM STA-
 TUM, INFINITUS. ILLE TEMPORALIUM RERUM
 MOTUS IMITATUR; cumque cum effingere, atque æquare
 non possit, ex immobilitate deficit in motum; ex simplicitate
 præsentie decrescit in infinitam futuri ac præteriti quanti-
 tatem; et, cum totam pariter vitæ suæ plenitudinem ne-
 queat possidere, hoc ipso, quod aliqua modo nunquam esse
 definit, illud, quod implere atque exprimere non potest,
 aliquatenus videtur æmulari, alligans se ad qualemunque
 præsentiam. hujus exigui volucrisque momenti: quæ, quo-
 riæ MANENTIB. ILLIUS PRÆSENTIÆ QUANDAM
 GESTAT IMAGINEM, quibuscumque contigerit, id præ-
 stat, ut ESSE videantur. Quoniam vero manere non po-
 nit, infinitum Temporis iter arripuit: eoque modo factum
 est, ut CONTINUARET VITAM EUNDO, cuius plen-
 tudinem complecti non valuit PERMĀNENDO. Itaque,
 &c. De Consolat. Philosoph. L. V.*

Ch.IV. Knowlege universally, *unless we give Pre-*
~~—~~ *cedence to ATOMS and LIFELESS BODY,*
making MIND, among other things, to be
struck out by a lucky Concourse.

§ 3. IT is far from the design of this Treatise, to insinuate that Atheism is the Hypothesis of our latter Metaphysicians. But yet it is somewhat remarkable, in their several Systems, how readily they admit of the above *Precedence*.

FOR mark the Order of things, according to their account of them. First comes that huge Body *the sensible World*. Then this and its Attributes beget *sensible Ideas*. Then out of sensible Ideas, by a kind of lopping and pruning, are made *Ideas intelligible, whether specific or general*. Thus should they admit that MIND was coeval with BODY, yet *till BODY gave it Ideas*, and awakened its dormant Powers, it could at best have been nothing more.

more, than a sort of dead Capacity; for Ch. IV.
INNATE IDEAS it could not possibly have ~~any~~
any.

AT another time we hear of Bodies so exceedingly fine, that their very Exility makes them susceptible of *sensation* and *knowledge*; as if they shrunk into *Intellect* by their exquisite subtlety, which rendered them too delicate to be Bodies any longer. It is to this notion we owe many curious inventions, such as *subtle Æther*, *animal Spirits*, *nervous Ducts*, *Vibrations*, and the like; Terms, which MODERN PHILOSOPHY, upon parting with *occult Qualities*, has found expedient to provide itself, to supply their place.

BUT the *intellectual Scheme*, which never forgets Deity, postpones every thing corporeal to the *primary mental Cause*. It is here it looks for the origin of *intelligible Ideas*, even of those, which exist in *human Capacities*. For tho' *sensible Objects* may be

Ch. IV. be the destined medium, to awaken the dormant Energies of Man's Understanding, yet are those Energies themselves no more contained in *Sense*, than the Explosion of a Cannon, in the Spark which gave it fire (1).

IN

(1) The following Note is taken from a Manuscript Commentary of the *Platonic Olympiodorus*, (quoted before, p. 371;) upon the *Phedo* of *Plato*; tho' perhaps some may object to from inclining to the Doctrine of *Platonic Reminiscence*, yet it certainly gives a better account how far the *Senses* assist in the acquisition of *Science*, than we can find given by vulgar Philosophers.

Οὐδέποτε γὰρ τὰς χειρίδες καὶ δεύτερα ἀρχαὶ οὐ αἵτιας
ἴσται τῶν πρεπτῶν. οὐ δέ τοι καὶ ταῖς ἐγκυκλίοις ἐκπυγ-
εσσι τείλεσθαι; καὶ ἀρχὴν ἐπειν τὸν αἰσθητικὸν τὸν ἐπιστή-
μαν, λέξομεν ἀντὶν ἀρχὴν ἡνίκα ὡς αἰσθητικὸν, ἀλλὰ ὡς
ἐρεθίζομεν τὸν ἡμεῖραν ψυχὴν εἰς αὐτάμυνσιν τῶν καθόν-
των κατὰ τούτην δὲ τὸν ἐννοίαν ἐργταὶ καὶ τὸ ἐν Τι-
μαῖῳ, διὰ δι' θύμου καὶ ἀληθεῖας τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἐπο-
ρίταρεν γένος, διότι ἐκ τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰς αὐτάμυνσιν
ἀφικνέεθα. Those things, which are inferior and se-
condary, are by no means the Principles or Causes of the
more excellent; and tho' we admit the common interpreta-
tions, and allow *SENSE* to be a *Principle* of *SCIENCE*,
we must however call it a *Principle*, not as if it was the
efficient

IN short ALL MINDS, that are, are SIMILAR and CONGENIAL; and so too are their

efficient Causes, but as it rouses our Soul to the Recollection of general Ideas—According to the same way of thinking is it said in the Timæus, that through the Sight and Hearing we acquire to ourselves Philosophy, because we pass from Objects of SENSE to REMINISCENCE or RECOLLECTION.

And in another passage he observes—Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ πάμφορφον ἀγαλμά ἐγίν οὐ ψυχὴ, πάντων τῶν ὄντων ἔχοντα λόγυς, ἐριθίζομένη. ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀναμιμετρίσκεται ὡς ἔνδον ἔχει λόγια, καὶ τάτις προβάλλεται. For in as much as the SOUL, by containing the Principles of all Beings, is a sort of OMNIFORM REPRESENTATION or EXEMPLAR; when it is roused by objects of Sense, it recollects those Principles, which it contains within, and brings them forth.

Georgius Gemistus, otherwise called Pletno, writes upon the same subject in the following manner. Τὴν ψυχὴν φασὶν οἱ τα ἔιδη τιθέμενοι ἀναλαμβάνεσσαν ἐσγείπιενταν τὰς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς λόγιας, ἀκριβέστερον ἀντεῖς ἔχοντας καὶ τελεώτερον ἐν ἑαυτῇ ἔχειν, οὐ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἔχονται. Τὸ δὲ τελεώτερον τέτο καὶ ἀκριβέστερον εἰκὸν ἀν αἴσθητῶν ἔχειν τὴν ψυχὴν, οὐγε μὴ ἐγίν ἐν αὐτοῖς. Οὐ δὲ αὐτὸν μηδαμὲν ἀλλόθι ἐν αὐτὴν ἐξ αὐτῆς διανοεῖσθαι.

Ch.IV. *their Ideas, or intelligible Forms. Were*
 it otherwise, there could be no intercourse
 between

νοεῖσθαι: ἐδὲ γὰρ τεφυκέναι τὸν ψυχὴν μιδαμῆ ὅν, τὰ
 διανοεῖσθαι: τὰς γὰρ ψευδεῖς τῶν δοξῶν ἐχὶ μὴ ὄντων
 ἀλλ' ὄντων μὲν, ἀλλων δὲ κατ' ἄλλων ἔνται συνθέσεις
 τινὰς, καὶ κατὰ τὸ ὄρθον γινομένας. Λέπεσθαι δὲ αὐτὸν
 ἔτερας τινὸς φύσεως τολμῷ ἔτι κρείτιονός τε καὶ τελεωτέ-
 ρας ἀφίκειν τὴν ψυχὴν τὸ τελεώτερον τύπο τῶν ἐν τοῖς
 αἰσθητοῖς λόγων. *Those who suppose IDEAL FORMS,*
say that the Soul, when she assumes, for the purposes of
Science, those Proportions, which exist in sensible objects,
possesses them with a superior accuracy and perfection, than
that to which they attain in those sensible objects. Now
this superior Perfection or Accuracy the Soul cannot have
from sensible objects, as it is in fact not in them; nor yet
can she conceive it herself as from herself, without its
having existence any where else. For the Soul is not
formed so as to conceive that, which has existence no where,
since even such opinions, as are false, are all of them com-
positions irregularly formed, not of mere Non-Beings, but
of various real Beings, one with another. It remains
therefore that this Perfection, which is superior to the
Proportions existing in sensible objects, must descend to the
Soul from SOME OTHER NATURE, WHICH IS BY
MANY DEGREES MORE EXCELLENT AND PERFECT.
Pleth. de Aristote. et Platonic. Philosoph. Diff. Edit.
Paris 1541.

The ΛΟΓΟΙ or PROPORTIONS, of which Ge-
 mistus here speaks, mean not only those relative Pro-
 portions

between Man and Man, or (what is more Ch. IV.
important) between Man and God.

FOR

portions of *Equality* and *Inequality*, which exist in *Quantity*, (such as double, sesquialter, &c.) but in a larger sense, they may be extended to mathematical *Lines*, *Angles*, *Figures*, &c, of all which *Ἄόγοις* or *Proportions*, tho' we possess in the *Mind* the most clear and precise Ideas, yet it may be justly questioned, whether any one of them ever existed in the *sensible* World.

To these two Authors we may add *Boethius*, who, after having enumerated many acts of the *MIND* or *INTELLECT*, wholly distinct from *Sensation*, and independent of it, at length concludes,

*Hæc est efficiens magis
Longè caussa potentior,
Quam quæ materiæ modo
Impressas patitur notas.
Præcedit tamen excitans,
Ac vires animi movens,
Vivo in corpore passio.
Cum vel lux oculos ferit,
Vel vox auribus instrepit;
Tum MENTIS VIGOR excitus,
QUAS INTUS SPECIES TENET,
Ad motus simileis vocans,
Notis applicat exteris,
INTRORSUMQUE RECONDITIS
FORMIS miscet imagines.*

De Consolat. Philosoph. L. V.

Ch. IV. For what is Conversation between Man and Man?—It is a mutual intercourse of *Speaking* and *Hearing*.—To the Speaker, it is *to teach*; to the Hearer, it is *to learn*.—To the Speaker, it is *to descend* from *Ideas* to *Words*; to the Hearer, it is *to ascend* from *Words* to *Ideas*.—If the Hearer, in this ascent, can arrive at *no Ideas*, then is he said *not to understand*; if he ascend to Ideas dissimilar and heterogeneous, then is he said *to misunderstand*.—What then is requisite, that he may be said *to understand*?—That he should ascend to certain Ideas, treasured up *within himself*, correspondent and similar to those *within the Speaker*. The same may be said of a *Writer* and a *Reader*; as when any one reads to-day or to-morrow, or here or in *Italy*, what *Euclid* wrote in *Greece* two thousand years ago.

Now is it not marvelous, there should be *so exact an Identity of our Ideas*, if they were

were only generated from *sensible Objects*, Ch. IV, infinite in number, ever changing, distant in Time, distant in Place, and no one Particular the same with any other?

AGAIN, do we allow it possible for *God* to signify his *will* to Men; or for *MEN* to signify their *wants* to *God*?—In both these cases there must be *an Identity of Ideas*, or else nothing is done either one way or the other. Whence then do these **COMMON IDENTIC IDEAS** come?—Those of *Men*, it seems, come all from *Sensation*. And whence come *God's Ideas*?—Not surely from *Sensation* too; for this we can hardly venture to affirm, without giving to *Body* that *notable Precedence of being prior to the Intellection of even God himself*.—Let them then be *original*; let them be *connate*, and *essential to the divine Mind*.—If this be true, is it not a fortunate Event, that *Ideas of corporeal rise, and others of mental, (things derived from subjects so totally distinct)*

Ch. IV. *thet*) should so happily co-incide in the same
~~same~~ wonderful Identity?

HAD we not better reason thus upon so abstruse a Subject?—Either all MINDS have their Ideas *derived*; or all have them *original*; or *some have them original, and some derived*. If all Minds have them *derived*, they must be derived from something, *which is itself not Mind*, and thus we fall insensibly into a kind of Atheism. If all have them *original*, then are all *Minds divine*, an Hypothesis by far more plausible than the former. But if this be not admitted, then must *one Mind* (at least) have *original Ideas*, and the rest have them *derived*. Now supposing this last, whence are those Minds, whose Ideas are derived, most likely to derive them?—From MIND, or from BODY?—From MIND, a thing *homogeneous*; or from BODY, a thing *beterogeneous*? From MIND, such as (from the Hypothesis) has *original*

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original Ideas; or from BODY, which we Ch. IV. cannot discover to have any Ideas at all? (1)—An Examination of this kind, pursued with accuracy and temper, is the most probable method of solving these doubts. It is thus we shall be enabled with more assurance to decide, whether we are to admit the Doctrine of the Epicurean Poet,

CORPOREA NATURA *animum confare,*
animamque;

or trust the Mantuan Bard, when he sings in divine numbers,

Igneus est ollis vigor, et CÆLESTIS ORIGO
Seminibus.—

BUT

(1) ΝΟΥΝ δὲ σὸν ΣΩΜΑ γεννᾷ· τῶς γὰρ ἀνοίκητα ΝΟΥΝ γεννήσοι; No BODY produces MIND: for how should THINGS DEVOID OF MIND produce MIND? *Sallust de Diis et Mundo*, c. 8.

D d

Ch.IV. But it is now time, to quit these Speculations. Those, who would trace them farther, and have leisure for such studies, may perhaps find themselves led into regions of Contemplation, affording them prospects both interesting and pleasant. We have at present said as much as was requisite to our Subject, and shall therefore pass from hence to our concluding chapter.

C H A P. V.

Subordination of Intelligence—Difference of Ideas, both in particular Men, and in whole Nations—Different Genius of different Languages—Character of the English, the Oriental, the Latin, and the Greek Languages—Superlative Excellence of the Last—Conclusion.

ORIGINAL TRUTH (a), having the Ch. V. most intimate connection with the ~~supreme~~ Intelligence, may be said (as it were) to

(a) Those Philosophers, whose Ideas of *Being* and *Knowledge* are derived from *Body* and *Sensation*, have a short method to explain the nature of TRUTH. It is a *facititious* thing, made by every man for himself; which comes and goes, just as it is remembered and forgot; which in the order of things makes its appearance *the last* of any, being not only subsequent to *sensible* Objects, but even to our *Sensations* of them. According to this Hypothesis, there are many Truths, which have been, and are no longer; others, that will be, and have

Ch. V. to shine with unchangeable splendor, enlightening throughout the Universe every possible Subject, by nature susceptible of its benign influence, Passions and other obstacles may prevent indeed its efficacy, as clouds and vapours may obscure the Sun ; but it self neither admits *Diminution*, nor *Change*, because the Darkness respects only particular Percipients. Among these therefore we must look for ignorance and

not been yet ; and multitudes, that possibly may never exist at all.

But there are other Reasoners, who must surely have had very different notions ; those I mean, who represent TRUTH not as the *last*, but the *first* of Beings ; who call it *immutable, eternal, omnipresent* ; Attributes, that all indicate something more than human. To these it must appear somewhat strange, how men should imagine, that a crude account of the method *how they perceive* Truth, was to pass for an account of *Truth itself* ; as if to describe the road to *London*, could be called a Description of that Metropolis.

For my own part, when I read the detail about Sensation and Reflection, and am taught the process at large how my Ideas are all generated, I seem to view the

and error, and for that *Subordination* of Ch. V. *Intelligence*, which is their natural consequence.

WE have daily experience in the Works of ART, that a *partial Knowledge* will suffice for *Contemplation*, tho' we know not enough, to profess ourselves Artists. Much more is this true, with respect to NATURE; and well for mankind is it found

D d 3 to

the human Soul in the light of a Crucible, where Truths are produced by a kind of logical Chemistry. They may consist (for aught we know) of *natural materials*, but are as much *creatures of our own*, as a Bolus or Elixir.

If Milton by his URANIA intended to represent TRUTH, he certainly referred her to a much more ancient, as well as a far more noble origin.

—Heav'ly born!
Before the hills appear'd, or fountains flow'd,
Thou with eternal Wisdom didst converse,
Wisdom thy Sister; and with her didst play
In presence of th' almighty Father, pleas'd
With thy celestial Song. — P. L. VII.

See Proverbs VIII. 22, &c. Jeremiah X. 10. Mart. Antonin. IX. 1.

Ch. V. to be true, else never could we attain any
 natural Knowledge at all. For if the *constitutive Proportions* of a Clock are so subtle, that few conceive them truly, but the Artist himself; what shall we say to *those seminal Proportions*, which make the essence and character of every natural Subject?—Partial views, the Imperfections of Sense; Inattention, Idleness, the turbulence of Passions; Education, local Sentiments, Opinions, and Belief, conspire in many instances to furnish us with Ideas, some *too general*, some *too partial*, and (what is worse than all this) with many that are *erroneous*, and contrary to Truth. These it behoves us to correct as far as possible, by cool suspense and candid examination.

Νῆφε, καὶ μέμνηστι ἀπιστεῖν, ἀρθρα ταῦτα
 τῶν Φρεγῶν.

AND thus by a connection perhaps little expected, the Cause of LETTERS, and that

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that of VIRTUE appear to co-incide, it Ch. V.
being the business of both to examine our Ideas,
and to amend them by the Standard
of Nature and of Truth (b).

IN this important Work, we shall be led to observe, how Nations, like single Men, have their *peculiar* Ideas; how these *peculiar* Ideas become THE GENIUS OF THEIR LANGUAGE, since the *Symbol* must of course correspond to its *Archetype* (c);

D d 4 how

(b) How useful to ETHIC SCIENCE, and indeed to KNOWLEDGE in general, a GRAMMATICAL DISQUISITION into the *Etymology* and *Meaning* of WORDS was esteemed by the chief and ablest Philosophers, may be seen by consulting *Plato* in his *Cratylus*; *Xenoph. Mem.* IV. 5. 6. *Arrian. Epict. I.* 17. II. 10. *Marc. Anton.* III. 11. V. 8. X. 8.

(c) ΗΘΟΤΣ ΧΑΡΑΚΤΗΡ ἵς, τ' ἀνθεώτι
ΛΟΓΟΣ. Stob. *Capiuntur Signa haud levia, sed obser-*
vatu digna (quad fortasse quispiam non putarit) de ingeniosis
et moribus populorum et nationum ex linguis ipsorum. Ba-

Ch. V. how the *wisest* Nations, having the *most* and *best Ideas*, will consequently have the *best* and *most copious Languages*; how others, whose Languages are motley and compounded, and who have borrowed from different countries different Arts and Practices, discover by WORDS, to whom they are indebted for THINGS.

To illustrate what has been said, by a few examples. WE BRITONS in our time have been remarkable borrowers, as our *multiform* Language may sufficiently shew. Our Terms in *polite Literature* prove, that this came from *Greece*; our Terms in *Music* and *Painting*, that these came from *Italy*; our Phrases in *Cookery* and *War*, that we learnt these from the *French*; and our Phrases in *Navigation*, that we were taught by the *Flemings* and *Low Dutch*. These many and very different Sources of our Language may be the cause, why it is so deficient in *Regularity* and *Analogy*. Yet we have this advantage to compensate the defect,

defect, that what we want in *Elegance*, Ch. V.
we gain in *Copiousness*, in which last re-
spect few Languages will be found supe-
rior to our own.

LET US PASS FROM OURSELVES TO THE NATIONS OF THE EAST. The (*d*) Eastern World, from the earliest days, has been at all times the Seat of enormous Monarchy. On its natives fair Liberty never shed its genial influence. If at any time civil Discords arose among them (and arise there did innumerable) the contest was never about, *the Form of their Government*; (for this was an object, of which the Combatants had no conception;) it was all from the poor motive of, *who should be their Master*, whether

(*d*) Διαὶ γὰρ τὸ δελικώτεροι εἶναι τὰ ἡθι ἐι μετ
Βάρβαροι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ασίαν τῶν περὶ
τὴν Ευρώπην, ὑπομένειν τὴν δεσποτικὴν ἀρχὴν, ὃδε
δυχεραινούντες. *For the Barbarians by being more slaves in their Manners than the Greeks, and those of Asia than those of Europe, submit to despotic Government without murmuring or discontent.* Arist. Polit. III. 4.

Ch. V. whether a *Cyrus* or an *Artaxerxes*, a ~~Ma-~~
~~bonet~~ or a *Muslapba*.

SUCH was their Condition, and what was the consequence?—Their Ideas became consonant to their servile State, and their Words became consonant to their servile Ideas. The great Distinction, for ever in their sight, was that of *Tyrant* and *Slave*; the most unnatural one conceivable, and the most susceptible of pomp, and empty exaggeration. Hence they talked of Kings as Gods, and of themselves, as the meanest and most abject Reptiles. Nothing was either great or little in moderation, but every Sentiment was heightened by incredible Hyperbole. Thus tho' they sometimes ascended into the *Great* and *Magnificent* (2), they as frequently degenerated

(2) The truest Sublime of the East may be found in the Scriptures, of which perhaps the principal cause is the intrinsic Greatness of the Subjects there treated; the Creation of the Universe, the Dispensations of divine Providence, &c.

gerated into the *Tumid* and *Bombast*. The Ch. V.
Greeks *too of Asia* became infected by their
neighbours, who were often at times not
only their neighbours, but their masters ;
and hence that *Luxuriance of the Asiatic Stile*, unknown to the chaste eloquence
and purity of *Athens*. But of the *Greeks* we
forbear to speak now, as we shall speak of
them more fully, when we have first consi-
dered the *Nature or Genius of the Romans*.

AND what sort of People may we pro-
nounce the *Romans*?—A Nation engaged
in wars and commotions, some foreign,
some domestic, which for seven hun-
dred years wholly engrossed their thoughts.
Hence therefore their *LANGUAGE* be-
came, *like their Ideas*, copious in all Terms
expressive of things *political*, and well
adapted to the purposes both of *History*
and *popular Eloquence*.—But what was
their *Philosophy*?—As a Nation, it was
none, if we may credit their ablest *Writers*.
And hence the *Unfitness of their Language*
to

Ch. V. to this Subject; a defect, which even Cicero is compelled to confess, and more fully makes appear, when he writes Philosophy himself, from the number of terms, which he is obliged to invent (f). Virgil seems

(f) See *Cic. de Fin.* I. C. 1, 2, 3. III. C. 1, 2, 4, &c. but in particular *Tusc. Disp.* I. 3. where he says, *PHILOSOPHIA jacuit usque ad hanc etatem, nec ullum habuit lumen LITERARUM LATINARUM; quæ illystranda et excitanda nobis est; ut si, &c.* See also *Tusc. Disp.* IV. 3. and *Acad.* I. 2. where it appears, that 'till Cicero applied himself to the writing of *Philosophy*, the Romans had nothing of the kind in their language, except some mean performances of *Amanius* the *Epicurean*, and others of the same sect. How far the Romans were indebted to Cicero for *Philosophy*, and with what industry, as well as eloquence, he cultivated the Subject, may be seen not only from the titles of those Works that are now lost, but much more from the many noble ones still fortunately preserved.

The *Epicurean Poet Lucretius*, who flourished nearly at the same time, seems by his silence to have over-looked the *Latin* writers of his own sect; deriving all his *Philosophy*, as well as *Cicero*, from *Grecian Sources*; and, like him, acknowledging the difficulty of writing in *Philosophy in Latin*, both from the *Poverty* of the Tongue, and from the *Novelty* of the Subject.

Nec

seems to have judged the most truly of his Countrymen, when admitting their inferiority in the more elegant Arts, he concludes at last with his usual majesty,

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*Nec me animi fallit, GRAIORUM obscura reperta
Difficile inlustrare LATINIS versibus esse,
(Multa novis rebus præstertim quom sit agendum,) Propter EGESTATEM LINGUÆ et RERUM NO-
VITATEM : Sed tua me virtus tamen, et sperata voluptas
Suavis amicitia quemvis perferre laborem
Suadet — Lucr. I. 137.*

In the same age, VARRO, among his numerous works, wrote some in the way of *Philosophy*; as did the Patriot BRUTUS, a *Treatise concerning Virtue*, much applauded by Cicero; but these Works are now lost.

Soon after the writers above mentioned came HORACE, some of whose Satires and Epistles may be justly ranked amongst the most valuable pieces of *Latin Philosophy*, whether we consider the purity of their Stile, or the great Address, with which they treat the Subject.

After Horace, tho' with as long an interval as from the days of Augustus to those of Nero, came the Satirist Persius, the friend and disciple of the Stoic Cornutus; to whose precepts as he did honour by his virtuous life,

10

Ch. V.

*Tu regere imperio populos, Ro-
mane, memento,
(Hæ tibi erunt artes) pacisque imponere
morem,
Parcere subjectis, et debellare superbos.*

FROM

so his works, tho' small, shew an early proficiency in the Science of Morals. Of him it may be said, that he is almost the single *difficult* writer among the *Latin Classics*, whose meaning has sufficient merit, to make it worth while to labour thro' his obscurities.

In the same degenerate and tyrannic period, lived also SENECA; whose character, both as a Man and a Writer, is discussed with great accuracy by the noble Author of the *Characteristics*, to whom we refer.

Under a milder Dominion, that of Hadrian and the *Antonines*, lived AULUS GELLIUS, or (as some call him) AGELLIUS, an entertaining Writer in the miscellaneous way; well skilled in Criticism and Antiquity; who tho' he can hardly be entitled to the name of a *Philosopher*, yet deserves not to pass unmentioned here, from the curious fragments of Philosophy interspersed in his works.

With *Aulus Gellius* we range MACROBIUS, not because a Contemporary, (for he is supposed to have lived

FROM considering *the Romans*, let us
pass to THE GREEKS. THE Grecian
COMMON-

under *Hondrius* and *Theodosius*) but from his near resemblance, in the character of a Writer. His Works, like the other's, are miscellaneous; filled with Mythology and antient Literature, some Philosophy being intermixed. His Commentary upon the *Somnium Scipionis* of *Cicero* may be considered as wholly of the *philosophical* kind.

In the same age with *Andus Gellius*, flourished **APULEIUS** of *Madaura* in *Africa*, a *Platonic* Writer, whose Matter in general far exceeds his perplexed and affected Stile, too conformable to the false Rhetoric of the Age when he lived.

Of the same Country, but of a later Age, and a harsher Stile, was **MARTIANUS CAPELLA**, if indeed he deserve not the name rather of a *Philologist*, than of a *Philosopher*.

After *Capella*, we may rank **CHALCIDIUS** the *Platonic*, tho' both his Age, and Country, and Religion are doubtful. His manner of writing is rather more agreeable than that of the two preceding; nor does he appear to be their inferior in the knowledge of Philosophy, his work being a laudable Commentary upon the *Timaeus of Plato*.

The

Ch. V. COMMONWEALTHS, while they maintained their Liberty, were the most heroic Confederacy, that ever existed. They were the

The last *Latin* Philosopher was *Boethius*, who was descended from some of the noblest of the *Roman* Families, and was Consul in the beginning of the sixth Century. He wrote many philosophical Works, the greater part in the *Logical* way. But his *Ethic* piece, *On the Consolation of Philosophy*, and which is partly prose, and partly verse, deserves great encomiums both for the Matter, and for the Stile; in which last he approaches the Purity of a far better age than his own, and is in all respects preferable to those crabbed *Africans* already mentioned. By command of *Theodoric* king of the *Goths*, it was the hard fate of this worthy Man to suffer death; with whom the *Latin Tongue*, and the last remains of *Roman Dignity*, may be said to have sunk in the western World.

There were other *Romans*, who left *Philosophical* Writings; such as *Musonius Rufus*, and the two Emperors, *Marcus Antoninus* and *Julian*; but as these preferred the use of the *Greek Tongue* to their own, they can hardly be considered among the number of *Latin* Writers.

And so much (by way of sketch) for THE LATIN AUTHORS OF PHILOSOPHY; a small number for so vast an Empire, if we consider them as all the product of near six successive centuries.

the politest, the bravest, and the wisest of men. In the short space of little more than a Century, they became such Statesmen, Warriors, Orators, Historians, Physicians, Poets, Critics, Painters, Sculptors, Architects, and (last of all) Philosophers, that one can hardly help considering THAT GOLDEN PERIOD, as a Providential Event in honour of human Nature, to shew to what perfection the Species might ascend (g).

Now

(g) If we except *Homer*, *Hesiod*, and the *Lyric Poets*, we hear of few *Grecian* Writers before the expedition of *Xerxes*. After that Monarch had been defeated, and the dread of the *Persian* power was at an end, the **EF-FULGENCE OF GRECIAN GENIUS** (if I may use the expression) broke forth, and shone till the time of *Alexander the Macedonian*, after whom it disappeared, and never rose again. This is that *Golden Period* spoken of above. I do not mean that *Greece* had not many writers of great merit subsequent to that period, and especially of the philosophic kind; but the *Great*, the *Striking*, the *Sublime* (call it as you please) attained at that time to a height, to which it never could ascend in any after age.

E. e

The

Ch. V. Now THE LANGUAGE OF THESE
GREEKS was truly like themselves, it was
con-

The same kind of fortune befel the people of *Rome*. When the *Punic* wars were ended, and *Carthage* their dreaded Rival was no more, then (as *Horace* informs us) they began to cultivate the politer arts. It was soon after this, their great Orators, and Historians, and Poets arose, and *Rome*, like *Greece*, had her *Golden Period*, which lasted to the death of *Octavius Cæsar*.

I call these two Periods, from the two greatest Geniuses that flourished in each, one THE SOCRATIC PERIOD, the other THE CICERONIAN.

There are still farther analogies subsisting between them. Neither Period commenced, as long as solicitude for the common welfare engaged men's attentions, and such wars impended, as threatened their destruction by Foreigners and Barbarians. But when once these fears were over, a general security soon ensued, and instead of attending to the arts of defence and self-preservation, they began to cultivate those of Elegance and Pleasure. Now, as these naturally produced a kind of wanton insolence (not unlike the vicious temper of high-fed animals) so by this the bands of union were insensibly dissolved. Hence then among
the

conformable to their transcendent and Ch. V.
universal Genius. Where Matter, so
abounded,

the Greeks that fatal *Peloponnesian* War, which together with other wars, its immediate consequence, broke the confederacy of their Commonwealths; wasted their strength; made them jealous of each other; and thus paved a way for the contemptible kingdom of *Macedon* to enslave them all, and ascend in a few years to universal Monarchy.

A like luxuriance of prosperity sowed discord among the *Romans*; raised those unhappy contests between the *Senate* and the *Gracchi*; between *Sylla* and *Marius*; between *Pompey* and *Cæsar*; till at length, after the last struggle for Liberty by those brave Patriots *Brutus* and *Cassius* at *Philippi*, and the subsequent defeat of *Anthony* at *Albium*, the *Romans* became subject to the dominion of a FELLOW-CITIZEN.

It must indeed be confessed, that after *Alexander* and *Ottavius* had established their Monarchies, there were many bright Geniuses, who were eminent under their Government. *Aristotle* maintained a friendship and epistolary correspondence with *Alexander*. In the time of the same Monarch lived *Theophrastus*, and the Cynic, *Diogenes*. Then also *Demosthenes* and *Aeschines* spoke their two celebrated Orations. So likewise in the time of *Ottavius*, *Virgil* wrote his *Eneid*, and with

Ch. V. abounded, Words followed of course, and those exquisite in every kind, as the Ideas for which they stood. And hence it followed, there was not a Subject to be found, which could not with propriety be expressed in *Greek*.

HERE were Words and Numbers for the Humour of an *Aristophanes*; for the native

Horace, *Varius*, and many other fine Writers, partook of his protection and royal munificence. But then it must be remembered, that these men were bred and educated in the principles of a free Government. It was hence they derived that high and manly spirit, which made them the admiration of after-ages. The Successors and Forms of Government left by *Alexander* and *Otho*, soon stopt the growth of any thing farther in the kind. So true is that noble saying of *Longinus*—
 Θρέψαι τε γὰρ ἵκανή τὰ φρονήματα τῶν μεγαλοφρόνων
 ἢ ΕΛΕΤΘΕΡΙΑ, καὶ ἐπελπίσαι, καὶ ἄμα διώθειν τὰ
 ἀρόθυμον τῆς ἀρεθεῖς ἀλλήλων ἔριδος, καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ
 πρωτεῖα φιλοτιμίας. It is LIBERTY that is formed to
 nurse the sentiments of great Geniuses; to inspire them with
 hope; to push forward the propensity of contest one with
 another, and the generous emulation of being the first in rank.
 De Subl. Sect. 44.

native Elegance of a *Philemon* or *Menander*; for the amorous Strains of a *Mimnermus* or *Sappho*; for the rural Lays of a *Theocritus* or *Bion*; and for the sublime Conceptions of a *Sophocles* or *Homer*. The same in Prose. Here *Isocrates* was enabled to display his Art, in all the accuracy of Periods, and the nice counterpoise of Diction. Here *Demosthenes* found materials for that nervous Composition, that manly force of unaffected Eloquence, which rushed, like a torrent, too impetuous to be withheld.

Who were more different in exhibiting their *Philosophy*, than *Xenophon*, *Plato*, and his disciple, *Aristotle*? Different, I say, in their character of Composition; for as to their *Philosophy* itself, it was in reality *the same*. *Aristotle*, strict, methodic, and orderly; subtle in Thought; sparing in Ornament; with little address to the Passions or Imagination; but exhibiting the whole with

Ch. V. such a pregnant brevity, that in every sentence we seem to read a page. How exquisitely is this all performed *in Greek*? Let those, who imagine it may be done as well in another Language, satisfy themselves either by attempting to translate him, or by perusing his translations already made by men of learning. On the contrary, when we read either *Xenophon* or *Plato*, nothing of this method and strict order appears. The *Formal* and *Didactic* is wholly dropt, Whatever they may teach, it is without professing to be teachers; a train of Dialogue and truly polite Address, in which, as in a Mirrour, we behold human Life, adorned in all its colours of Sentiment and Manners.

AND yet though these differ in this manner from the *Stagirite*, how different are they likewise in character from each other? — *Plato*, copious, figurative,

tive, and majestic; intermixing at times the facetious and satiric; enriching his Works with Tales and Fables, and the mystic Theology of antient times. *Xenophon*, the Pattern of perfect simplicity; every where smooth, harmonious, and pure; declining the figurative, the marvellous, and the mystic; ascending but rarely into the Sublime; nor then so much trusting to the colours of Stile, as to the intrinsic dignity of the Sentiment itself,

THE Language in the mean time, in which *He* and *Plato* wrote, appears to suit so accurately with the Stile of both, that when we read either of the two, we cannot help thinking, that it is he alone, who has hit its character, and that it could not have appeared so elegant in any other manner,

AND thus is THE GREEK TONGUE, from its Propriety and Universality, made
E e 4 for

Ch. V. *for all that is great, and all that is beautiful, in every Subject, and under every Form of writing.*

GRAIIS *ingenium, GRAIIS dedit ore
rotundo
Musa loqui.*

It were to be wished, that those amongst us, who either write or read, with a view to employ their liberal leisure (for as to such, as do either from views more sordid, we leave them, like Slaves, to their destined drudgery) it were to be wished, I say, that the liberal (if they have a relish for letters) would inspect the finished Models of *Grecian Literature*; that they would not waste those hours, which they cannot recall, upon the meaner productions of the *French* and *English* Press; upon that fungous growth of Novels and of Pamphlets, where, it is to be feared, they rarely find any

any rational pleasure, and more rarely Ch. V.
still, any solid improvement.

To be *competently* skilled in antient learning, is by no means a work of such insuperable pains. The very progress it-self is attended with delight, and resem-bles a Journey through some pleasant Country, where every mile we advance, new charms arise. It is certainly as easy to be a Scholar, as a Gamester, or many other Characters equally illiberal and low. The same application, the same quantity of habit will fit us for one, as completely as for the other. And as to those who tell us, with an air of seeming wisdom, that *it is Men, and not Books,* we must study to become knowing; this I have always remarked, from repeated Experi-ence, to be the common consolation and language of Dunces. They shelter their ignorance under a few bright Examples, whose transcendent abilities, without the

common

Ch. V. common helps, have been sufficient of
 themselves to great and important Ends.
 But alas !


Decipit exemplar vitiis imitabile—

IN truth, each man's Understanding, when ripened and mature, is a composite of natural Capacity, and of super-induced Habit. Hence the greatest Men will be necessarily those, who possess the best Capacities, cultivated with the best Habits. Hence also moderate Capacities, when adorned with valuable Science, will far transcend others the most acute by nature, when either neglected, or applied to low and base purposes. And thus for the honour of CULTURE and GOOD LEARNING, they are able to render a man, if he will take the pains, intrinsically more excellent than his natural Superiors.

AND so much at present as to GENERAL IDEAS; *how we acquire them; whence they are derived; what is their Nature; and what their connection with Language.* So much likewise as to the Subject of this Treatise, UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR.


End of the THIRD Book.

A D-



A D V E R T I S E M E N T.

THE following Notes are either Translations of former Notes, or Additions to them. The additional are chiefly Extracts from Greek Manuscripts, which (as the Author has said already concerning others of the same kind) are valuable both for their Rarity, and for their intrinsic Merit.



ADDITIONAL NOTES.

PAG. 95.—TO STOP, &c.] The Quotation from *Proclus* in the Note may be thus rendered—
**THAT THING IS AT REST, which FOR A TIME
 PRIOR AND SUBSEQUENT IS IN THE SAME PLACE;
 both itself, and its Parts.**

P. 105. In the Note, for *γιγνόμενος* read *γένομενος*, and render the passage thus—*For by this faculty (namely the faculty of Sense) we neither know the Future, nor the Past, but the Present only.*

P. 106. NOTE (d).] The passage of *Philoponus* here referred to, but by mistake omitted, has respect to the notion of beings corporeal and sensible, which were said to be nearly approaching to Non-Entitys. The Author explains this among other reasons, by the following—Πῶς δὲ τοῖς μὴ ἔστι γειτνιάζει; Πρῶτον μὲν, ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα τὸ παρελθόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ μέλλον, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ ὄντα· τὸ μὲν γαρ οὐφάνισται καὶ ἐκ ἐτοῖς ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἐπών οὐφάνισται δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ τὰ φύσικα πάντα, μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς κινήσεως ἀντων παρακολύθημά ἐστι δὲ χρόνος. *How therefore is it that they approach nearly to Non-Entitys? In the first place, because HERE (where they exist) exists THE PAST and THE FUTURE, and these are NON-ENTITYS; for the one is vanished, and is no more, the other is not as yet. Now all natural Substances pass away along with TIME, or rather it is upon their Motion that TIME is an Attendant.*

ADDITIONAL NOTES.

P. 119—in the Note here subjoined mention is made of the REAL Now, or INSTANT, and its efficacy. To which we may add, that there is not only a *necessary* Connection between *Existence* and the *Present Instant*, because *no other Point of Time* can properly be said to be, but also between *Existence* and *Life*, because whatever lives, by the same reason necessarily *Is*. Hence *Sophocles*, speaking of *Time present*, elegantly says of it—

—χρόνῳ τῷ ζώῃ, καὶ παρόντι νῦν.

THE LIVING, and Now present TIME;

Trachin. V. 1185.

P. 227.—The Passage in *Virgil*, of which *Servius* here speaks, is a description of *Turnus*'s killing two brothers, *Amicus* and *Diores*; after which the Poet says of him,

—curru abscissa DUORUM

Suspendit capita —————

This, literally translated, is—he hung up on his chariot the heads of Two persons, which were cut off, whereas the Sense requires, of THE Two persons, that is to say, of *Amicus* and *Diores*. Now this by *Amborum* would have been express properly, as *Amborum* means THE Two; by *Duorum* is express improperly, as it means only Two indefinitely.

P. 259.—The Passage in Note (o) from *Themistius*, may be thus rendered—Nature in many instances appears to make her transition by little and little, so that in some Beings it may be doubted, whether they are Animal, or Vegetable.

P. 294.

P. 294. Note (c)—*There are in the number of things many, which have a most known EXISTENCE, but a most unknown ESSENCE; such for example as Motion, Place, and more than either of them, Time. The EXISTENCE of each of these is known and indisputable, but what their ESSENCE is, or Nature, is among the most difficult things to discern. The Soul also is in the same Class: that it is something, is most evident; but what it is, is a matter not so easy to learn.* Alex. Aphrod. p. 142.

P. 340.—**LANGUAGE—INCAPABLE OF COMMUNICATING DEMONSTRATION.]** See Three Treatises, or Vol. I. p. 220, and the additional note on the words, *The Source of infinite Truths, &c.*

P. 368.—in the Note—*yet so bold the Philosopher of Malmesbury, and the Author of the Essay, &c.]*

Philoponus, from the Philosophy of *Plato* and *Pythagoras*, seems to have far excelled these *Moderns* in his account of **WISDOM** or **PHILOSOPHY**, and its *Attributes*, or *essential Characters*.—*Ιδίον γὰρ φιλοσοφίας τὸ ἐν τοῖς τολλοῖς ἔχει τὸ διαφορὰν δεῖξαι τὴν κοινωνίαν, οὐ τὸ ἐν τοῖς τολλοῖς ἔχει τὴν κοινωνίαν δεῖξαι τὸν διαφέρειν· εἰ γὰρ δυσχερέστερον τὸ δεῖξαι φάτνης (lege φάτης) καὶ τεριστρᾶς κοινωνίαν (τωντὸ γὰρ τρεπτῶν), ἀλλ' εἰ (lege ὅπερ) τὸ διαφορὸν τέτταν ἐπεῖν· εἰδὲ κυνὸς καὶ ἵππες διαφορὰν, ἀλλὰ τί κοινὸν ἔχεσσιν.* **IT IS THE PROPER BUSINESS OF PHILOSOPHY TO SHEW IN MANY THINGS, WHICH HAVE DIFFERENCE, WHAT IS THEIR COMMON CHARACTER; and IN MANY THINGS, WHICH HAVE A COMMON CHARACTER, THRO' WHAT IT IS THEY DIFFER.**

ADDITIONAL NOTES.

is indeed no difficult matter to shew the common Character of a Wood-Pigeon and a Dove (for this is evident to every one), but rather to tell where lies the Difference; nor to tell the Difference between a Dog and a Horse, but rather to shew, what they possess in common. Philop. Com. MS. in Nicomach. Arithm.

P. 379.—THEY ARE MORE EXQUISITE THAN, &c.] The Words of Aristotle, here referred to, are these—μᾶλλον δ' ἐσι τὸ οὐεκα καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐν τοῖς τῆς φύσεως ἔργοις, οὐ ἐν τοῖς τῆς τεχνῆς. THE PRINCIPLES OF DESIGN and BEAUTY are more in the Works of NATURE, than they are in those of ART.

P. 379.—WE MUST OF NECESSITY ADMIT A MIND, &c.] The following quotation, taken from the third Book of a manuscript *Comment of Proclus on the Parmenides of Plato*, is here given for the sake of those, who have curiosity with regard to the doctrine of IDEAS, as held by antient Philosophers.

Εἰ δὲ δεῖ συντόμως ἐιπεῖν τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς τῶν ἴδεῶν ὑποθέσεως, δι' οὐ ἔκείνοις ἡρεσε, ῥητέον ὅτι ταῦτα τάντα ὅσα ὄφατά, ἐράνια καὶ ὑπὸ σελήνην, οὐ ἀπὸ ταῦλομάτε ἐσὶν, οὐ κατ' αἰτίαν ἀλλ' ἀπὸ ταῦλομάτε ἀδύνατον. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὑσέροις τὰ κρείτιονα, νῦν, καὶ λόγος, καὶ αἰτία, καὶ τὰ αἰτίας, καὶ ὅτι τὰ ἀποτελέσματα κρείτιον τῶν ἀρχῶν, τρόπος τῷ καὶ ὁ φοσιν ὁ Ἀριστότελος δεῖ τρόπον κατὰ συμβεβηκός αἰτίων εἶναι τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ, τέτων γὰρ ἔκβασις τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ὥσε τε ἀπὸ ταῦλομάτε τρεσσύτερον ἀν οὐ τὸ κατ' αἰτίαν, εἰ καὶ ἀπὸ ταῦλομάτε τὰ Θειότατα οὐ τῶν φανερῶν. If there-

therefore we are to relate concisely the Cause, why THE HYPOTHESIS OF IDEAS pleased them (namely Parmenides, Zeno, Socrates, &c.) we must begin by observing that all the various visible objects around us, the heavenly as well as the sublunary, are either from CHANCE, or according to a CAUSE. FROM CHANCE IS IMPOSSIBLE; for then the more excellent things (such as Mind, and Reason, and Cause, and the Effects of Cause) will be among those things that come last, and so the ENDINGS of things will be more excellent than their BEGINNINGS. To which too may be added what Aristotle says; that ESSENTIAL CAUSES OUGHT TO BE PRIOR TO ACCIDENTAL, in as much as EVERY ACCIDENTAL CAUSE IS A DEVIATION FROM THEM; so that whatever is the Effect of such essential Cause [as is indeed every work of Art and human Ingenuity] must needs be prior to that which is the Effect of Chance, even tho' we were to refer to Chance the most divine of visible objects [the Heavens themselves].

The Philosopher, having thus proved a *definite Cause* of the World in opposition to *Chance*, proceeds to shew that from the Unity and concurrent Order of things this Cause must be ONE. After which he goes on, as follows.—

—Ἐι μὲν ἐν ἀλόγον τέτο, ἀτοπον. ἔγει γάρ τι πάλιν τῶν ὑγέρων τῆς τάτων αἰτίας κρείτιον, τὸ κατὰ λέγον καὶ γυνώσιν τοιεῖν, οἷσιν τὸ Παντὸς δν, καὶ τὸ "Ολε μέρος, διὸ τὸν αἰτίας ἀλόγον τοιεῖτο. Ἐι δὲ λέγον ἔχον, καὶ ἀυτὸ γινώσκον, οἵδειν ἐαυτὸ δίπτε τῶν πάντων αἰτίων δν, ή τέτο αἰγνοῦν, αἰγνούσει τὴν ἐαυτῆ φύσιν. Ἐι δὲ οἴδειν, διτε κατ' ἕστιαν ἵστι τὸ πάντος αἰτίου, τὸ

ADDITIONAL NOTES.

ἢ ὡρισμένως εἰδὸς θάτερον, καὶ θάτερον δίδει εἴκεντά-
κης, δίδειν ἄρα καὶ ἐξιν αἰτιον ὡρισμένως· δίδειν ἐν καὶ
τὸ Πᾶν, καὶ τάντα εἴκεντάν τὸ Πᾶν, ὃν ἐσιν καὶ αἰτιον.
Καὶ εἰ τέτο, ἥτοι εἰς ἐαυτὸν ἄρα βλέπον, καὶ ἐαυτὸν γι-
νώσκον, δίδει τὰ μετ' αὐτόν. Λόγοις ἄρα καὶ ἐιδεσιν αὐ-
λοις δίδει τὰς Κοσμικὰς Λόγιες, καὶ τὰ εἴδη, εἴκεντάν τὸ
Πᾶν, καὶ ἐσιν ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ Πᾶν, ὡς ἐν αἰτιῷ, χωρὶς τῆς
ὑλῆς. — Now IF THIS CAUSE BE VOID OF REA-
SON, that indeed would be absurd; for then again there
would be something among those things, which came last
in order, more excellent than their Principle or Cause. I
mean by more excellent, something operating according to
Reason and Knowledge, and yet within that Universe, and
a Part of that Whole, which is, what it is, from a Cause
devoid of Reason.

But if, on the contrary, THE CAUSE OF THE UNI-
VERSE BE A CAUSE, HAVING REASON and know-
ing itself, it of course knows itself to be the Cause of all
things; else, being ignorant of this, it would be ignorant
of its own nature. But if it know, that from ITS VERY
ESSENCE IT IS THE CAUSE OF THE UNIVERSE,
and if that, which knows one part of a Relation definite-
ly, knows also of necessity the other, it knows for this rea-
son definitely the thing of which it is the Cause. IT
KNOWS THEREFORE THE UNIVERSE, and all things
out of which the Universe is composed, of all which also
it is the Cause. But if this be true, it is evident that
BY LOOKING INTO ITSELF, AND BY KNOWING
ITSELF, IT KNOWS WHAT COMES AFTER IT-
SELF, AND IS SUBSEQUENT. It is, therefore, through
certain REASONS and FORMS DEVOID OF MATTER
that

that it knows those mundane Reasons and Forms, out of which the Universe is composed, and that the Universe is in it, as in a Cause distinct from and without the Matter.

P. 380—AGREEABLE TO WHICH IDEAS THESE WORKS ARE FASHIONED, &c.] It is upon these Principles that Nicomachus in his *Arithmetic*, p. 7. calls the Supreme Being an *Artist*—*ἐν τῇ τῇ τεχνίτῃ Θεῷ διανοίᾳ, in Dei artificis mente.* Where Philoponus, in his *manuscript Comment*, observes as follows —*τεχνίτην φοιτὶ τὸν Θεὸν, ὃς τάντιν τὰς ἀρώτας αἰτίας καὶ τὰς λόγους αὐτῶν ἔχοιται.* He calls GOD an ARTIST, as possessing within himself the first Causes of all things, and their Reasons or Proportions. Soon after speaking of those Sketches, after which Painters work and finish their Pictures, he subjoins —*ἄσπερ οὐ ημεῖς, εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα σκιαγραφήματα βλέποιτε, τοιοῦτον τὸ δέ τι, οὐτω καὶ ὁ δημιουργός, ἀρδεῖ ἐκεῖνα ἀπο-ελέπων, τὰ τῆδε τάντα κεκόσμηκεν ἀλλ' ισέον, ὅτι τὰ μὲν τῷδε σκιαγραφήματα ἀτελῆ εἰσιν, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ οἱ ἐν τῷ Θεῷ λόγοι ἀρχέτυποι καὶ ταντέλειοι εἰσιν.* As therefore we, looking upon such Sketches as these, make such and such particular things, so also the Creator, looking at those Sketches of his, hath formed and adorned with beauty all things here below. We must remember, however, that the Sketches here are imperfect; but that the others, those REASONS or Proportions, which exist in GOD, are ARCHETYPAL and ALL-PERFECT.

It is according to this Philosophy, that *Milton* represents God, after he had created this visible World, contemplating

— — — — — *how it shew'd.*
In prospect from his throne, how good, how fair,
 ANSW'RING HIS GREAT IDEA — — — — —

P. Loft, VII. 556.

Proclus proves the Existence of these GENERAL IDEAS or UNIVERSAL FORMS by the following Arguments. — — *εἰ τοίνυν ἐσὶν ἀιτία τῷ παντὸς ἀντῷ τῷ* ξίναι τοιχσα, *τὸ δὲ ἀντῷ τῷ ξίναι τοιχν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐμυτῆς τοιεῖς ἀσίας τέτο ἐσὶ πρώτως, ὅπερ τὸ τοιεύμενον δευτέρως καὶ ὁ ἐσὶ πρώτως, δίδωσι τῷ τοιεύμενῳ δευτέρως· οἷον τὸ πῦρ καὶ δίδωσι Θερμότητα ἄλλω, καὶ ἐσὶ Θερμὸν, καὶ ψυχὴ δίδωσι ζωὴν, καὶ ἔχει ζωὴν, καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων ἴδοις ἀνὰ ἀληθῆ τὸν λόγον, ὅσπερ ἀντῷ τῷ ξίναι τοιεῖ. καὶ τὸ ἀιτίου ἐν τῷ παντὸς ἀντῷ τῷ ξίναι τοιχν τέτο ἐσὶ πρώτως, ὅπερ ὁ κόσμος δευτέρως. εἰ δὴ ὁ κόσμος πλάνηρμα ἐιδὼν ἐσὶ παντοίων, μηδὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀιτίῳ τῷ κόσμῳ ταῦτα πρώτως· τὸ γαρ ἀντὸ ἀιτίου καὶ πλιον, καὶ σελήνην, καὶ ἀνθρώπουν ὑπέγησε, καὶ ἵππον, καὶ ὄλων τὰ ἐιδη, τὰ ἐν τῷ παντί. ταῦτα ἀρα πρώτως ἐσὶν ἐν τῷ ἀιτίᾳ τῷ παντὸς, ἄλλος πλιον παρὰ τὸν ἴμφατην, καὶ ἄλλος ἀνθρώπος, καὶ τῶν ἐιδῶν ὄμοιώς ἔχασον. ἐγιν ἀρα τὰ ἐιδη πρὸ τῶν ἀισθητῶν, καὶ ἀιτίαι ἀντῶν τὰ δημιουργικὰ κατὰ τὸν ἐιρημένον λόγον, ἐν τῷ μιᾷ τῷ κόσμῳ παντὸς ἀιτίᾳ προύπαρχοντα. *If therefore THE CAUSE OF THE UNIVERSE be a Cause which operates merely by existing, and if that which operates merely by existing operate from its own proper Essence, such CAUSE IS PRIMARILY, WHAT ITS EFFECT IS SECONDARILY, and that, which it is primarily, it giveth to its Effect secondarily. It is thus that Fire both giveth Warmth**

to something else, and is itself warm; that the Soul giveth Life, and possesseth Life: and this reasoning you may perceive to be true in all things whatever, which operate merely by existing. It follows therefore, THAT THE CAUSE OF THE UNIVERSE, operating after this manner, IS THAT PRIMARILY, WHICH THE WORLD IS SECONDARILY. If therefore the WORLD be the plenitude of Forms of all Sorts, these FORMS MUST ALSO BE PRIMARILY IN THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD; for it was the same Cause, which constituted the Sun, and the Moon, and Man, and Horse, and in general all the Forms existing in the Universe. These therefore exist primarily in the Cause of the Universe; another Sun besides the apparent, another Man, and so with respect to every Form else. The FORMS therefore, PREVIOUS to the sensible and external Forms, and which according to this reasoning are their ACTIVE and EFFICIENT CAUSES, are to be found PRE-EXISTING IN THAT ONE AND COMMON CAUSE OF ALL THE UNIVERSE.

Procli Com. MS. in Plat. Parmenid. L. 3.

We have quoted the above passages for the same reason as the former; for the sake of those, who may have a curiosity to see a sample of this *antient Philosophy*, which (as some have held) may be traced up from *Plato* and *Socrates* to *Parmenides*, *Pythagoras*, and *Orpheus* himself.

If the Phrase, *to operate merely by existing*, should appear questionable, it must be explained upon a supposition, that in the Supreme Being no Attributes are secondary, intermittent, or adventitious, but all original, ever perfect and essential. See p. 162, 359.

That we should not therefore think of a *blind unconscious* operation, like that of Fire here alluded to, the Author had long before prepared us, by *uniting Knowledge with natural Efficacy*, where he forms the Character of these *Divine and Creative Ideas*.

But let us hear him in his own Language.—ἀλλ' ἐισερχόμεν τὴν ιδιότητα αὐτῶν (sc. Ιδεῶν) ἀφορίσασθαι διὰ τῶν γνωριμωτέρων, ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν φυσικῶν λόγων λάβωμεν τὸ αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι τοιητικὸν, ὃν δὴ καὶ τοιεῖσθαι ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνικῶν τὸ γνωστικὸν, ὃν τοιεῖσθαι, εἰς καὶ μὴ αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι τοιεῖσθαι, καὶ ταῦτα ἐνώσαντες φύμεν αἰτίας εἶναι τὰς Ιδέας δημιουργικὰς. ἀμαὶ καὶ νοερὰς τῶντων τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἀποτελεμένων. But if we should chuse to define the peculiar character of IDEAS by things more known to us than themselves, let us assume, from NATURAL PRINCIPLES THE POWER OF EFFECTING, MERELY BY EXISTING, all the things that they effect; and from ARTIFICIAL PRINCIPLES THE POWER OF COMPREHENDING all that they effect, although they did not effect them merely by existing; and then uniting those two, let us say that IDEAS are at once the EFFICIENT and INTELLIGENT CAUSES of all things produced according to Nature. From book the second of the same Comment.

The Schoolman, *Thomas Aquinas*, a subtle and acute writer, has the following sentence, perfectly corresponding with this Philosophy. *Res omnes comparantur ad Divinum Intellectum, sicut artificata ad Artem.*

The Verses of *Orpheus* on this subject may be found in the tract *De Mundo*, ascribed to *Aristotle*, p. 23. *Edit. Sylburg.*

Ζεῦς ἄρσην γένετο, Ζεῦς κ. τ. λ.

P. 391—WHERE ALL THINGS LIE INVELOPED,
[&c.]

—ὅσα τέρις ΤΑ ΠΟΛΛΑ κατὰ δῆ τινα με-
ρισμὸν, τοσαῦτα καὶ ΤΟ ΕΝ ἐκεῖνο τῷ μερισμῷ
κατὰ τὸ τάντη ἀμερές· καὶ γὰρ ἐν, ὡς ἐλαχίσον, κα-
θάπερ ὁ Σπεύσιππος ἔδοξε λέγειν, ἀλλ' ΕΝ, ΩΣ
ΠΑΝΤΑ. *As numerous as is THE MULTITUDE OF INDIVIDUALS by Partition, so numerous also is that PRINCIPLE OF UNITY by universal Impartibility. For it is not ONE, as a MINIMUM is one (according to what Speucippus seemed to say), but it is ONE, as being ALL THINGS.* Damascius *ωρὶ Αρχῶν*, MS.

P. 408—THE WISEST NATIONS—THE MOST COPIOUS LANGUAGES.] It is well observed by *Muretus* —*Nulli unquam, qui res ignorant, nomina, quibus eas exprimerent, quæsierunt.* Var. Lect. VI. 1.

P. 411.—BUT WHAT WAS THEIR PHILOSOPHY?] The same *Muretus* has the following passage upon the ROMAN TASTE FOR PHILOSOPHY.—*Beati autem illi, et opulenti, et omnium gentium victores ROMANI, in petendis honoribus, et in prensandis civibus, et in exteris nationibus verbo componendis, re compilandis occupati, philosophandi curam servis aut libertis suis, et Græculis esurientibus, relinquebant. Ipsi, quod ab avari-*
tia,

ADDITIONAL NOTES.

*tia, quod ab ambitione, quod a voluptatibus reliquum erat
temporis, ejus si partem aliquam aut ad audiendum Gra-
cum quempiam philosophum, aut ad aliquem de philosophia
libellum vel legendum vel scribendum contulissent, jam se ad
eruditionis culmen pervenisse, jam vietiam a se et profliga-
tam jacere Graeciam somniabant.* Var. Lect. VI. 1.

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